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introDuction
The great leap in knowledge of human genetics over the last two decades has had major impact 
on human assisted reproductive technology (ART)1 that consequently has attracted special 
regulatory controls throughout the world.2  Genetic science and ART have intersected and 
given rise to the term ‘reprogenetic’.3  The extensive scope for medical4 benefits as a result 
of emerging reprogenetic technologies, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), is 
compelling.  Prospects raised by the myriad possibilities of reprogenetics explain why many 
societies and governments perceive a need for special controls, and provide impetus for 
jurisdictions to determine their respective legal and policy positions.  The provision of ART 
in the human health context is distinctive from the provision of many other medical services 
which do not have specific and extensive regulatory frameworks surrounding their provision.5 
PGD is a technique used in ART and provides huge potential for medical benefit but, given the 
possibility of indiscriminate implementation, has been seen to require limitation. 
This chapter of the report is in two parts.  The first part describes and analyses the New Zealand 
framework for regulating PGD and focuses on the Guidelines on Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis which was developed by the National Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive 
Technology and the recently enacted Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004.  In 
addition, medico-legal obligations imposed on providers in New Zealand which are relevant in 
the assisted reproductive technology (ART) context will be discussed.  This part also provides 
an in-depth analysis of the approach of the United Kingdom to regulating PGD, followed by a 
description of the United States regulatory position which provides a comparison to the other 
regimes that have adopted facilitative approaches.
The second part provides comparative analyses of how PGD is regulated in New Zealand, 
the state of Victoria and the UK – these are countries which have taken a broadly similar 
facilitative approach by opting for the adoption of legislative frameworks that delegate a range 
of decision-making powers to statutory bodies
Part a:  regulatory MoDels
1  new ZealanD
The legislative model which permits the use of PGD in New Zealand may best be described as 
a skeleton framework.  While the parameters regulating the use, manipulation and storage of 
embryos are found in the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act (the HART Act) 2004, 
no specific provisions exist in regard to PGD, apart from a prohibition on the use of PGD for 
non-medical sex selection.  However, the Act delegates a policy-making role to an Advisory 
Committee and creates an Ethics Committee which is responsible for approving applications 
in accordance with policy made by the Advisory Committee for procedures which include 
PGD.  The Act also provides a mechanism by which certain procedures may be declared to 
be ‘established procedures’ on the basis of the Advisory Committee’s recommendation.  Once 
an assisted reproductive procedure is declared to be an ‘established procedure’ by Order 
in Council, the procedure ceases to be a regulated procedure and does not require Ethics 
Committee approval pursuant to the Act. PGD in restricted circumstances has recently been 
declared to be an established procedure.6  
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Prior to the enactment of the HART Act, the Minister of Health requested the National Ethics 
Committee on Assisted Human Reproduction (NECAHR) to promulgate guidelines for the 
safe and ethical use of PGD.  A period of research and public consultation ensued.  These 
Guidelines have since been designated as interim Advisory Committee Guidelines under the 
interim provisions provided in the HART Act 2004.  The Guidelines specify what applications 
of PGD may be carried out with the approval of the Ethics Committee, specify further 
prohibited applications of PGD, and also set out information and counselling requirements 
for providers.7  
Consequently, PGD in New Zealand is regulated under the HART Act, by the Order in Council 
which lists the categories of PGD that are established procedures, and by the interim Guidelines. 
Whilst the Guidelines remain effective for the next three years, the Advisory Committee will 
assume responsibility for their revision before the interim period expires.8   
The following provides an analysis of the development of law in relation to ART and PGD 
in New Zealand.  The Guidelines on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, which provide an 
essential backdrop to the New Zealand policy on PGD under the HART Act 2004, will be 
discussed first and then followed by the HART Act 2004.  The underlying philosophy of the 
Act, an overview of the substantive provisions of the Act in relation to PGD, the obligations 
placed on PGD providers and the implications of the regulatory framework for New Zealand 
will be examined.
1.1  tHe necaHr guiDelines 
In June 2003 (more than a year before the enactment of the HART Act 2004), the Minister 
of Heath approved in principle the provision of PGD services in New Zealand, subject to 
NECAHR developing guidelines for the safe and ethical use of the procedure.  NECAHR 
commissioned the Cochrane Menstrual Disorders and Subfertility Group for the New Zealand 
Guidelines Group which produced the report “A Systematic Review of the Quantifiable Harms 
and Benefits of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis” to provide clinical evidence base for the 
draft guidelines.9  
The reviewers in that report concluded:
PGD is a promising approach but it is important not to overstate its potential.  There is 
no reliable evidence as yet that it improves reproductive outcomes, even though diagnostic 
process itself appears to be reliable with low risk of error.  Moreover there is a wide range of 
hereditary abnormalities and PGD currently applies to a relatively small number of them.  
There is currently insufficient evidence to support the use of PGD for aneuploidy screening 
except in the context of a controlled study.  Only long-term ongoing follow up of children 
born after PGD can provide data on its safety and effectiveness as new clinical protocols 
emerge and new technologies are developed.10
The reviewers suggested several modifications to the proposed Guidelines.  These included that 
PGD for familial single gene disorders, sex linked disorders and familial chromosomal disorders 
should only be permissible when there was a ‘high risk of severe abnormality’.  A definition 
of what constituted “severe” was included.  It was defined as: where the disorder is lethal in 
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childhood or early adulthood; or where physical abnormalities are likely to result in painful 
disability without options for effective treatment; or where developmental abnormalities are 
likely to result in a child/adult unable to function independently and participate in normal life. 
It was also recommended that aneuploidy screening should only be permitted in the context of 
a controlled research protocol. These proposed modifications were not adopted by NECAHR 
in the approved Guidelines.
The proposed guidelines for PGD formulated by NECAHR were disseminated in October 
2004 (and, as it turned out, the month before Parliament passed the HART Act) to fertility 
clinics, District Health Boards, professional organisations, consumer groups, government 
agencies and interested individuals for public consultation.  Public meetings throughout the 
country were also held in order to hear oral submissions.  
The revised guidelines were approved by the Minister of Health and released in March 2005. 
The Guidelines on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis11 reflect significant change from those 
proposed in the draft document, both in terminology and with regard to when PGD may be 
performed, and in some procedural requirements.12 
With the enactment of the HART Act, references to NECAHR should now be read as referring 
to the newly established Advisory Committee or Ethics Committee where appropriate.
The approved Guidelines contain five sections. For ease of reference, a copy of the Guidelines 
is attached in Appendix 2 of this section of the report.  The first category covers clinical 
applications of PGD which may be carried out without NECAHR approval, and which have 
since been declared to be established procedures. These applications of PGD may now be 
carried out as a matter of course in New Zealand. The second involves PGD with HLA tissue 
typing, which now constitutes a regulated activity under the Act, requiring prior ethical 
approval before it can be carried out.   The third section sets out the prohibited uses of PGD 
under the Guidelines, whilst the fourth deals with information and counselling requirements. 
The last section sets out the procedural obligations for the providers of PGD services.
1.1.1  section 1:  uses oF PgD not requiring necaHr aPProval – now    
 estaBlisHeD ProceDures
Section 1 of the Guidelines sets out the criteria for permissible PGD in the case of familial 
single gene disorders, for sex determination in prescribed circumstances of familial sex-linked 
disorders, and for familial chromosomal disorders. PGD is also permitted in this category 
for aneuploidy screening in the case of non-familial chromosomal disorders associated with 
advanced reproductive age or infertility.
The Guidelines provide that PGD may be performed where familial single gene disorders 
have been identified in the family or whanau and there is a 25% or greater risk of an affected 
pregnancy.  The same criteria are applied to performing PGD for sex determination where 
familial sex-linked disorders have been identified in the family/whanau but no specific test for 
the particular mutation that causes the disorder is available. The restriction that there must 
be no specific test available for the particular sex linked disorder prevents the occurrence of 
sex-selection where a familial sex-linked disorder exists but it is possible to reliably test for the 
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mutation.13  If this requirement did not exist, sex selection could occur which would involve 
systematically discarding male embryos, although 50% of the embryos would be unaffected. 
In the case of familial chromosomal disorders, the disorder must have been identified in the 
family/whanau.   However, it is the last criterion set down in the Guidelines for each of these 
three categories of familial disorders that requires mention. 
The final criterion for permissible PGD in these categories is that there is ‘evidence that the 
future individual may be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder’.  In contrast, the proposed 
Guidelines sought to authorise PGD when there was ‘a high risk of serious abnormality’.14 
Whether ‘serious abnormality’ and ‘serious impairment’ differ in a real sense is debatable, but 
the change is likely to reflect a move to more disability-sensitive language.  There is no longer 
any reference to a ‘high risk’, but mere evidence of potentially serious impairment will suffice. 
This would indicate that the threshold for permissible PGD without NECAHR approval has 
been significantly reduced. 
Another notable change in the approved Guidelines in these clinical categories is the omission 
of the requirement that ‘the option of prenatal testing alone is unacceptable to the couple’. 
The implication of the proposed provision was that prenatal testing was to be considered as 
a first option, and only when it was an unacceptable primary clinical course of action for the 
proposed parent(s) should PGD be considered.  Under the approved Guidelines, there is no 
such limitation.
The restrictions on the use of PGD for familial chromosomal disorders and screening for 
aneuploidy have been significantly loosened in the approved Guidelines.  It had been originally 
proposed that approval for PGD for familial chromosomal disorders must be sought from 
NECAHR.  Each application would then be considered on a case-by-case basis.  PGD in these 
circumstances could only be carried out where there was a high risk of serious abnormality 
and the option of prenatal testing alone was unacceptable.  The approved Guidelines no longer 
require such approval to be sought, and permit PGD where the disorder has been identified in 
the family/whanau and there is evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired 
as a result of the disorder.
Similarly, it had been proposed that PGD for aneuploidy screening required NECAHR 
approval on a case-by-case basis.  The approved Guidelines authorise PGD for non-familial 
chromosomal disorders (aneuploidy testing) where the woman is of advanced reproductive 
age or has had recurrent implantation failure or recurrent miscarriage.15  
The Guidelines do not provide a definition of serious impairment.  Rather, they provide that ‘it 
is the responsibility of PGD providers, in collaboration with a clinical geneticist, to determine 
whether a disorder is likely to be serious in the offspring’.  
On the face of it, the professionals have a broad mandate to determine what constitutes a 
disorder that could cause serious impairment in a future child, and the likelihood of that 
happening.16  The fact that clinicians determine the likelihood of a disorder manifesting in 
prospective offspring is generally unproblematic, but determining what constitutes a serious 
disorder is less straightforward.  Objective and subjective factors may influence whether a 
condition is perceived as serious or not.  Considerations such as the likelihood of the disease 
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manifesting in the offspring and the age at which it may present, and the possibilities of 
prevention and therapy are objective considerations.   Subjective considerations encompass the 
experience of the prospective parents in relation to the condition.17  It could be claimed that 
by leaving such decisions in the hands of the treating clinicians, rather than in those seeking 
the procedure, PGD cannot be represented as providing greater autonomy and reproductive 
freedom.18  
An alternative proposition supporting clinicians deciding whether a disorder is likely to be 
serious is that it is possible that consumers may attempt to compel a provider to perform 
PGD for a monogenic or chromosomal disorder that has relatively little impact on the future 
individual.19   However it is likely, and desirable, that in clinical practice these decisions will 
be made in collaboration with the intending parents.  A related issue concerns the extent to 
which a physician has an obligation to perform PGD in cases he or she considers morally 
questionable.20
There are major implications in changing the wording from a ‘high risk of serious abnormality’ 
to ‘evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired’ in relation to single gene 
disorders. The group of genetic disorders which may be brought within the category of single 
gene disorders which may cause serious impairment is extremely wide.  It could be, and is likely 
to be, interpreted by providers as including late onset susceptibility disorders.  A late onset 
susceptibility disorder is still a single gene disorder, but is a single gene disorder with reduced 
penetrance.  Such disorders may be tested for without recourse to the ethics committee in 
New Zealand.
An example of a late onset, lower penetrance disorder is the BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 mutation. 
Carriers of the mutation have a 60-90% risk of developing cancer of the breast or ovary 
compared with a 10% risk in the general population.  There is, however, no certainty of 
developing cancer - only a risk.  A carrier of the mutation may never in fact develop cancer, or 
even if they do, may live several decades before the first symptoms of disease appear.  However, 
it is doubtful that new therapeutic developments will be available for the next generation of 
BRCA mutation carriers that could significantly improve prevention, morbidity and mortality 
from BRCA-related forms of cancer.21 
PGD for BRCA mutation has not yet been licensed in the UK.  Researchers are soliciting the 
opinions of women carrying the mutation in regard to the effect their carrier status has on 
reproductive choices, and whether they would consider PGD if it was available.22   The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) recently announced that it has been carrying 
out a scientific review on disorders where the genetic conditions were not fully penetrant. 
This includes conditions such as inherited breast cancer or inherited ovarian cancer, and 
hereditary non polyposis colon cancer.  The views of the public are currently being sought on 
the appropriateness of offering PGD to screen out such disorders.23  
At the end of 2004, the HFEA evoked sharp criticism from some groups when it agreed to 
licence a clinic to test embryos for familial adenomatous polyposis coli, a genetically inherited 
form of colon cancer which manifests in childhood or adolescence.  It was alleged that the 
HFEA was making decisions behind ‘closed doors’.24  This type of criticism is significant, 
as there is no requirement in the HFE Act that the HFEA carry out consultation prior to 
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determining licensable activities.25   Yet, there seems to be an implicit assumption on the part 
of both interest groups and Ministers of Parliament that policy decisions extending the use of 
PGD must occur in line with public input.26
The provision of PGD for all of the late onset, lower penetrance conditions mentioned above 
may be carried out as a matter of course in New Zealand as an established procedure. The 
Guidelines require that the single gene disorder must have been identified in the family/
whänau; that there is a 25% or greater risk of an affected pregnancy; and simply that there is 
evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder. 
It is doubtful that NECAHR, when formulating the Guidelines, intended this as a consequence 
of the wording change.  Rather, their intention was to make the threshold lower as it was often 
difficult for clinicians to predict whether there was a high risk of serious disorder when a 
disorder could be mild or severe depending on the expressivity of the mutation in question.27 
The decision to provide PGD is essentially left up to the clinician involved.  In this respect, 
the provision of PGD in New Zealand for single gene disorders where there is evidence that it 
may cause serious impairment in the ‘future individual’ (not ‘child’) is very broad.  This has 
occurred, not only without public consultation and debate on the issue, but, in all likelihood, 
without advertence to the implications of the wording change in practice.
1.1.2  section 2:  uses oF PgD requiring necaHr aPProval – now   
 regulateD By tHe aDvisory coMMittee anD etHics coMMittee
As mentioned above, the NECAHR Guidelines now constitute Guidelines promulgated by the 
Advisory Committee (i.e. ACART).  In the context here, any reference to NECAHR should be 
read as referring to the Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ECART), 
established under the HART Act 2004, which has the function of reviewing of applications. 
The Guidelines require that proposed PGD for HLA tissue typing must be submitted to 
NECAHR for ethics approval on a case-by-case basis.  However, the wording of the approved 
Guidelines differs in two potentially important respects from that in the proposed document. 
The Guidelines set out criteria in relation to both the live child who would be the recipient of 
tissue donation and to the embryo.  In regard to the affected child, it remains a requirement 
that the disease suffered must be a single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked disorder, and 
the planned treatment for the affected child will only utilise the cord blood of the future 
sibling.  In addition, the approved Guidelines require that ‘no other possibilities for treatment 
or sources of tissue are available’.  This could be a more stringent requirement than that of the 
proposed guidelines which required only that ‘all other possibilities for treatment and sources 
of tissue for the affected child have been explored’.  However, in practical  terms the distinction 
may only be superficial.
It is the restrictions relating to the embryo that potentially extend the scope of permissible 
PGD in relation to HLA tissue typing.  Whilst it remains a requirement that the embryo will be 
a sibling of the affected child, it is no longer a requirement that the embryo be ‘at risk of being 
affected by the condition affecting the existing child’, but that it is at risk of being affected by a 
‘familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked disorder for which a PGD test is available’. 
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While this may extend the scope to a small extent, the normative framework which permits 
PGD with HLA tissue-typing requires that there are therapeutic indications for the embryo to 
justify embryo biopsy.  This departs from the approach of the United Kingdom. 
There is a major anomaly apparent in the HLA tissue typing Guidelines.  The Ethics Committee 
may not approve HLA tissue typing for a sibling in need of stem cells unless the sick sibling 
is suffering from a genetic disorder. This is so even when performing PGD as an established 
procedure to diagnose a familial single gene, chromosomal or sex linked disorder in the 
embryo is clinically indicated, and the HLA tissue typing is merely an additional procedure. 
However, in the case of an affected child who is suffering from a genetic condition, which 
the prospective embryos are not at risk of inheriting, HLA tissue typing may be performed 
regardless of whether the embryo is at risk of inheriting the same condition as the sick sibling, 
because HLA tissue typing is an ‘add on’ and not the primary reason for the tissue typing.
It is unlikely that this anomaly is intended.  Reportedly, NECAHR had intended to permit 
HLA testing to be carried out as an ‘add on’ when the potential embryo was at risk from a 
genetic condition for which a test was available.28  The intention was to permit HLA tissue 
typing as long as there was a medical indication to justify performing an embryo biopsy.  This 
anomaly could be easily rectified by simply requiring that the affected child be suffering from 
a condition which is severe or life-threatening.
In summary, the New Zealand guidelines prohibit PGD for third party benefit in the absence 
of a risk to the embryo of a genetic disorder for which there is a test available.  Although 
the normative framework is permissive, at this point it only permits therapeutic applications 
of PGD.  
A compelling argument has been made that performing PGD to HLA tissue type an embryo 
could be more easily ethically justified than simply performing PGD to test for the presence of 
genetic conditions.29  This argument is necessarily based on the premise that embryo biopsy in 
the course of PGD does not expose the embryo to significant harm.  It follows that as PGD is 
not in itself a cure, but simply a selection procedure; the embryo is selected because of genetic 
characteristics it already had.  Hence, the benefit in terms of ‘best interests’ for a particular 
child born from PGD in this context is its existence, rather than a genetic disorder free state. 
Without PGD, the chances are that the particular child would not have been born. In this way, 
PGD does not benefit the child in the sense that it prevents the child from having a serious 
disease, although the parents benefit significantly from having a healthy child rather than a 
child suffering from a genetic disorder.  In the case of HLA tissue typing, PGD is carried out 
for a purpose that clearly affects another person; namely, the sick sibling.  
In comparison, PGD to select against genetic disease is carried out for reasons other than those 
which affect another person; namely, simply to create a person without a genetic disease rather 
than to cure a person with a genetic disorder.  The point made here is that in the context of 
PGD for tissue typing, there is an extra person in the equation who benefits from the procedure 
apart from the parents, and that is the sick sibling.30  It is notable that the HFEA in the UK 
now permits PGD to tissue type for sick siblings as a stand-alone procedure when there is no 
heritable genetic risk to the embryo.
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It is a mandatory requirement under the approved guidelines that the Ethics Committee fully 
considers the health and wellbeing of the family/whanau when it receives an application for 
approval to perform HLA tissue typing.  
1.1.3  section 3:  ProHiBiteD uses oF PgD
The approved Guidelines prohibit PGD for social or non-medical reasons.  Altering the genetic 
constitution of an embryo is also prohibited, although it should be noted that the HART Act 
2004 does not go that far.31   PGD is prohibited under the Guidelines for any reasons other than 
those specified in sections one and two above.  
Selection of an embryo with a genetic impairment seen in a parent is not permitted.  Hence deaf 
parents may not choose to select an embryo that carries the genetic mutation that encodes for 
deafness.   In some quarters, this has been described as ‘decisional asymmetry’, where medical 
selection may only be used when it prevents the disorder, rather than selects for it.32  The 
argument raised by people who are themselves deaf and who wish to raise a deaf child is that 
deafness may be life-enhancing.  Being deaf may provide a person with a sense of community, 
language and culture.33  Such parents may believe that they are acting in their child’s best 
interests; that by producing a child who is not deaf, the child may feel like an ‘outsider’ – part 
neither of the deaf nor the hearing community.  However, the implications of this provision in 
the Guidelines go further than this dilemma.  
Consider the following clinical scenario.  Theoretically, a couple may undergo PGD for cystic 
fibrosis combined with aneuploidy screening because of advanced reproductive age.  Only 
a limited number of eggs are produced, and the only one which is not affected with cystic 
fibrosis is affected with Down’s syndrome.  The Guidelines would not prevent a couple from 
choosing to implant an embryo with Down’s syndrome, as neither of the parents is affected 
with the disorder.  It is unclear whether the purpose of the section is to prevent the selection 
of embryos with disabilities, and whether a doctor would feel it would be ethically wrong to 
implant the embryo.  This difficulty is amplified by the fact that it is generally not considered 
ethically wrong for a woman to carry a pregnancy to term in the knowledge that the baby has 
Down’s syndrome. 
Similarly, it is possible that a couple may go through PGD only to find that all of the embryos 
are affected with the disorder being screened for.  Their choices in this situation are to go 
through IVF again, or go through IVF again using donor gametes, to give up, or to conceive a 
pregnancy naturally taking the risk that a resulting child may be affected.  If the couple decide 
that they do not wish to go through IVF again, and they do not want to use donor gametes, 
they may wish to implant the embryos, in the hope that the expressivity of the disorder in the 
resulting child will only be mild.34  However, this appears to be precluded under the Guidelines, 
which may in fact limit some reproductive choices.  This is an area that needs to be clarified for 
both prospective parents and providers before such a situation arises.  
It may, of course, be inaccurate to describe PGD as providing greater autonomy and reproductive 
freedom to couples.  The Guidelines provide that in the clinical circumstances of familial 
single gene disorders, familial sex-linked disorders and familial chromosomal disorders, ‘it is 
the responsibility of PGD providers, in collaboration with a clinical geneticist to determine 
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whether a disorder is likely to be serious in the offspring’.35    This puts the responsibility for 
decision-making squarely in the hands of the clinicians prior to the performance of PGD.   
1.1.4  section 4:  inForMation anD counselling
Clauses 9 and 10 of the Guidelines deal with information disclosure and informed consent. 
There are extensive information requirements on providers who must ensure those seeking 
PGD are given all of the information relevant for informed decision-making with regard to 
IVF and PGD procedures, including risks and alternatives as well as information regarding the 
background and experience of the clinic and clinicians. Success rates of the procedure, both in 
general terms and at the clinic, must be disclosed, as well as the alternatives to PGD.
Providers must give genetic and clinical information regarding the specific disorder/infertility 
and the likely impact of the disorders on those affected and their families/whanau prior to 
obtaining consent from those seeking PGD.  Information about treatment, counselling and the 
extent of community and social support must also be imparted.     
The disclosure to consumers of the availability of prenatal testing following successful 
implantation is now a mandatory requirement under clause 10 of the interim Guidelines,36 
as is the fact that under the Guidelines, providers are required to supply information for the 
Advisory Committee’s annual report. 
Counselling requirements for people with familial disorders and those with non-familial 
disorders have been distinguished in the approved guidelines.  Providers must ensure that 
those seeking PGD for familial disorders receive genetic and psychosocial counselling from 
qualified counsellors trained in genetic counselling. Counselling must be culturally appropriate 
and include consideration of the nature of the disorder and its likely impact on the offspring 
and family, and the availability of treatment.  The family/whanau experience of the genetic 
disorder, the range of alternatives to PGD and the subsequent decision-making processes, and 
the possible implications of undertaking PGD must be canvassed.    Counselling for non-
familial disorders must also be culturally appropriate, include consideration of the range of 
alternatives to PGD as well as the subsequent decision-making processes and the possible 
implications of undertaking PGD.
What is noticeably absent from the counselling requirements is that which appeared in the 
proposed guidelines.  It had been proposed that genetic counselling must include a discussion 
of ‘the potential difference in moral status afforded to an embryo compared with a foetus, 
and the implications this may have for choosing between using PGD to select against an 
embryo, or termination of a pregnancy following prenatal diagnosis’.  The omission is arguably 
appropriate as it may seem coercive.  
Additionally, it is no longer a requirement that counselling specifically include a discussion of 
the way in which genetic testing of embryos may impact on those who are already living with 
the condition that is being selected against. 
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1.1.5  section 5:  ProceDural requireMents
Section 5 of the Guidelines sets out the procedural requirements necessary for providers 
wishing to perform PGD.  A more permissive approach was adopted in the approved Guidelines 
in relation to specific tests but procedural requirements were made more stringent. 
All clinics wishing to provide PGD must be accredited by the Reproductive Technology 
Accreditation Committee (RTAC) of the Fertility Society of Australia.37 In addition, clinics 
must meet any requirements of RTAC regarding the provision of PGD, which effectively 
endorses the RTAC Code of Practice as the current standard for fertility service providers. 
The Guidelines require that clinics must apply to NECAHR for approval to provide PGD using 
the generic ‘innovative treatment’ application form. This requirement does not apply in the 
context of PGD uses that have since been declared to be ‘established procedures’ because they 
may now be carried out by fertility services as a matter of course.  However, clinics seeking 
to perform PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing must apply to the newly established 
Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ECART).
 The application for ‘Ethics Approval of an Innovative Treatment’ requires extensive information 
under six headings.  The first requires general information.  This includes information  such 
as where and when the procedure is to occur, and the qualifications and experience of the 
principal medical specialists and all other medical specialists involved in the procedure.  The 
second part of the application requires a description of the specific aims and an explanation of 
the scientific basis of the treatment,  An explanation. of the proposed protocols and procedures 
involved must be provided.  
The third part deals with consumer issues.  The procedure for obtaining informed consent from 
clients for all aspects of the treatment must be outlined.  Information regarding counselling 
arrangements, including the professional training of counsellors, as well as their availability 
before, during and after the project and fees and arrangements for their payments must be 
provided.  The next part of the innovative treatment application form requires an explanation 
by the applicant of the risks and benefits of the treatment for all people involved, including a 
potential child. This includes the physical and psychological risks and/or side effects to all those 
involved.   This is followed by part 5 which requires the applicant to provide an explanation of 
what they consider to be the ethical issues involved in the treatment, and how these issues have 
been addressed.  Additionally the applicant must explain how any cultural issues in relation 
to the project have been addressed.  The last part requires details of the measures taken for 
protection of information and record keeping.
An annual report from each clinic approved to perform PGD must be submitted to NECAHR 
under the Guidelines.  The report must include information about the number of PGD 
procedures carried out for familial disorders and the genetic condition tested for in each 
procedure.  The report must also detail the number of PGD procedures carried out for non-
familial disorders, and the medical indications leading to the use of PGD.  The outcomes of 
each procedure (to be reported in the following year), including results from any subsequent 
genetic testing must be provided. Similarly, any ethical issues that have arisen during the course 
of treatment, and any issues that have emerged during counselling that could have long-term 
impact on the offspring and their family/whanau must be described.  
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Since the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ACART) under the HART Act 2004, NECAHR is no longer the body to whom fertility 
services must provide annual reports.  Under the new regulatory scheme, ACART will request 
information regarding PGD treatment cycles from clinics at the end of each financial year.  A 
summary of the data collected will be included in ACART’s Annual Report to the Minister 
of Health.
1.1.6  legal status oF tHe guiDelines
At any time during the interim period of three years after the enactment of the HART 
Act 2004, the Minister of Health may require ECART to treat specified provisions of any 
document as interim guidelines issued by the Advisory Committee for the purposes of 
the Act.38 As explained at the beginning of this section, the Minister has approved the 
NECAHR Guidelines as interim Guidelines under the HART Act.39  They are effective 
until 21 November 2007, unless revoked sooner.40  This means the Guidelines have to be 
reviewed or new guidelines have to be formulated before that date. 
The Guidelines have legal force in several ways.  In particular, sections of the Guidelines 
dealing with information and counselling and the procedural requirements are effectively 
standards of good practice.   They may be taken into account in any investigation involving 
a provider and a consumer under the Code of Rights.  The effect of Right 4(2) of the Code 
is that services, which include fertility services and diagnostic services, must be provided 
in compliance with legal, professional, ethical, and other relevant standards. As the single 
source of guidelines for providers of PGD in New Zealand, the guidelines would be most 
persuasive in any investigation of a breach of a consumers’ rights under the Code.  
Performing PGD outside the limits of the Guidelines would mean that the activity is 
an assisted reproductive procedure as defined and regulated under the HART Act 2004.  
If PGD is performed outside the boundaries of the Guidelines without following the 
process set out in the Act - that is, without ethics committee approval - then the person 
performing the procedure commits an offence and is liable to conviction or fine not 
exceeding $50 000.41   Because of this indirect legal force,  the Guidelines are analogous to 
delegated legislation.42   
The parameters set by the Guidelines were adopted by the HART Act 2004.
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1.2  tHe Hart act
1.2.1  BackgrounD
This section provides an analysis of the HART Act, including the history prior to enactment, 
and the framework that has been established for regulating assisted reproductive procedures, 
including PGD, in New Zealand.
The first attempt to introduce legislation regulating reproductive technology and research 
in New Zealand was made in 1996 via a Private Members Bill introduced into Parliament 
by Labour MP, Dianne Yates.  The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill was 
unanimously sent to the Health Committee in 1997, where it remained.  In 1998 a Government 
Bill was introduced to Parliament, in the form of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill.   The 
Government Bill in the name of National MP Doug Graham contained substantively similar 
subject matter to the Yates Bill, but recommended a different structure for decision-making. 
The Government Bill delegated ethical oversight to NECAHR rather than utilising a licensing 
regime as proposed in the Yates Bill. 43  
In April 2003, the HART Bill became the subject of Supplementary Order Paper No.80. 
The HART Bill as amended by Supplementary Order Paper No.80 (HART SOP) contained 
substantial amendments to the Bill introduced by Dianne Yates.44 The basis for the amendments 
were ‘to reflect changes in technology and scientific knowledge since the bill was developed, 
and to fit within the current legislative framework for the health sector’.45 
Significantly, the HART SOP removed the provisions providing for a licensing authority 
which had been proposed in the Yates HART Bill, providing instead for a ministerial advisory 
committee to provide advice, develop guidelines and monitor established procedures.  It also 
provided for mandatory ethics review of all applications of assisted human reproductive 
procedures or research that were not established procedures.  
Effectively faced with a third bill on ART, the Health Select Committee called for submissions 
on issues covered by both the private Yates Bill and the Government Bill, as well as the HART 
SOP.46  The Committee presented its report in August 2004, recommending significant 
amendments to what was, for ease of reference, referred to as the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Bill.   
The Health Select Committee recommended several amendments to the HART SOP.  One 
amendment of particular note was that the proposed principle that the health and well-being 
of children born as a result of assisted human reproduction should be ‘paramount’ in all 
decisions about procedures, should be replaced with the words ‘an important consideration’.47 
Other recommendations involved strengthening the consultation requirements of ACART 
prior to providing significant advice to the minister, or before issuing guidelines.  
The Health Committee stated specifically in relation to PGD that ‘we expect the advisory 
committee, in considering pre-genetic [sic] diagnosis, to ensure decisions are made for medical 
rather than social reasons’.48  However, this was not formalised in the Bill itself.  
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The genetic basis of characteristics such as intelligence, height, hair and eye colour is not yet 
well understood, and is likely to involve multiple genes.   It has been said that: 
Popular accounts of PGD assume that it will eventually be used to select for such non-medical 
traits as intelligence, height, sexual orientation, beauty, hair and eye colour, memory, and 
other factors.  Because the genetic basis of those traits is unknown, and in any case is likely to 
involve many different genes, […] it is unrealistic to think that non-medical screening […], 
with the possible exception of perfect pitch, will occur anytime soon.49
The Health Committee recommended that the Advisory Committee be required to provide 
specific scientific and ethical analysis prior to recommending to the Minister that a procedure 
be declared to be established.  The HART SOP removed the provision for a licensing authority 
and licensing regime for assisted reproductive services, which was proposed in the original 
Yates HART Bill.  Instead, fertility services were to be regulated under the same Act which 
regulates other health service providers: the Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001. 
This proved to be a highly contentious issue.  The Health Committee reported that they had 
examined regulatory approaches taken in other parts of the world, particularly Australia, 
the United Kingdom and Canada, which have licensing systems, in considering the most 
appropriate system that ‘fits the New Zealand health structure’.  Issues such as accreditation 
of fertility services were also considered.  In defence to criticisms of the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Bill, the Chairperson of the Health Select Committee stated: 
I believe it is robust, because we had to construct it in the context of our health system.  
New Zealand is not Canada, the United Kingdom, or Australia.  We have a health and 
disability sector here that takes a safety and quality approach.  We could not have a 
licensing regime and think that just by bringing accreditation to the licensing of clinics, we 
would have a robust system.  So we must remind ourselves that this bill is reflective of the 
current health environment in which we all work.50
The Health Committee acknowledged that  ‘decisions about human reproduction can have an 
intergenerational impact, so it is important that decision-making in this area is accompanied 
by a robust system for ethical decision-making.  Our recommended amendments explicitly 
allow for public input into establishing that ethical framework, to ensure that guidelines are 
set that meet public expectations’.51  The Committee acknowledged that the amendments 
proposed a less prescriptive approach than the other jurisdictions considered. 
On the third reading of the Bill in Parliament, Dianne Yates stated that the bill posed as many 
problems as it answered.52  Of concern was the fact that the revised bill left decision-making 
regarding some highly controversial technologies (including PGD) to a Ministerial Advisory 
Committee which would formulate ‘mere guidelines and not regulations’.  
Green MP Sue Kedgley, deputy chairperson of the health committee that considered the Bill, 
was perhaps the most critical of it, saying:  
Regrettably, the Government has taken what was a really impressive bill – Dianne Yates’ 
member’s bill – that would have set up a good regulatory regime similar to one that exists 
in England, Canada, Australia, and other jurisdictions, and gutted it to such an extent that 
this legislation sets up one of the weakest, most permissive regulatory regimes for assisted 
245
human reproductive technologies in the world – a regime that relies on guidelines, rather 
than regulation, and a regime that bypasses Parliament completely and delegates policy-
making in that highly contentious, ethical minefield area to a committee of unelected and 
unaccountable experts meeting behind closed doors.53  
The Greens claimed that by setting up a framework by which policy on significant and 
potentially contentious issues was to be made in a committee that is not directly accountable 
to Parliament, the Bill breached the well-established parliamentary principle that matters of 
policy and substance should be dealt with by Parliament.54 
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act was finally enacted in November 2004, after 
eight years.55  Within seven months of the Bill being enacted, PGD in restricted circumstances 
was declared to be an established procedure. 
1.2.2  PHilosoPHy oF tHe Hart act
The normative framework of the HART Act 2004 in relation to PGD is permissive in part 
and facilitative. It creates a framework for decision-making by a statutory body, rather than 
prescribing regulations in terms of procedures. Nowhere in the Act is it specified that PGD 
must be limited to therapeutic uses, and only one clinical application of PGD, sex selection, 
is expressly referred to in the Act.  While the Act sets limits in terms of prohibited assisted 
reproductive procedures, it does not prohibit the conduct of research. So, for example, genetic 
modification of gametes or embryos is not forbidden; it is only the implanting of them into a 
human being that is expressly prohibited. Hence, there is considerable scope for the creation 
of guidelines by the Advisory Committee in relation to assisted reproductive procedures 
including PGD and human reproductive research.
The first purpose declared in the Act is to ‘secure the benefits of assisted reproductive 
procedures, established procedures and research for individuals and society in general’. This 
is to be achieved by ‘taking appropriate measures for the protection and promotion of the 
health, safety, dignity, and rights of all individuals, but particularly those of women and 
children, in the use of procedures and research’.56  The Act sets out other purposes which are 
to ‘provide a robust and flexible framework of regulating and guiding the performance of 
assisted reproductive procedures’57 and to prohibit the performance of assisted reproductive 
procedures (not being established procedures) without ethical approval,58 as well as prohibiting 
unacceptable reproductive procedures or research.59 
The Act sets out several principles that all persons exercising powers or performing functions 
under the Act must be guided by.   These include the principles that the health and well-being of 
children born as a result of an assisted reproductive procedure is an important consideration, 
in all decisions about that procedure;60 that the ‘human safety, and dignity of present and 
future generations should be preserved and promoted;’61 and that ‘while all persons are affected 
by assisted reproductive procedures and established procedures, women, more than men, are 
directly and significantly affected by their application, and the health and well-being of women 
must be protected in the use of these procedures’.62    
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The last-mentioned criterion signals that provisions must be made to protect the health and well-
being of women who undertake assisted reproductive procedures or established procedures. 
It should not be taken to indicate that concern for the health and well-being of women is of 
greater importance than other interests when making decisions about procedures.  
These principles clearly indicate that there are competing interests to be assessed and balanced 
in relation to assisted reproductive procedures or research, including the health and well-being 
of a potential child, and the health and well-being of women undergoing treatment.  However, 
no interest is absolute. 
Additional principles require that the different ethical, spiritual, and cultural perspectives in 
society should be considered and treated with respect,63 and that the needs, values, and beliefs 
of Mäori in particular should be considered and treated with respect.64  This latter provision is 
distinctive in terms of health law by providing for the needs, values and beliefs of Mäori in the 
principles section of the Act.  This has no counterpart in other primary health legislation.65  For 
example, the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, possibly the most important piece 
of health law in New Zealand, does not expressly refer to Mäori at all.66  The original principle 
provided in the Yates Bill referred to the ‘principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’.67  The Select 
Committee recommended that it be amended as it was ‘unclear how service providers, Mäori 
and the courts would interpret the Treaty of Waitangi in this context’.  The Committee was of 
the opinion that it may be more appropriate to amend the provision to recognise instead the 
specific cultural concerns of Mäori, such as whakapapa, mauri, and genetic ownership and 
control of genetic information.68    
The removal of the paramountcy principle in relation to the welfare of the child born as a 
consequence of an assisted reproductive procedure signals that the interests of those seeking 
assisted reproductive procedures may be an equally important consideration, as is the human 
health, safety and dignity of present and future generations. The Health Select Committee 
drafted the amendment to the paramountcy principle for the following reasons. It has been 
established that the health risks to children born as a result of assisted human reproduction are 
generally higher than children who are conceived naturally.  Procedures might not be approved 
if they involved any health risks over and above those associated with natural conception if 
the health and well-being of children born as a result of an assisted reproductive procedure or 
established procedure had to be the paramount consideration.69  The Government obtained a 
Crown Law legal opinion which advised that conferring paramountcy on the health and well-
being of any child born as a result of ART could leave the Government open to litigation if a 
child was harmed by an assisted reproductive procedure.70  
However, many submissions to the Health Select Committee on the HART SOP welcomed 
the paramountcy principle.  A submission from the New Zealand Fertility Clinic drew 
attention to the fact that a paramountcy clause could be used as grounds to refuse providing 
fertility treatment in rare cases to a parent or parents that were ‘unable to meet the minimum 
requirements of a safe, nurturing environment’.71  However, the legal position in relation to 
‘fitness to parent’ concerns is not clear, and has been the cause of considerable debate in the 
United Kingdom.72  
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Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that ‘men and women 
of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to national 
laws governing this right’.  The Convention has been incorporated into domestic law in the 
United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK); no similar provision exists in New 
Zealand domestic law.  Whilst the state should not prevent a person from having a child 
under international human rights jurisprudence, this is not absolute and even recently a New 
Zealand Court has been prepared to countenance limiting that right in the case of a woman 
suffering from mild intellectual disability.73  In most jurisdictions, guardianship rights may be 
suspended or extinguished in extreme cases where children are at risk.  The question arises 
whether a provider may refuse to provide fertility services on the grounds that the child would 
be at risk.74
The common law position in relation to intervening in ‘at risk’ pregnancies against the wishes 
of a competent pregnant woman is that to do so is an invasion of the woman’s physical integrity 
and autonomy.75   In the review of the Human Fertilisation Act 1990 (UK) recently undertaken 
by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee it was considered that it would 
be an infringement of liberty for the State to prevent fertile individuals from having a child in 
circumstances where there were fitness to parent concerns.   In their opinion the same course 
of action should be followed in the case of children born as a result of ART as those born 
by natural means whereby social services are notified of an at risk pregnancy.76   However, 
there would seem to be a distinction between not interfering in an established pregnancy, and 
being compelled to provide ART.  A provider in this situation may discuss with the patient the 
reasons for not wishing to provide treatment and refer on, or may take the approach adopted 
by the House of Commons Select Committee.77  
It is possible that lowering the threshold for permissible intervention by removing the 
paramountcy provision in relation to a child born as a result of ART may result in alternative 
tests which may be used to judge whether a procedure should be permitted other than the 
more restrictive best interests test.  A clinical example of this may arise with tissue typing.  This 
involves performing PGD to determine the compatibility of embryos as potential stem cell 
donors for siblings suffering from life-threatening haematologic diseases.78   The procedure 
has evoked controversy in that it is not prima facie in the best interests of the future child to be 
exposed to PGD where there is no genetic risk to the embryo.79  Justifications that have been 
raised for performing the procedure on the grounds of best interests include arguments such as 
that it is better for the child to be born in this manner than not be born at all, or that it will be 
better to be born and grow up with a live sibling than into a family that is bereaved.  However, 
when it is required that the health and well-being of a child born as a result is an ‘important 
consideration’, there is far greater flexibility to employ a test such as the ‘reasonable parent’ test 
which permits wider motives to be taken into consideration, as long as the procedure is not 
clearly against the interests of the potential child.80
The reality that assisted reproduction involves balancing interests and incurs additional 
risks, some of which are already known, but some of which may not be known for many 
years, is relevant to the following principle expressed in the Act.  It provides that ‘no assisted 
reproductive procedure should be performed on an individual and no human reproductive 
research should be conducted on an individual unless the individual has made an informed 
choice and given informed consent’.81 
24
In summary, the underlying philosophy of the HART Act appears to be to secure the benefits of 
ART for individuals whilst providing a framework to protect and safeguard the health, safety, 
dignity and rights of all individuals, including the perceived wider interests of society. 
1.2.3  categories oF assisteD reProDuctive ProceDures
The Act sets up three distinct categories of assisted reproductive procedures: those which are 
prohibited, those which are regulated, and those which are declared to be established procedures. 
An assisted reproductive procedure is defined in section 5 of the Act, which provides: 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, – assisted  reproductive procedure or 
procedure 
(a)  means a procedure performed for the purpose of assisting human reproduction that  
 involves-
 (i)   the creation of an in vitro human embryo; or 
 (ii) the storage, manipulation, or use of an in vitro human gamete or and in vitro  
  human embryo; or
 (iii) the use of cells derived from an in vitro human embryo; or
 (iv) the implantation into a human being of  human gametes or human embryos;  
  but
(b) does not include an established procedure.
Hence, PGD falls within the scope of an ‘assisted reproductive procedure’ unless it is declared 
by an Order in Council to be an established procedure.  
1.2.3.1  Prohibited activities
The Act has adopted the widespread prohibition against permitting a human embryo 
to develop outside the body of a human being beyond fourteen days after its formation. 
Criminal sanctions apply for any breach of this provision.82  However, research on embryos is 
not expressly prohibited although it is limited by the fourteen day rule.
The Act prohibits the sale or purchase of human embryos or gametes.83  This effectively sets 
the bar against potential exploitation of women in particular, with implications not only at 
a national level but also on a global level.  The potential for a global fertility industry is best 
illustrated by a newspaper article in 2004 which revealed that the UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority intended to visit a Romanian clinic in order to monitor the purchase of 
human ova from women by UK clinicians. The procedure of egg recovery is invasive, requiring 
hyper-stimulation with gonadotrophins prior to egg pick up, and carries risks such as ovarian 
hyperstimulation syndrome.  While the HFEA was in no sense involved in the transactions, 
observers were purportedly shocked that the HFEA ‘tacitly approved this commodification 
and globalisation of tissue in the form of the cross-border trade in ova’.84  Whilst the New 
Zealand regulatory approach may be described as a permissive regime, this does not extend to 
permitting the commercialisation of gametes or embryos.
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Prohibited activities which carry a penalty of either imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
five years or a fine not exceeding $200 000, or both, are listed in schedule 1 of the Act.85  Other 
prohibitions in the Act carry lesser penalties, and concern prohibiting the development of 
embryos beyond fourteen days,86 storage of in vitro embryos and gametes,87 obtaining gametes 
from minors,88 and advertising for illegal activities.89   
Of direct relevance to PGD is section 11, which places restrictions on the sex selection of 
human embryos. Section 11(1) provides:
No person may, for reproductive purposes, -
(a) select an in vitro human embryo for implantation into a human being on the basis  
 of the sex of the embryo; or
(b) perform any procedure, or provide, prescribe, or administer any thing in order to  
 ensure, or in order to increase the probability, that a human embryo will be of a  
 particular sex.
A person who breaches this section is liable to either imprisonment for up to one year, or a fine 
of up to $100 000, or both.90  However, the statute provides a lawful excuse if sex selection was 
undertaken to prevent or treat a genetic disorder or disease.91  
Section 11 is drafted extremely broadly.  Whilst section 11(1) (a) relates directly to PGD, it is 
assumed that section 11(1)(b) is intended to cover techniques such as sperm sorting, which 
allows parents to select the sex of their child prior to conception,92 or to new techniques which 
may be developed in the future.  However, the provision is drafted so broadly that a person 
who, for example, consults a homeopath for homeopathic remedies to increase their chances 
for a child of a particular sex, could render the homeopath liable to prosecution under the Act.93 
Whilst this is most unlikely, the question whether this particular section was a proportionate 
response to concern relating to sex selection is begged.94
1.2.3.2 regulated activities
The Act sets up two types of bodies: an advisory committee which is responsible for creating 
policy, and an ethics committee which facilitates the implementation of that policy.  The 
adoption of a split regulatory framework instead of a central regulatory body has been criticised 
on the basis that it goes against an international trend which perceives that the creation of a 
single body creates greater consistency, provides greater accountability, and therefore increases 
the ability to foster public confidence.95  However, the National Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Human Reproduction (NECAHR), which had previously been responsible for establishing 
guidelines, and for reviewing and approving assisted reproductive procedures and assisted 
reproductive research, was supportive of the creation of two bodies.  In a submission on the 
HART SOP it was stated: 
As a Ministerial Advisory Committee, NECAHR currently develops policy and guidelines 
on assisted human reproduction as well as giving ethical approval on individual 
applications.  This dual role has become increasingly difficult for NECAHR as the 
number of issues it is being required to consider is increasing in number and complexity.  
NECAHR supports the separation of the development of policy and guidelines from the 
ethical approval process.  
250
The New Zealand National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability Support Services 
Ethics (NEAC) also endorsed the separation of policy and development of guidelines from the 
operational work of reviewing particular proposals for similar reasons.96  Whilst the framework 
clearly has the support of two of the major ethics bodies of New Zealand, it could be argued 
that the issue is one of resources, rather than that a split regulatory body is the most desirable 
option in itself.  However, the policy-making role undertaken by the Advisory Committee 
requires a high level of skill and experience.  The ability for the Advisory Committee to 
concentrate only on creating policy is an appropriate utilisation of expertise. Being able to 
focus on policy increases the efficiency of the policy-making process.  These are compelling 
reasons in favour of the division of roles between the two bodies.
1.2.3.2.1 ECArt
The Act provides that assisted reproductive procedures may only proceed with the prior written 
approval of the ethics committee,97 which may give an approval subject to any conditions it 
thinks fit to impose.98  The ethics committee may not give an approval unless it is satisfied 
that the activity proposed to be undertaken under the approval is consistent with relevant 
guidelines or relevant advice issued or given by the advisory committee.99  If there are no 
relevant guidelines or advice, the ethics committee may not approve an assisted reproductive 
procedure or human reproductive research until such time as the Advisory Committee 
formulates them.  The ethics committee is therefore restrained by the parameters set by the 
Advisory Committee.100 The ethics committee has the power to cancel an approval, either in 
whole or in part, in certain circumstances.101  
The Minister of Health is responsible for designating an ethics committee as the relevant ethics 
committee for the purposes of the Act.102  Section 27(3) provides:
(3) In designating a committee under this section, the Minister
 Must ensure that the committee-
 (a) complies in its composition with any applicable standard governing ethics  
  committees determined by the national advisory committee appointed under  
  section 16(1) of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.
The national advisory committee appointed under section 16(1) is the National Advisory 
Committee on Health and Disability Support Services Ethics, more commonly referred to as 
‘NEAC’.  There is one national set of standards for ethical review in New Zealand, which is the 
Operational Standard for Ethics Committees.103 
The Operational Standard requires that an ethics committee should include a minimum of 10 
persons, half of whom should be lay members, including a lay chair.104  There must be a lawyer 
and a person with expertise in ethics, and at least two Mäori members with an awareness of te 
reo Mäori and an understanding of tikanga Mäori.105  The Operational Standard also provides 
that it is important that the committee’s composition include individuals possessing knowledge 
and understanding of consumer and community issues and perspectives.  Each committee 
should have a composition tailored to provide it with appropriate medical, scientific, clinical 
and research expertise to enable it to ethically review the majority of the proposals coming 
before it.  In addition to the requirements prescribed by the applicable standard, the HART Act 
requires that the ethics committee includes one or more members with expertise in assisted 
reproductive procedures; and one or more members with expertise in human reproductive 
research.106  
However, the Terms of Reference for the Ethics Committee provide that ECART must consist 
of not fewer than 8 and not more than 12 members.  This sets the minimum number of 
members lower than that required by the Operational Standard.  It could be claimed that 
if ECART is constituted with only 8 members, as it currently is, it is improperly constituted 
under the HART Act 2004.
Section 27(4) of the Act provides:
The committee designated under this section is subject to any applicable 
ethical standards determined by the national advisory committee appointed 
under section 16(1) of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.
This appears to state that the designated ethics committee is subject to the Operational 
Standard. 107 Chapter 6 of the Standard sets out the procedure for committee meetings, and 
provides that every question before any meeting shall be determined by consensus decision-
making.  Using a consensus approach requires a process of discussion and debate leading to 
a decision, rather than by a process of formal vote casting.  A proposal will only be approved 
when every member is willing to allow the proposal to proceed.  On this approach a single 
settled and consistent objection to the proposal will necessitate further discussion or review.  
Curiously, the Terms of Reference for the Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive 
Technology provide that while a consensus position should be achieved where possible, 
where that is not possible, a vote shall apply with a two-thirds majority required for decision-
making.108  The Terms of Reference also provide that should a member or members wish to 
abstain from some or all of the decision-making process because of strong moral or religious 
reasons the abstentions shall not affect the approval process.  Given that ECART must work 
within guidelines and on advice from ACART it seems that they do not have a great deal of 
discretion in their decision-making ability.  It is therefore unclear why a Health and Disability 
Ethics Committee must reach a consensus decision, yet ECART only requires a two thirds 
majority to determine issues.
Additionally, it is unclear whether the decision-making parameters in the Terms of Reference 
are valid in view of the requirements of section 27(4) of the HART Act 2004.  The Terms 
of Reference provide that ECART must operate in accordance with the following specified 
criteria.  ECART must perform its duties in accordance with: the HART Act and any other 
enactment;  the ECART terms of reference; any guidelines or advice issued by ACART or 
transitional guidelines gazetted by the Minister of Health under section 79 [sic] of the Human 
Assisted Technology Act;109 and in accordance with Chapters 1-4 of the Operational Standard. 
It is stated that ‘on any point of conflict, the guidelines issued by ACART will have precedence 
over the Operational Standard’.  
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However, on a plain reading of the statute the Minister must ensure that the committee 
complies in composition with the standard, which is set out in chapter 6 of the Operational 
Standard.  This chapter is precluded from the Terms of Reference.  Similarly, the Act provides 
that the designated ECART is subject to the standard.  These are mandatory provisions, not 
discretionary provisions.  It is submitted that if ECART is not constituted according to, and 
does not follow the procedures set out in the Operational Standard, then ECART will be acting 
ultra vires.  Any decision may then be challenged by judicial review on the grounds that it is 
procedurally invalid.  
The HART Act and the Terms of Reference are silent on review or appeal rights of an applicant 
whose proposal is declined. The Operational Standard provides that committees have an 
obligation to review a previous decision to grant or decline ethical approval of a proposal when 
new information relevant to that decision arises.110  The Operational Standard also provides 
for a second opinion process, which could be undertaken either by the ethics committee or 
the applicant.  Where the application is a research proposal, or any proposal has a research 
element, second opinion requests should be referred to the National Ethics Committee or the 
Health Research Ethics Committee.  It is stated that ‘principles of natural justice underlie the 
second opinion process’.111
In contrast the HART Act merely provides that, in carrying out their functions, ECART may 
consult with any persons who, in the opinion of the committee, are able to assist it to perform 
its functions.112  ECART must forward research reports to ACART, along with comments or 
requests for advice that the ethics committee considers appropriate.   Yet there is no mechanism 
providing for natural justice, whereby an applicant may appear before ECART, nor is there 
any mechanism to appeal against a decision of ECART.  This is a substantial barrier to ECART 
achieving transparency and fairness, and may affect public confidence in the decision-making 
process.  Whilst judicial review may be brought on either substantive or procedural grounds 
against a decision of ECART, it is costly and time consuming. 
1.2.3.2.2 ACArt
The Minister of Health is responsible under the HART Act for establishing the Advisory 
Committee on Assisted Reproductive Procedures and Human Reproductive Research, 
(ACART).  The Advisory Committee must consist of not fewer than 8 and not more than 12 
members,113 at least half of whom must be lay persons.114  There must be one or more members 
with expertise in either assisted reproductive procedures, human reproductive research, ethics, 
or relevant areas of the law.115  Additionally, there must be one or more members with expertise 
in Mäori customary values and practice and the ability to articulate issues from a Mäori 
perspective, and one or more members with the ability to articulate issues from a consumer 
perspective.116   
Significantly, the Advisory Committee must also include one or more members with the ability 
to articulate the interests of children, who must either be the Commissioner for Children, or 
be a representative or employee of the Commissioner.117  This may ameliorate the dilution of 
the principle in the Act relating to the health and well-being of children born as a result of an 
assisted reproductive procedure or established procedure by providing such children with a 
voice on the Committee. 
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Appointing a diverse range of persons contributes to the ability of the Advisory Committee 
to be perceived as capable of engaging in legitimate, democratic decision-making.  ACART 
must follow an extensive consultative process in the formulation of guidelines or advice, in an 
attempt to engage in inclusive and widespread debate with the public. This kind of engagement 
with the public has been referred to as ‘biomedical diplomacy’.118 However, there are procedural 
concerns relating to the decision-making processes which may undermine ACART’s ability to 
follow a  transparent policy-making path.
Whilst the composition of the Advisory Committee is specified in the Act, the Act confers 
on the Committee complete freedom to regulate its procedure in any manner that it thinks 
fit.119  There are no guidelines for decision-making processes, such as whether consensus or 
unanimity is required.  A simple majority may be all that is required to introduce guidelines 
and advice.  The Terms of Reference for ACART state that every question before any meeting 
shall generally be determined by consensus decision-making.  Where a consensus cannot be 
reached a simple majority vote will apply.  In such circumstances, the Chairperson shall have 
the casting vote.  Whilst consensus decision-making may be the ideal, it is the process and 
robustness of the decision-making that is the essential factor. Residual disagreement may be 
inevitable, but is not necessarily a sign of failed deliberation. 
Decisions made by the Advisory Committee must be made in accordance with the principles 
as stated in the Act.120  The Terms of Reference outline the role and functions of ACART.121 
These include the heading ‘Duties and responsibilities of a Member’, under which it is stated 
This section sets out the Minister of Health’s expectations regarding the duties and 
responsibilities of a person appointed as a member of ACART.  This is intended to aid 
members of ACART by providing them with a common set of principles for appropriate 
conduct and behaviour and serves to protect ACART and its members.
As an independent statutory body, ACART has an obligation to conduct its activities in 
an open and ethical manner.  ACART has a duty to operate in an effective manner within 
the parameters of its functions as set out in its Terms of Reference and in accordance with 
the HART Act.
It is stated that members should have a commitment to work for the greater good of the 
committee.  The Terms of Reference require that members perform their functions in good 
faith, honestly and impartially and avoid situations that might compromise their integrity 
or otherwise lead to conflicts of interest and, additionally, that ‘[p]roper observation of 
these principles will protect ACART and its members and will ensure that it retains public 
confidence’.
The Terms of Reference notes that members attend meetings and participate in committee 
activities as independent persons responsible to ACART as a whole.  Members are not appointed 
as representatives of professional organisations and/or particular community bodies.  This is 
pertinent to the justifiable requirement that ACART should not assume that a particular group’s 
interests have been taken into account simply because a member is associated with a particular 
group.  In addition, such a requirement is necessary where members must be prepared to think 
and reason beyond partisan viewpoints.  If not, decision-makers would be unable to engage 
with, and analyse issues beyond, the perspective of their own particular groups.
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It is a requirement that the chair of ACART must ensure that the agenda and minutes are 
published on the internet as soon as possible after they are confirmed by the members of 
the committee. This has not been achieved by NECAHR, where although there were three 
meetings in the year ending 2005, the last minutes posted were December 2004.  It is unclear 
whether ACART meetings will be open to the public.  
Of great significance are the duties the Terms of Reference impose on ACART in relation 
to information.  Whilst members are free to express their own views within the context of 
committee meetings, members must publicly support a course of action decided by ACART. 
If unable to do so, members must not publicly comment on decisions.
Such a provision has a counterpart in the Constitutional Convention enshrined in the Cabinet 
Manual.  This convention requires that once Cabinet makes a decision, then (except in some 
coalition governments when ‘agree to disagree’ processes have been established) Ministers 
must support the decision, regardless of their personal views and whether or not they were at 
the meeting concerned.122  
Whilst this may be justified in terms of Cabinet decision-making, it is a far greater leap to 
justify it in terms of an Advisory Committee.  The legitimacy of the Advisory Committee’s 
decision-making in terms of transparency and accountability may be better served by 
providing the reasons for ACART decisions, and the competing perspectives that it took into 
account.  It may be useful to report whether the particular decision was made by unanimity, 
consensus or simple majority.  This would show that ‘conclusions are based on conscientious 
and intelligible moral thought’.123  This is no more than our judiciary do when providing 
majority and dissenting decisions in the courts.124
Providing reasons for decision-making was achieved to an extent by NECAHR when they 
published the approved Guidelines on PGD.  In the introduction it was stated that:
During the consultation period a diverse range of views was expressed on assisted human 
reproductive technologies, genetic testing, and the moral status of the embryo, as well 
as on PGD.  These ranged from strong support of the guidelines to total rejection of all 
reproductive technologies, including PGD.  The pluralistic nature of New Zealand society 
means that universal agreement on the use of PGD was not a possibility.  In revising the 
guidelines following the public consultation, NECAHR took account of all the submissions 
and focused on the strength of the arguments with regard to particular clauses in the 
guidelines, rather than on the number of stakeholders for or against them.
Concerns of disability groups were also specifically addressed:
Concern has been raised that PGD discriminates against people with disabilities, and 
promotes the view that the birth of people with disabilities should be prevented.  However, 
it is important to distinguish between ‘disability’ and ‘people with disabilities’, and that 
selecting against embryos with disabilities does not necessarily imply that those with 
disabilities are living lives that are either less valuable or less meaningful.
It has been noted that there was no explicit mention of Mäori values in the NECAHR 
Guidelines.125  A greater explanation for the substantive provisions and the reasons for allowing 
or limiting specific aspects of PGD would enhance future policy created by the Advisory 
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Committee.  This should include an explanation of the scientific evidence, particular ethical 
strands of argument, (for example reproductive autonomy is an ethical strand which should 
be considered as well as the moral status of the embryo) and the underlying principle used to 
determine the particular policy.  
The functions of the advisory committee include guideline development and the provision 
of advice to the ethics committee, and the review of such guidelines and advice.126 The 
Advisory Committee must also provide advice to the Minister on issues arising out of assisted 
reproductive procedures or human reproductive research.127  This includes, but is not limited 
to, advice as to whether –
 (i)  the Act or any other Act should be amended to prohibit or provide for any kind of  
  assisted reproductive procedure or human reproductive research: 
 (ii)  on the basis of the information, assessment, advice, and ethical analysis required  
  under section 6(2)(a) to (d),  any kind of procedure or treatment should be   
  declared to be an established procedure: 
 (iii) whether any established procedure should be modified or should cease to be an   
  established procedure: [emphasis author’s]
 (iv)  whether a moratorium should be imposed on any kind of assisted reproductive   
  procedure or human reproductive research: 
 (v)  regulations should be made under section 76 of the Act to regulate the   
  performance of any kind of assisted reproductive procedure or research.128
It is a particular strength of the HART Act that it provides ACART with the flexibility to advise 
whether certain procedures should be revoked from the established procedure category.  This 
mechanism enables ACART to respond quickly to any health concerns that may arise as the 
procedures are increasingly implemented and more medical and scientific knowledge becomes 
available.
In addition, there is a provision under the Act to effectively ‘buy time’ when there is a need for 
the Advisory Committee to develop guidelines, or to provide advice to the Minister.  In these 
circumstances, the Minister may recommend the passing of an Order in Council declaring a 
particular assisted reproductive procedure or human reproductive research to be subject to a 
moratorium for up to eighteen months.129  During this time, the ethics committee must not 
consider or grant a request to approve a proposal for that form of procedure or research.130 
This prevents any particular assisted reproductive procedure or human reproductive research 
from taking place until formulation of guidelines or advice occurs following due process 
under the Act. 
Of great relevance is the requirement that the advisory committee must monitor the 
application, and health outcomes, of assisted reproductive procedures and established 
procedures; and developments in human reproductive research.131  Hence there is an emphasis 
on safety and accountability, which covers all assisted reproductive procedures and research, 
including established procedures.  However, the Act does not specify in what way the oversight 
is to occur.  Nor does it provide specifically that medium and long-term outcomes must be 
monitored.  This is a substantial gap, given that some adverse developmental side effects may 
only become apparent as a child grows up. 
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The Advisory Committee is required to provide the Minister with information, advice, and if it 
thinks fit, recommendations regarding specified assisted reproductive activities, including the 
selection of embryos using preimplantation genetic analysis.132 
1.2.3.2.3 Statutory obligations of the ACArt
(a) Barometer of Public Opinion
The Advisory Committee may only issue guidelines if interested parties and members of the 
public have been given a reasonable opportunity to make submissions on a discussion paper 
or on an outline of the proposed guidelines.133  The Advisory Committee is statutorily obliged 
to take those submissions into account.134 After receiving a copy of the guidelines, the Minister 
must table them in the House of Representatives, but does not need the approval of the House 
for them to come into effect.135  
Similarly, for specified instances of assisted reproductive research and ART (including selection 
of embryos using PGD), the Advisory Committee must call for and take into consideration 
submissions before giving significant advice to the Minister.136 This requirement effectively 
ensures that the committee assesses the barometer of public opinion prior to issuing guidelines 
or providing significant advice to the Minister, but does not mean that views expressed will 
necessarily be accommodated. 137    
Whilst undertaking consultative measures to determine public opinion is traditionally viewed 
as engendering public trust,  it must be recognised that reliance on quantification of the 
dominant opinions from public consultations which are ‘often based on an unrepresentative 
sample, limited analysis, and attenuated moral discussion’ places demands on resources, and 
of itself does not necessarily create legitimate and fair policy-making.138  
(b) Duty to Consult
Before the Advisory Committee gives advice to the Minister or issues guidelines to the ethics 
committee, it must consult on the proposed advice or guidelines with any members of the 
public or any other person or group ‘that the committee considers appropriate’ and with 
appropriate government departments and agencies.139 Although some may hold cynical views 
of the consultation requirement, seeing them simply as a form of window dressing, the Court 
of Appeal has declared that consultation provisions impose real obligations. In Wellington 
International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand140 the Court considered what was required by 
a duty to consult. McKay J observed,  ‘consultation does not require agreement between the 
parties, but requires more than mere notification’.141  Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said:
The requirement of consultation must never be treated perfunctorily or as a mere formality.  
The local authority must know what is being proposed. They must be given a reasonably 
ample and sufficient time to express their views or to point to problems or difficulties: they 
must be free to say what they think. 142
In addition, before the advisory committee issues guidelines to the ethics committee, it must 
consult on the proposed guidelines with the Minister of Health.143 It is implied in effect that 
the Minister is the final arbiter on the guidelines, although there is no statutory right of veto, 
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nor is there a requirement that the Minister must approve the guidelines or the advice of the 
ACART.  However it is difficult to envisage the Minister tabling guidelines in Parliament that 
he is strongly opposed to, given his political vulnerability.   In this way the Minister wields 
considerable power.  This is compounded by the fact that appointments to the Advisory 
Committee are made and terminated by the Minister.144   
In summary, there are significant fetters on the activities of the Advisory Committee in terms 
of the extensive requirement to consult widely prior to establishing guidelines or giving advice. 
However, there is a shortfall in achieving legitimate decision-making by virtue of the lack of 
independence from the Minister of Health, and a lack of transparency in the decision-making 
process.   Reasons ought to be given as to how decisions are made in order to legitimate the 
decision-making process and policy recommendations.
There is no appeal process under the Act.  Decisions of ACART may be subject to judicial review 
on grounds either of procedural or substantive invalidity.    However, this process is costly.  It is 
possible that complaint to the ombudsman may be utilised as a vehicle for review.145
1.2.3.3  estaBlisHeD ProceDures 
As indicated above, ACART may advise the Minister of Health that certain assisted reproductive 
procedures should be declared by Order in Council to be established procedures.  This has the 
effect that those procedures may be carried out without recourse to the jurisdiction of ECART 
and ACART. The Governor-General may make an Order in Council on the recommendation 
of the Minister, who may request the Order on the basis of advice received from ACART.146 
However, ACART must still monitor the outcomes of established procedures, and may 
recommend to the Minister that an established procedure should cease being an established 
procedure. 
In tendering advice to the Minister that an assisted reproductive procedure should be declared 
to be an established procedure, ACART must provide the Minister with a report that sets out 
scientific and ethical analysis relating to the procedure, and whether, in its expert opinion, the 
Minister should recommend that the assisted reproductive procedure or treatment be declared 
an established procedure.147 
In April 2005 the Director-General of Health, Dr Karen Poutasi, advised the Minister of Health 
of a list of procedures which should be declared to be ‘established procedures’.148  Under the 
interim provisions of the Act, the Director General of Health is deemed to be the Advisory 
Committee for the nine months following the date on which the HART Act receives Royal 
assent.149   Surprisingly, PGD in circumstances covered by Section 1 of the NECAHR Guidelines 
was included in the list of proposed established procedures.  Consequently, PGD for familial 
single-gene disorders, familial sex-linked disorders, and familial chromosomal disorders which 
were within the criteria set out in section 1 of the Guidelines became established procedures.  So 
too was PGD for non-familial chromosomal disorders associated with advanced reproductive 
age or associated with infertility. 
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This was surprising on several fronts. First, in almost all jurisdictions that allow PGD, the practice 
is still being considered experimental, due to ongoing scientific uncertainty.150  This had been 
emphasised in the “Systematic Review of Quantifiable Harms and Benefits of Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis” which recommended a cautious approach because the ‘evidence on the 
effectiveness and long term safety of PGD is currently limited and inconclusive’.151  It may 
have seemed reasonable to wait for the newly established ACART to make recommendations 
involving PGD. 
The Order in Council was passed with urgency to enable fertility services to continue to provide 
routine services after the date that the HART Act provisions regulating assisted reproductive 
procedures became effective. The procedures at issue needed to be declared to be established; 
if not, they would each need to have ethical approval before they could be undertaken.  While 
this is understandable in the case of IVF and other routine procedures, it is more difficult to 
justify PGD on that basis that it had never been performed in New Zealand and as such was 
not a routine procedure.  The Minister stated that ‘the proposed established procedures do not 
differ from the status quo, and are not likely to be controversial’.152 
Although the decision may have seemed precipitous, due process in making the Order in 
Council was followed under the Act.  In accordance with section 6(2)(a)-(d) of the Act, the 
Director-General commissioned a report from an Advisory Group (AGART) to review the risks 
and benefits associated with specific assisted reproductive procedures, and the acceptability of 
those risks.153  This differed from the Systematic Review of the Quantifiable Harms and Benefits 
of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in that it covered a range of ARTs.
AGART convened in 2004 to provide the Director-General of Health with advice on the risks 
associated with ART and an assessment of those risks.  The group met three times and based 
their recommendations on systematic reviews carried out by the New Zealand Guidelines 
Group including the Systematic Review and literature searches and updates carried out by New 
Zealand Health Technology Assessment.154
The Terms of Reference for the Advisory Group on Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
required the group to undertake:
• An in-depth assessment of the possible health risks to children and the mother,   
 including intergenerational health risks, associated with ART.  The assessment   
 will take account of current research data and knowledge on health risks associated  
 with these procedures and of gaps in the basic science of human fertilisation and   
 sperm selection, and hereditable traits linked to sub-fertility.
• An assessment of the level of elevated risk of adverse health outcomes for children,  
 the mother and subsequent generations associated with the use of ART:
 - focusing on those procedures currently available in New Zealand or likely to be  
  available in the near future,
 - an assessment of whether the level of risk associated with each of those   
  procedures is acceptable,
  recommendations on whether those procedures should be approved as   
  ‘established procedures’ for the purposes of the HART Act 2004.
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• Broad scientific advice on monitoring and research needs in relation to ART   
 (retrospective or prospective), including surveillance, epidemiology and data   
 collection.  This will involve providing advice on:
 - the usefulness of the data currently collected by fertility clinics in terms of   
  assessing the health risks associated with particular ART and on what, if any,   
  additional information is needed
 - management of the information (eg, governance arrangements, anonymisation  
  of data)
 - what, if any, research could usefully be undertaken in New Zealand, including  
  long term follow-up of ART children
AGART considered the risks associated with procedures available in New Zealand at that 
time,155 and also considered the risks associated with procedures which they considered were 
likely to be, or may be, available in the near future.  This included PGD, use of thawed ovarian 
tissue, and in vitro maturation within IVF or ICSI.  
The Advisory Group concluded that, although there were clearly some risks associated with 
PGD, these risks were not markedly higher than the risks associated with IVF and therefore the 
risks associated with PGD were acceptable.
The Minister was subsequently advised by AGART that the risks associated with PGD fell 
within an acceptable level for New Zealand because the risks were not raised above those risks 
for IVF alone, and PGD offered potential benefits for those who were genetically predisposed 
to having a child with a serious disorder.  However, where there is no infertility or genetic risk 
to the embryo, the risk/benefit ratio is significantly altered.
AGART noted in its report that fertility clinics collect information on all babies born as a 
result of ART – including pregnancy and birth outcomes, mode of delivery, birth status, birth 
weight, gestational age, plurality, perinatal mortality, congenital malformation and maternal 
morbidity.   Providers obtain information by following up both the lead maternity carer and 
the patient after the due date of birth of any assisted pregnancy.  The information collected is 
fed into the Australia and New Zealand Assisted Reproduction Database (ANZARD), and is 
used for three purposes:
• Generation of the National Perinatal Statistics Unit (Australia) annual report
• Generation of summary data reports for the Reproductive Technology Accreditation  
 Committee (RTAC), which is responsible for accrediting fertility clinics in both   
 Australia and New Zealand
• To provide fertility clinics with regular internal reports of their outcomes for   
 comparison with Australia and New Zealand-wide norms.
ANZARD includes information about treatment methods and PGD, as well as details of 
pregnancy and birth outcomes, including mode of delivery, birth status, birth-weight, 
gestational age plurality, and prenatal mortality. Congenital malformation and maternal 
morbidity is self reported by patients.  All data is reported on an anonymised basis.  
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ANZARD is useful in terms of providing information relating to perinatal and maternal health 
outcomes but there is a gap in that congenital malformations are not reported by fertility 
clinics.  AGART recommended that fertility clinics should collect and report to the Ministry 
of Health the NHI number of all infants born as a result of ART so that it may be linked with 
the New Zealand Birth Defects Monitoring Programme and matched against the NZ Birth 
Defects Register. However, not all health outcomes will be picked up as birth defects, such as 
some epigenetic disorders.  Nor are medium- or long-term data collected.  
It was stated that the concern expressed internationally about the outcomes for children born 
as a result of ART was shared by the Ministry of Health.  The Ministry is to examine the 
possibility of ‘matching data and putting in place systematic monitoring of health outcomes 
for children born as a result of assisted reproductive procedures.  This is likely to include 
discussions with fertility clinics, seeking advice regarding any privacy issues and assessing the 
suitability of the Birth Defects Monitoring Programme.’156  This is an issue of great importance 
which needs to be addressed with some urgency.  
The Ministry of Health intends to periodically match the NHI number of babies born from 
assisted reproductive procedures with the Birth Defects Monitoring Programme.  Although 
theoretically the data could be matched to any Ministry of Health database which also has the 
National Health Index number, no other matching is intended.157
Access to fertility services for the performance of PGD is significantly limited for many people 
by virtue of the cost involved.  It has, however, been announced that public funding for up to 
two cycles of PGD for couples at risk of transmitting serious genetic disorders will be made 
available.158  The funding does not cover PGD to screen for aneuploidy.  It is expected that 
around 40 couples a year will be able to access funding through the District Health Boards.159  
In Australia, PGD costs about $1700 on top of an IVF cycle and there is no Medicare rebate 
for PGD.160  Although there is no overall NHS funding for PGD in the UK, Guidelines for 
Commissioners of NHS services were released in 2002.161  These guidelines recommend 
that individual cases should be considered by commissioners for NHS funding.  It was 
recommended that two to three cycles would increase the chance of a successful pregnancy 
and make the most cost-effective use of genetic probe development.  However this is only 
a guideline, and does not translate to what is occurring in practice.162  Hence, New Zealand 




The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 provides a skeleton framework 
which prohibits certain specified assisted reproductive procedures and uses, and confers 
authority upon an Advisory Committee (ACART) to determine the finer details of 
permissible and impermissible assisted reproductive activities.  Assisted reproductive 
procedures are regulated by Guidelines crafted by ACART and applied by an Ethics 
Committee (ECART) that is also appointed under the Act.  Some assisted reproductive 
procedures avoid regulation where there are sufficient grounds to have them declared to 
be established procedures.  The Act adopts a facilitative regulatory approach.  The Act 
provides a flexible and potentially permissive regulatory framework for the provision of 
PGD in New Zealand, whilst prohibiting PGD for social sex selection.  
Analysis of the interim Advisory Committee Guidelines has revealed several ethical 
issues which may pose difficulties for both providers and consumers of PGD.  Should a 
prospective parent be limited in their choice of available embryos, and seek to implant 
an affected embryo in the hope that the expressivity of a disorder is low, or on the basis 
that having a disabled child is better than no child at all, it is possible that a breach of 
the Guidelines may occur with the consequences of rendering the provider liable to a 
fine under the HART Act.  There is no process whereby a provider could get immediate 
direction when faced with such a situation, although they could apply to the Ethics 
Committee for clarification of the Guidelines.  This grey area needs to be addressed before 
such a clinical scenario arises.     
An Order in Council has recently been passed declaring certain applications of PGD to be 
established procedures.  It is notable that the application of PGD for single gene disorders 
in the established procedures category is very broad.  On the face of it, PGD to detect 
low penetrance single gene disorders may be carried out as an established procedure. 
This potentially covers late onset disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and susceptibility 
disorders such as BRCA 1 and 2 or familial adenomatous polyposis coli.  It is most unlikely 
that NECAHR intended this consequence when drafting Category 1 of the Guidelines.  It 
is equally unlikely that the Director General of Health intended this consequence when 
recommending the passing of the Order in Council which made Category 1 of the Guidelines 
established procedures.  There needs to be clarification of this issue so that providers and 
consumers may operate in an area of certainty, and without fear of sanctions.
PGD in conjunction with tissue typing remains a tightly and conservatively regulated 
‘assisted reproductive procedure’ under the Act.   The parameters of permissible HLA 
tissue typing are problematic on several counts.  The drafters have gone beyond their 
jurisdiction in requiring an assurance that the planned treatment for the affected child 
will utilise only the cord blood of the future child.  Medical procedures carried out on a 
live child are covered by established principles of health care law, and it is not within the 
remit of a policy-making body to attempt to predetermine those issues.   In addition, 
the HLA Guidelines encompass a structural anomaly. An embryo may be tested for HLA 
compatibility as an add-on procedure if an embryo biopsy is indicated to test for the 
presence of a genetic disorder, but this may not be carried out if the affected child is 
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suffering from a non-genetically heritable condition, regardless of whether embryo biopsy 
is indicated to test for the presence of a familial single gene or familial chromosomal 
disorder in the embryo.   Again, it is unlikely that this was an intended consequence by those 
responsible for the Guidelines.  The anomaly may be easily rectified by requiring only that 
the affected child is suffering from a severe life-threatening condition.  Regulating HLA 
tissue typing so narrowly is in tension with the minimal evidence of risk to the embryo, 
particularly when such a wide range of PGD is permitted as an established procedure.
At this point, all of the policy formulated via and pursuant to the Act has been based purely 
on therapeutic applications of PGD technology. Although there has been an intention 
expressed by the Select Committee that PGD should not be used for selection of non-
medical traits, this has not been expressly stated in the Act.163   While the prohibitions in 
Schedule One of the Act prohibit reproductive research, they do not prohibit the conduct 
of non-reproductive research, which may be permitted should the advisory committee 
promulgate guidelines.  In this way, there is also a permissive aspect to the Act.  
On the face of it, while the Act is permissive, it is far from conferring on the Advisory 
Committee unfettered and arbitrary decision-making power.  The New Zealand 
framework provides significant flexibility which is moderated by public consultation 
requirements under the Act and sets limits by prohibiting sex selection of embryos. 
Decisions must be made in accordance with the principles expressed in the Act.  These 
principles tend towards balancing competing interests, while protecting the health and 
well-being of stakeholders.  
However on deeper analysis, the Terms of Reference provided by the Minister for the 
Advisory Committee evoke some concerns.  Decisions of the Advisory Committee may 
be made by simple majority vote.  This may be criticised by some but it is the robustness 
of the debate that is important. Understandably, the members are restrained from 
commenting publicly indicating any disagreement with policy decisions.  However, it 
may increase transparency and public confidence in the legitimacy of the Committee if 
decisions are accompanied by reasoned analysis of the decisions, including the scientific 
basis, the differing perspectives taken into account, and the number of members in favour 
or against decisions that are made.
There are strong grounds to believe that the decision-making process set out in the 
Terms of Reference for ECART is ultra vires.  The Act provides that the ethics committee 
is subject to the Operational Standard for Ethics Committees.   The Ministers’ terms of 
reference permit decision-making on the grounds of a two third majority, contrary to 
the Operational Standard which requires consensus decision-making.  This leaves any 
decision made by ECART open to challenge by way of judicial review on the grounds of 
procedural invalidity.164  In addition, the Act requires that the Minister must ensure that 
the committee complies in its composition with the Operational Standard.  The Standard 
requires a minimum of 10 members.  However, the Ethics Committee Terms of Reference 
provide for 8 members as a minimum, and it is currently constituted with 8 members.  It 
is therefore possible that ECART is not legally constituted under the Act.
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There are no rights of appeal from the decision of an Ethics Committee or the Advisory 
Committee.165  This is a barrier to the Act achieving a ‘robust’ framework. Whilst ECART 
may seek or receive advice from ACART, they cannot be compelled by a claimant to do so.  
Judicial review is available, but it is expensive and time consuming. 
Finally, it is a concern that, although the Advisory Committee has been given the mandate 
and duty to monitor the application and health outcomes of assisted reproductive 
procedures and research, a robust, medium or long-term monitoring system was not put 
in place before PGD was declared to be an established procedure. 
In passing the Act, the New Zealand legislature has rejected a trend seen in other jurisdictions 
which have opted for a licensing system with one statutory body responsible for creating 
both policy and assessing applications.  One motivation for this is clearly that the system 
New Zealand has adopted is a cost-effective and efficient option.166  The fact that PGD has 
been declared to be an established procedure in certain specified circumstances adheres 
to the principle of imposing the least necessary regulatory intervention, and reduces the 
number of applications from consuming ECART time and money.  
There is little doubt that the HART Act 2004 was a necessary legislative initiative.  The 
framework sets up an affordable, efficient, responsive process, and is supported in health 
and safety aspects by other health law initiatives. However, it will be the fine-tuning of the 
work of the Advisory Committee that will dictate the success of the regulatory scheme in 
terms of being seen to be making policy in a transparent, fair and legitimate manner.  
1.3  oBligations on ProviDers – tHe MeDico-legal context
1.3.1  statutory oBligations unDer tHe Hart act
All New Zealand fertility clinics have been accredited by the Reproductive Technology 
Accreditation Committee (RTAC), which is the accreditation body of the Fertility Society of 
Australia, for the last decade and a half.  This external professional oversight of fertility services 
has been accepted on a voluntary basis by fertility service providers in New Zealand.  
The HART Act 2004 deems fertility services as coming within the definition of specified 
health or disability services under the Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001.167  The 
purpose of the HDS(S) Act is to: 
(a) promote the safe provision of health and disability services to the public; and 
(b)  enable the establishment of consistent and reasonable standards for providing   
 health and disability services to the public safely; and 
(c) encourage providers of health and disability services to take responsibility for   
 providing those services to the public safely; and 
(d)  encourage providers of health and disability services to the public to improve   
 continuously the quality of those services.168
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Under section 9 of the HDS(S) Act, a person providing fertility services must be certified by 
the Director-General to provide health care services of that kind, meet all relevant service 
standards, comply with any relevant conditions to which the person was subject by the 
Director-General, and must comply with the HDS(S) Act.
There are no specific standards for fertility services currently in New Zealand.  The Ministry 
of Health hopes to have a standard published by Standards New Zealand in early 2007.169 
Until such time as the Minister approves specific standards for providing fertility services,170 
providers are deemed to comply with the HDS(S) Act171 if the provider complies with specified 
criteria.  The provider needs to be certified by the Director-General of Health, must comply 
with any standards approved by the Director General of Health under the HART Act, and must 
have been the subject of an audit report by an approved organisation and that report must be 
given to the Director General within 5 days that it is received by the provider.172
The Director-General has approved the RTAC to audit the provision or likely future provision 
of fertility services in New Zealand in the interim period.173  The RTAC Code of Practice has 
been approved as the standard for providing fertility services in the interim period.174  The 
Terms of Reference for RTAC require them to visit centres using ART to assess compliance 
with the Code.  Accreditation (with or without conditions) may be granted to centres for up to 
three years.  The RTAC Code of Practice175 provides guidelines relating to staff and resources, 
patient information, consent, laboratory services, treatment methods, record keeping, ethics 
and research, quality control and accreditation.  In relation to laboratories, the Code of 
Practice provides that both biochemistry/endocrinology and andrology laboratories must be 
accredited by the Australian National Association of Testing Authorities or the New Zealand 
equivalent to the ISO 17025 guidelines.176  
As well as setting out standards, the Code of Practice makes recommendations for patient 
management.  It states that the objective of ART should be the live birth of a single healthy 
child.  For this reason, RTAC requests that all ART programs make every reasonable effort 
to reduce multiple pregnancy.177  Some of the language in the Code of Practice is expressed 
in terms of requesting, not requiring.  However, requirements for laboratory services and 
qualifications of laboratory personnel, record keeping, and information provision contain 
mandatory standards.
The HDS(S) Act provides the Director-General of Health with the authority to cancel the 
certification of a provider.178  In addition, cessation orders may prohibit the provision of 
services if the Director General is satisfied that the provision of services by the provider or 
under the provider’s control does not comply with certification and standards requirements, 
or services are being provided in an unsafe or unsanitary manner.179  Closing orders may also 
be made.180  A cessation or closing order may be revoked by the Director-General if she is 
satisfied that the reasons for which it was issued no longer apply, it is unlikely those reasons 
will apply again in the short term, and there are no other reasons that would justify the issue of 
a cessation order or a closing order in respect of the person or place concerned.181  An appeal 
process is provided under the Act against a cancellation or certification.182
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Consequently, the provisions of the HART Act have essentially provided the legal requirement 
for clinics to be accredited and to adhere to standards, given statutory reinforcement to 
voluntary professional self-regulation, and provided civil sanctions for non-compliance.  The 
Act has created new synergy by combining elements from both professional self-regulation 
and government regulation.  
The fact that accreditation of services is carried out by an Australian professional body may 
be criticised on the grounds that this important role should not be delegated to an offshore 
organisation.  However, this may enable inspections to be more objective than if carried out by 
New Zealand fertility providers, who would have to inspect their colleagues, with whom they 
may be competing for business. 
The health and disability infrastructure in New Zealand, which provides a framework for 
safety and accountability, and which can be extended to cover fertility services, is a compelling 
argument against adopting the licensing approach taken by other jurisdictions. 
 
1.3.2  otHer oBligations on ProviDers
Prior to the introduction of the HART Act 2004, fertility services did not operate in a legal 
vacuum, nor are they only subject to the requirements of the HART Act since its enactment. 
There are significant relevant additional regulatory measures affecting health providers in 
the New Zealand medico-legal context.  These include consumer protection law in the form 
of the Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Code of Rights, professional disciplinary 
proceedings under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, compensation 
for treatment injury pursuant to the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 
2001, civil claims for wrongful birth or wrongful life, and actions in criminal negligence.  The 
following is a brief discussion of how these discrete areas of law may impact upon fertility 
providers.  It is not intended to go into these in detail, which would require a far greater 
analysis, but rather to outline the potential issues that may arise in theory.   Close analysis of 
these issues will be carried the project progresses.
1.3.2.1  the common law and negligence 
In a common law claim for damages on the grounds of negligence it is necessary to prove several 
fundamental requirements.  These are that the practitioner owed the plaintiff a duty of care; 
that the practitioner breached the duty of care owed; that the plaintiff suffered compensable 
damage; and the damage suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the practitioner’s breach of the 
duty of care that he/she owed a plaintiff.  
Common law claims for negligence in New Zealand have been circumscribed by the statutory 
compensation regime. However, negligence is still relevant for the purpose of the Code of 
Consumers’ Rights, and for allegations of professional misconduct.  Significantly, both the 
Code of Rights and disciplinary law have dispensed with the requirement to establish harm 
arising from alleged negligence.  Because of this, the mere evidence of negligence may suffice 
to constitute a breach of the Code, or to satisfy a professional misconduct charge, without 
any evidence that the breach was causative of harm on the part of the plaintiff.  In this way, 
negligence is still a live issue in New Zealand.
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1.3.2.2  code of consumers’ rights
The purpose of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 is expressed as being: 
to promote and protect the rights of health consumers and disability services consumers, 
and, in particular, to secure the fair, simple, speedy, and efficient resolution of complaints 
relating to infringements of those rights.183 
This objective is achieved through the promulgation of a Code of Rights pursuant to the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act, and the establishment of a complaints process to 
ensure enforcement of those rights.184  A consumer of fertility services is a consumer under the 
Code of Health and Disability Consumers’ Rights.185  The rights provided under the Code may 
be described as generic rights, and include the following:
1  the Right to be Treated with Respect, 
2  the Right to Freedom from Discrimination, Coercion, Harassment, and exploitation,
3 the Right to Dignity and Independence, 
4 the Right to Services of an Appropriate Standard,  
 (this includes the right to have services provided with reasonable care and skill and  
 to have services provided that comply with legal, professional, ethical, and other   
 relevant standards)
5 the Right to Effective Communication, 
6 the Right to be Fully Informed, 
7 the Right to Make an Informed Choice and Give Informed Consent, 
8 the Right to Support
9 Rights in respect of teaching and research 
 and
10 the Right to Complain. 
Right 4 effectively provides a right to non-negligent care.  The Code is distinctive in providing 
an avenue for complaint, investigation and the imposition of limited sanctions without any 
requirement that the alleged negligence caused actual damage to the consumer.  Hence, the 
Code provides an avenue for redress where negligence has occurred in the absence of harm 
suffered by the complainant.  
These rights would cover any procedures carried out on a consumer of fertility services, 
and potentially any procedure performed on their gametes.  However, it is unlikely that the 
Code would apply to an embryo.  Gametes are derived from a ‘consumer’ and a ‘health care 
procedure’ includes any health treatment, examination, health research or health service 
administered to, or carried out on or in respect of, any person by any health care provider. 
Procedures performed in relation to gametes may therefore be services performed ‘in respect 
of ’ a consumer.  It is likely that a technician or embryologist in a lab would come within the 
definition of a ‘health care provider’ as contained in the Health and Disability Commissioner 
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Act 1994.186  However, it is unlikely that an embryo would come within the definition of a 
‘health care consumer’ under the Act’.187  As an embryo is perceived to have an independent 
moral status from a parent, but does not have any legal status as a person, any procedure is 
unlikely to be deemed to be carried out ‘on or in respect of a health care consumer’.  Hence 
there is scope for protection of fertility service consumers under the Code, but it is unlikely 
that the Health and Disability Commissioner has direct jurisdiction over PGD procedures on 
embryos under the Code of Rights.   
There is also a duty under Rights 6 and 7 of the Code to inform, and to obtain informed 
consent.  The Code augments the interim Guidelines, providing a complaints process for 
breaches.  For example, a provider is required under the Guidelines to supply the patient with 
specific information.188  If this does not occur, then a claim may be brought under the Code for 
breach of the Right to be informed.189
1.3.2.3  Professional Disciplinary law
The Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal was established on 18 September 2004 pursuant 
to section 84 of the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 (HPCA).190  The 
Tribunal hears and determines disciplinary proceedings brought against health practitioners.191 
Professional misconduct is defined in the HPCA Act as:
(a) … any act or omission that, in the judgment of the Tribunal, amounts to   
 malpractice or negligence in relation to the scope of practice in respect  of which the  
 practitioner was registered at the time the conduct occurred; or 
(b) … any act or omission that, in the judgment of the Tribunal, has brought  or was   
 likely to bring discredit to the profession that the health practitioner practised at the  
 time the conduct occurred.192
The definition of professional misconduct in s101(1)(a) of the HPCA Act refers to professional 
misconduct as meaning malpractice or negligence in relation to the way a health practitioner 
discharges his or her professional responsibilities.  Subsection 101(1)(b) categorises acts or 
omissions that do, or are likely to, bring discredit to the practitioner’s profession, regardless of 
whether the acts or omissions in question occurred in relation to the practitioner’s ‘scope of 
practice’, as professional misconduct.193 
In the first hearing reported under the new legislation it was declared unlikely that the legislature 
intended that all of the criteria required by the common law to establish negligence would 
need to be proven in the prosecution of health practitioners.  The inquiry to be undertaken 
in a matter before the Tribunal was whether the practitioner’s acts or omissions fell below 
the standards reasonably expected of a health practitioner in the circumstances of the person 
appearing before the Tribunal.  Whether or not there was a breach of the appropriate standards 
is to be measured against the standards of a responsible body of the practitioner’s peers.194 
This approach, it was said, ‘avoids the need for prosecuting authorities to prove damage’.195
It was stated that the test as to what constitutes professional misconduct involves a two step 
process. The first step involves an objective analysis of whether or not the health practitioner’s 
acts or omissions in relation to his or her practice can be reasonably regarded by the Tribunal 
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as constituting: malpractice; or negligence; or otherwise meets the standard of having brought, 
or was likely to bring discredit to the practitioner’s profession.  The second step of the process 
requires the Tribunal to be satisfied that the health practitioner’s acts or omissions require a 
disciplinary sanction for the purposes of protecting the public and/or maintaining professional 
standards and/or punishing the health practitioner. 
Hence, a practitioner may be liable for a finding of professional misconduct in the event of 
negligence when his or her act or omission falls below the standard reasonably expected of a 
health practitioner in the circumstances of the person appearing before the Tribunal.  It is not 
necessary to prove damages, but the Tribunal must be satisfied that disciplinary sanctions are 
required in order to protect the public, to maintain professional standards or simply to punish 
the health practitioner. 
1.3.2.4  injury Prevention, rehabilitation and compensation act 2001
Accident Compensation legislation was first introduced into New Zealand in the 1970s.196 
Historically, it provided cover for personal injury arising from medical misadventure which 
occurred as a result of medical error or medical mishap as defined in the Act.  As of 1 July 2005, 
the medical error and medical mishap provisions have been replaced with personal injury 
caused by treatment (treatment injury).197  The Act bars court proceedings for damages arising 
directly or indirectly from personal injury that is covered by the scheme.198
Treatment injury is defined as personal injury that is suffered by a person seeking treatment 
from one or more registered health professionals, or receiving treatment from or at the 
direction of one or more registered health professionals, that is caused by treatment.199 
Treatment includes;
(a) the giving of treatment, 
(b) diagnosis of a person’s medical condition, 
(c) a decision on the treatment to be provided (including a decision not to provide   
 treatment), 
(d) a failure to provide treatment or to provide treatment in a timely manner, 
(e) obtaining, or failing to obtain, a person’s consent to undergo treatment, including  
 any information provided to the person to enable the person to make an informed  
 decision on whether to accept treatment
(f) the provision of prophylaxis
(g) the failure of any equipment, device or tool used as part of the treatment process …
(h) the application of any support systems, including policies, processes, practices, and  
 administrative systems, that-
 (i)  are used by the organisation or person providing the treatment;
 (ii) directly support the treatment
Treatment injury does not include personal injury that is a necessary part or ordinary 
consequence of the treatment taking into account all the circumstances of the treatment, 
including the person’s underlying health condition and the clinical knowledge at the time of the 
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treatment.200  Treatment injury does not include personal injury that is wholly or substantially 
caused by a person’s underlying health condition,201 or that is a result of a person unreasonably 
withholding or delaying consent to treatment.202  There is no cover if personal injury is solely 
attributable to a resource allocation decision.203  Nor does the fact that the treatment did not 
achieve a desired result, of itself, constitute treatment injury.204
Treatment injury includes personal injury suffered by a person as a result of treatment given 
as part of a clinical trial where the claimant did not agree in writing to participate in a trial. 
Cover for treatment injury will also arise where an approved ethics committee gave approval 
for a trial, being satisfied that the trial was not to be conducted principally for the benefit of 
the manufacturer or distributor of the medicine or item being trialled.   
 Where personal injury occurs, for which there is cover under the IPRC Act, it is still possible 
that exemplary damages may be obtained where the actions of the practitioner constitute 
‘outrageous’ conduct, and other legal consequences do not adequately express the court’s 
disapproval of the practitioner’s conduct.205   Whilst the IPRC Act 2001 applies to consumers 
of fertility services, there is great uncertainty at to its relevance in the context of wrongful birth 
or wrongful life claims which may potentially be brought against fertility providers by parents 
of a disabled child or by a disabled child themselves. 
 
1.3.2.5  wrongful Birth
Wrongful birth actions involve a claim brought by a parent or parents who argue that, but 
for another person’s negligence, their child would not have been conceived or born. This 
could arise in the case of a provider failing to advise the risk of illness, or failing to advise a 
couple to undergo prenatal diagnosis after PGD, or failing to interpret correctly the results 
of a procedure such as PGD.  Where a breach of the duty of care is alleged, it may be claimed 
that the parents have been deprived of an opportunity to not proceed with implantation 
or pregnancy.  Damages may be sought in respect of the distress occasioned by the parents 
in respect of the existence of the disability in the child, and for the extra costs involved in 
raising such a child.  In New Zealand such claims are complicated by the Injury Prevention 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001. As already discussed, the IPRC Act bars court 
proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly from personal injury that is covered by 
the scheme.  This excludes the ability for a civil claim to be brought against a person when the 
cause of action involves personal injury caused by treatment (treatment injury).206 
It has been held in the High Court that conception, pregnancy, and childbirth could not be 
considered to be a personal injury to the mother when they occurred as a result of a natural or 
gradual process.207  However, it is plausible that conception through IVF could be construed as 
a personal injury if negligence occurred in the course of the procedure, as it is more difficult to 
construe it as a natural or gradual process.208  If this is accepted, an IVF/PGD parent would not 
be able to bring a civil claim for wrongful birth because of the statutory bar which excludes a 
person from bringing an action for personal injury covered by the Act.209  
If, on the other hand, wrongful birth cases are held to be outside the IPRC Act scheme, a 
provider may become liable in a civil claim for negligence resulting in wrongful birth.  In 
PGD cases, the issue becomes one of wrongful selection of an embryo, or a missed chance of 
terminating a pregnancy on the basis of prenatal diagnosis. 
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In Cattanach v Melchior,210 the High Court of Australia held that the costs of rearing a healthy, 
but unplanned, child were recoverable.  The United Kingdom has recently followed a different 
path based on policy grounds.211   These grounds were the incalculability in monetary terms 
to the parents of the benefits of the birth of a healthy child, the sense that it would be morally 
offensive for the parents to recover these costs, and that society would regard it so.  In Rees v 
Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust,212 the House of Lords reaffirmed that such costs are 
not recoverable, nor are the extra costs of raising a healthy child where the parent is disabled.213 
However, where the pregnancy has resulted in the birth of a disabled child, there may be a 
greater chance of damages being recovered.214  If a wrongful birth action in the context of an 
assisted reproductive procedure is held to be outside the IPRC Act in New Zealand, it remains 
to be seen which common law approach our courts adopt. 
1.3.2.6  wrongful life
A claim for wrongful life could be brought by a child born as a result of PGD if a test is 
undertaken to exclude a disorder, but it is negligently reported.  Another possible avenue in 
which it may arise is the situation where although no negligence was involved, a test was read 
as a false negative but the woman was not advised to undergo prenatal testing.  In the event 
that the child is born with the disorder for which PGD was carried out, it could be argued 
that had the mother been informed that the embryo carried that specific mutation, or that 
she should undergo prenatal testing in the second circumstance, she would not have had the 
embryo implanted, and the child would not have been born. A claim in negligence may also 
arise if a provider has failed to advise of a genetic risk to a prospective embryo.  
The basis for a wrongful life claim is often said to be a claim by the child that he or she would 
have been better off if he or she had never been born.215 Claims for wrongful life have evoked 
different judicial responses throughout the world.216   There have not been any successful 
actions brought on the grounds of wrongful life in New Zealand.217  
In a case heard in the New York Supreme Court, parents and their child who had cystic fibrosis 
sought to bring a medical malpractice action against a hospital, medical centre and physician.218 
It was alleged that the defendants failed to warn a couple who were undertaking IVF with 
donor ova that the donor was a carrier of cystic fibrosis. As the father was unknowingly a 
carrier of the genetic mutation also, the child subsequently born inherited cystic fibrosis.   It 
was made clear in the Supreme Court that rights of recovery did not exist for a child’s birth 
with cystic fibrosis or for parents for emotional distress.219  However, a right of recovery for 
pecuniary expense for the infant’s care and treatment could be available. Claims for gross 
negligence or fraud in failing to prevent the conception of child with cystic fibrosis could be 
brought, although causation issues would raise some difficulties for the claimants.
A case of wrongful life was recently heard in the Australian High Court.220  This is the first 
time the High Court of Australia has been asked to address the issue of wrongful life. The 
case involved two people, in one case an adult and in the other a child, who were seeking 
compensation for their disabilities which were allegedly caused by the negligence of doctors. 
Each has significant disabilities and will require care for the rest of their lives. In one case a 
doctor failed to diagnose rubella early in the mother’s pregnancy.  In the other case an IVF 
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clinic failed to properly advise parents of the risk of an inherited clotting disorder. The NSW 
Court of Appeal decided in a 2-1 judgment to reject the medical negligence claims of the two 
claimants.221  The case then went on appeal to the High Court.   The case was heard by the full 
court of the High Court on 10 November 2005, but the judgment is yet to be released.
The French courts bucked the trend of rejecting wrongful life claims on public policy grounds, 
becoming the first European jurisdiction to allow an action for wrongful life.222  In addition, 
a strong argument for reconsidering and allowing wrongful life actions in the form of 
‘diminished life’ actions has recently been made.223   
The areas of wrongful life and wrongful birth are extremely complex.  The above has been 
intended to merely provide an overview of the potential of these claims.  It is not in any way a 
full analysis of the issues and will be canvassed in greater detail in a later report.
1.3.2.  crimes against the Person – criminal negligence
The Crimes Act includes several provisions which may be relevant in the context of providing 
fertility services.  Section 155 of the Crimes Act 1961 imposes a legal duty on every one who 
undertakes (except in case of necessity) to administer surgical or medical treatment to have 
and to use reasonable knowledge, skill, and care in doing any such act.224   Anyone who omits 
to discharge that duty without lawful excuse is criminally liable for the consequences.  Section 
156 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that everyone who has in his/her charge or under his/her 
control anything whatever, whether animate or inanimate, or who erects, makes, operates, 
or maintains anything whatever, which, in the absence of precaution or care, may endanger 
human life is under a legal duty to take reasonable precautions against and to use reasonable 
care to avoid such danger. A person who omits without lawful excuse to discharge that duty 
will be criminally responsible for the consequences.   
However, these legal duties are subject to an important qualification, by virtue of an amendment 
to the Crimes Act in the 1990s.  Section 150A was inserted by the Crimes Amendment Act 1997 
after the sustained and effective lobbying of a coalition of medical bodies.225  As a result of 
the amendment, liability for criminal negligence will only accrue if in the circumstances of 
the particular case, the omission or neglect is a major departure from the standard of care 
expected of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies in those circumstances.226 
Although prosecutions under the Crimes Act 1961 are rare, they are still possible.227
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1.3.3  suMMary:  tHe MeDico-legal context
Fertility service providers are subject to professional and legal oversight in a number of 
ways.  For the purposes of the Code of Consumers’ Rights, there is no requirement for the 
provider to have caused harm to be guilty of a breach, although the sanctions available 
under the Code are relatively modest.  Causation of harm is not a prerequisite to a finding 
of professional misconduct under the HPCA Act 2003, but the tribunal must be satisfied 
that the health practitioner’s acts or omissions require a disciplinary sanction for any 
of the following purposes: protecting the public, maintaining professional standards or 
punishing the health practitioner.  Whilst the IPRC Act 2001 cushions a provider from 
claims in negligence by providing cover for treatment injury and placing a statutory bar on 
proceedings arising out of personal injury for which a claimant has cover under the Act, 
exemplary damages are available when a practitioner is guilty of ‘outrageous’ conduct. It 
is unclear whether the IPRC Act 2001 prevents a claim for wrongful birth in New Zealand 
in the context of ART. If it does not, it is similarly unclear whether policy concerns would 
override a Court’s willingness to allow a wrongful birth action in New Zealand.  Whether 
civil claims for wrongful life should be permitted is a strongly contested issue in other 
jurisdictions.  Again, there are complex issues involved which have mitigated against 
allowing such claims in other countries.    Criminal sanctions exist where negligence, 
which is a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in 
those circumstances, causes bodily harm or death. 
2  tHe uniteD kingDoM
The United Kingdom’s approach to regulating the use of PGD has been described as ‘one of 
the most liberal regulatory mechanisms in the world’.228 It is difficult to consider the legislative 
approach of the United Kingdom to the regulation of reproductive technologies without first 
taking into account the political context.  The predisposition of the United Kingdom is heavily 
geared towards scientific freedom.229  In a Foreword to the Government White paper, Our 
Inheritance, Our Future,230 Tony Blair wrote:
Our country has a remarkable scientific tradition.  The extraordinary achievements of 
Newton, Darwin and a host of other eminent scientists have both greatly increased the 
understanding of our world and improved the quality of life for everyone.  
Our record continues to be outstanding; with just one per cent of the world’s population, 
we receive nine per cent of scientific citations.  Nowhere has this record been more notable 
in recent decades than in bio-science and bio-technology.
The discovery in Britain of the structure of DNA 50 years ago – perhaps the biggest single 
scientific advance of the last century – marked the beginning of a golden age of bio-science 
in Britain which continues today.  It is likely to have as big an impact on our lives in the 
coming century as the computer had for the last generation.
The more we understand about the human genome, the greater will be the impact on our 
lives and on our healthcare …
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I am proud to know that much of this ground-breaking work is already taking place in 
our country.  I am also absolutely determined that the National Health Service should be 
able to respond to these advances so the benefits of genetics and the more personalised and 
improved healthcare it will bring are available to all.
It means we must prepare now for the future.  We must invest in research and research 
facilities to drive further discovery …231
It is apparent throughout the White Paper that there is a very strong desire to harness new 
genetic technologies in the United Kingdom, and to be world leaders in this area.  Notably, 
some of the world’s ‘firsts’ in ART and genetic science were British.  The first test tube baby in 
the world was Louise Brown who was born in Britain in 1978, and the first cloned mammal 
was a British sheep called Dolly.  This scientific drive is accompanied by initiatives aimed at 
increasing public awareness and understanding of issues raised by genetic technologies, and 
engaging the general public in consultation on certain topics.232   The Government established 
the Human Genetics Commission in 1999 to provide expert advice on human genetics and the 
relevant social and ethical issues arising from them.233  The hope is that these mechanisms will 
enable the Government to ensure that ‘its regulatory framework around genetics and health 
anticipates and reflects public concerns’.234  
The following discussion seeks to provide a brief background to the introduction of the HFE 
Act 1990 and an outline of the relevant substantive provisions of the Act.  A description of 
how PGD came to be a licensable activity, as well as the legal challenge to the HFEA’s decision 
to allow licenses for HLA tissue typing will be set out.  The current content of the Code of 
Practice in relation to PGD will then be outlined.  Excerpts of the relevant parts of an in-depth 
review of the HFE Act by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee will be 
provided.  This section will conclude with the Government proposals for change to the current 
system.
2.1  BackgrounD to tHe HFe act 10
In 1982 the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology was set up by 
the government under the chairmanship of Dame Mary (now Baroness) Warnock. 235 The 
Committee’s terms of reference were:
to consider recent and potential developments in medicine and science related to human 
fertilization and embryology; to consider what policies and safeguards should be applied, 
including consideration of the social, ethical and legal implications of their developments; 
and to make recommendations.
The Warnock Report was released in 1984.  In 1987 the Government White Paper, Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology: A Framework for Legislation was published after consultation on 
the Warnock report.236  A major focus of the Warnock report was on embryo research, which 
inevitably led to great discussion as to the moral status of embryos. A key conclusion of the 
Warnock Committee was that the human embryo had a special status, entitling it to ‘some 
protection in law’.237  After six years and much political debate after the Warnock Report was 
released, the HFE Act was passed.  
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The HFE Act has been described as a pragmatic response to the public anxieties evoked by 
the ability to create in vitro human embryos and the related potential for embryonic use, 
manipulation and research.  Ethical concerns for the embryo and the perceived need to 
protect the public were central to the Act which, it has been said, is evidence of the intention 
of the British Parliament to facilitate research and progress by legitimating such research with 
regulation.238 ‘Britain opted for a limited and pragmatic regulation of research and treatment 
focusing on ensuring public accountability on the part of both researchers and clinicians, 
facilitating medical and scientific progress and largely skating over fundamental questions of 
reproductive choice’.239 The price of the British ‘realpolitik’ has been described as a lack of a 
single coherent philosophy underlying the regulatory regime.240
2.2  tHe HFe act 10
The construction of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 is vastly different to 
that of the New Zealand Act.  The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 contains 
few express prohibitions, and delegates considerable decision-making power to the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA).  The Authority is an independent arm’s 
length body under the patronage of the Department of Health.241  The Act provides the basis 
for a system which authorises the HFEA to deal with the regulatory aspects of certain artificial 
reproductive procedures and research.242  
The purpose of the Act was to regulate the creation and use of human embryos outside the 
body, to prohibit certain practices in connection with embryos, and to establish and empower 
the HFEA to grant licenses for otherwise prohibited activities.  There is an absence of any 
principles set out in the Act itself.  The HFE Act should be read with the Warnock Report and 
the subsequent Government White Paper. 
The HFE Act sets out certain prohibitions in connection with embryos243 and sets up a licensing 
authority,244 the scope of whose power includes granting licences, authorising activities in the 
course of providing treatment services,245 storage246 and research.247 The HFEA is responsible 
for maintaining a code of practice for the proper conduct of activities carried on in pursuance 
of a licence under the Act.248  
Activities for which the HFEA may grant treatment licences are set out in clause 1, schedule 2 
of the Act, which provides:
1   (1)  A licence under this paragraph may authorise any of the following in the course  
  providing treatment services-
  (a) bringing about the creation of embryos in vitro,
  (b) keeping embryos,
  (c) using gametes,
  (d) practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to   
   be  placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that 
   purpose,
  (e) placing any embryo in a woman…
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 (3)   A licence under this paragraph cannot authorise any activity unless it appears to  
  the Authority to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing   
  treatment services.
‘Treatment services’ for the purposes of the Act are defined as ‘medical, surgical or obstetric 
services provided to the public or a section of the public for the purpose of assisting women 
to carry children’.249  Licences for treatment under paragraph 1 of schedule 2 may be granted 
subject to conditions specified in the licence, including the manner of the performance of 
activities referred to in sub-clause (1) above.250  
The Act sets out the conditions of every licence for treatment.251  It is provided that ‘a woman 
shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of 
any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a 
father), and of any other child who may be affected by the birth’.252
The HFE Act permits the Secretary of State to make regulations for any purpose for which 
regulations may be made under the Act.253  This effectively permits amendments to be made 
to the Act in the form of regulations.  However, certain regulations may not be passed unless 
a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the House of Parliament.254 
Parliamentary scrutiny involves either an affirmative resolution of any proposed change, or in 
some cases negative resolution.   
Scrutiny of secondary legislation by negative resolutions involves regulations being lodged in 
the office of the clerk of each House. The regulations will come into force 40 days after lodging 
if they have not been made subject to a resolution for annulment passed in either the House 
of Commons or the House of Lords.  The less rigorous safeguard of negative resolution by the 
House concerns any additional functions to be undertaken by the HFEA,255 the composition 
of the HFEA licence committees,256 changes in licensing procedure,257 any proposed increase or 
decrease in the permitted period for the storage of eggs or embryos,258 and any changes in the 
information which the HFEA is obliged to disclose to an applicant under s31 of the Act.   
Parliamentary scrutiny and affirmative resolution are necessary for making regulations which 
would add to the activities involving keeping or use of an embryo that are to be prohibited 
under the Act.259 Similarly, any proposal relaxing regulations prohibiting the storage or use of 
gametes260 or adding to the practices which may be authorised in a treatment licence261 must be 
subject to an affirmative resolution of the House of Parliament.  The statutory instrument will 
not take effect until approval occurs in Parliament by affirmative resolution.  
In 2001, section 3 of the Act was extended by regulations to allow the HFEA to grant licences 
for research to be undertaken on human embryos in order to increase knowledge about the 
development of embryos, about serious disease and to enable the knowledge derived to be 
applied in the development of treatments to combat serious disease.262  Embryonic research 
had previously been restricted to research involving infertility, congenital disease, miscarriage, 
contraception or the detection of genetic or chromosomal abnormalities.263  This regulation 
has opened the door to stem cell research, distinguishing the UK regime as amongst the most 
liberal in Europe.  
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2.3  tHe HFe act anD PgD
It is apparent from the relevant sections of the HFE Act set out above that the Act does not 
expressly provide for the licensing of PGD.  However, the Act provides a mechanism for passing 
regulations to extend the list of activities for which treatment licences may be given.  Such 
regulations would require the affirmative resolution of the House of Parliament, as already 
discussed.  Significantly, regulations were not utilised to mandate the licensing of clinics for 
PGD when applicants first approached the HFEA for a licence to carry out PGD.  Instead, the 
HFEA took the approach that the Act implicitly authorised them to license clinics to provide 
PGD services.
The Authority assumed jurisdiction over PGD on the following grounds.  The HFE Act 
explicitly permits research on embryos, and the possibility of developing methods for detecting 
gene or chromosome abnormalities in embryos prior to implantation was recognised at the 
time of enactment.  This was supported by the fact that a clinical trial undertaken at the time 
to develop PGD for a life-threatening sex-linked disorder had occurred.  The HFEA was 
therefore of the opinion that the Act implicitly supported the licensing of PGD for severe or 
life-threatening disorders, and it was consequently within their mandate to create policy in the 
area.264  Currently eight clinics are licensed in the UK to carry out PGD for specific medical 
conditions.265
The HFEA is responsible for maintaining a Code of Practice for the proper conduct of activities 
carried on in pursuance of a licence under the Act.  It is also responsible for issuing guidance to 
fertility clinics which may supplement the Code of Practice at relevant times.266  In August 1999, 
the HFEA issued an interim licensing guidance for PGD via letter from the Chief Executive, 
which included guidelines for the licensing of embryo biopsy practitioners.  In November 
1999, after the release of the interim guidance, the HFEA and the Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Testing (ACGT) then issued a consultation document on Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis.  When the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) was formed a month later in 
December, it took over the consultation from the ACGT.267  A joint HFEA and HGC working 
party was established in late 2000 to analyse the responses and to formulate recommendations 
to the HFEA. 268   
The consultation document did not directly address the question of Preimplantation HLA 
tissue typing.  However, interim guidance for the use of PGD with tissue typing where there was 
a genetic risk to the embryo was announced by the HFEA in November of 2001. This guidance 
was in contrast with an opinion provided by the HFEA Ethics Committee which was in favour 
of permitting preimplantation tissue typing in the absence of a heritable condition.269  The 
ethics committee opinion addressed three issues in relation to preimplantation tissue typing.  
~ Is PGD with HLA typing compatible with the ‘welfare of the unborn child?’ 
~ Is licensing PGD with HLA typing compatible with the public good?  
~ Can morally significant criteria be found to demarcate ‘acceptable’ and     
 ‘unacceptable’ reasons for the conception and selection of embryos? 
2
The committee believed that consideration of the welfare of the child should not be restricted 
to a narrow legal perspective, but should include the wider question of the putative child’s 
actual moral, psychological, social and physical welfare.270  The ethics committee believed 
that in this context arguments based on eugenics were irrelevant, as the explicit purpose 
of the treatment is to cure a particular condition.  The committee favoured a ‘principle of 
constrained parental decision-making when deciding whether a child should be conceived and 
selected to provide donor tissue for an affected sibling’.  The constraints involved exhausting 
other avenues of tissue, or treatment, and the condition suffered by the existing child needed 
to be severe or life-threatening.  The ethics committee believed that the technique should also 
be available where a sibling suffered from a life-threatening but non-inherited condition.  The 
opinion of the ethics committee was not adopted by the HFEA, which took a more restrictive 
approach.  A material reason given for the more restrictive approach was the lack of evidence 
relating to the effects of embryo biopsy.271
When the HFEA agreed to license PGD with tissue typing in 2002 for a couple whose child 
was suffering from the genetic disorder beta thalassaemia, judicial review proceedings were 
brought by the lobby group CORE.272  It was claimed that the HFEA had no power to issue 
a licence that permitted the use of PGD with HLA tissue typing to select between healthy 
embryos.   The HFEA was also strongly criticised by the House of Commons Select Committee 
on Science and Technology at that time.273  The basis of the Select Committee criticism was 
that the decision to allow tissue typing occurred in the absence of public consultation on the 
issue, and went significantly further than PGD which was carried out in the interests of the 
future child itself:
The HFEA’s decision to allow tissue typing in conjunction with preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis went beyond the scope of its own public consultation.  It is vital that the public 
are taken along with decisions of such ethical importance.274
In 2003, a decision of the High Court in relation to the legality of the HFEA decision to license 
tissue typing cast a shadow of doubt on whether it was within the statutory authority of the 
HFEA to confer licences on clinics to perform PGD simpliciter.275  However, Lord Phillips MR 
subsequently confirmed in the Court of Appeal in an obiter dicta statement that the HFEA did 
have the authority pursuant to the HFE Act to issue licenses for PGD.276   This view was clearly 
persuaded by the fact that not adopting this interpretation of the Act ‘would render unlawful a 
practice which has been carried on for over a decade and which is patently beneficial’.277  
The HFEA revised the interim guidance on PGD via Chair’s Letter in May of 2003.278  The 
revised guidance was incorporated into the 6th edition of the Code of Conduct which included 
a chapter dedicated to PGD, for the first time.  The guidance did not include guidelines on HLA 
testing because of the uncertainty surrounding the legality of the procedure.279
After the Quintavalle case had been successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, the HFEA 
decided to review its tissue typing policy.  The Ethics and Law Committee were responsible 
for the review.  The HFEA adopted the recommendations, extending its policy on HLA tissue 
typing in July of 2004 to permit HLA tissue typing in the case of siblings with sporadic disease, 
as well as in heritable disease cases.280  The following provides a review of the details of the case, 
and provides a discussion of the scope of the HFEA’s authority under the HFE Act 1999.  The 
requirements of the HFEA Code of Conduct will then be set out.
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2.4   Hla testing – tHe quintavalle JuDgeMents
The precursor to the Quintavalle litigation began in September 2001 when an IVF service 
provider sought a ruling from the HFEA as to whether they could apply for a licence to permit 
the clinic to carry out tissue typing for a couple whose child was suffering from a genetically 
inherited blood disorder, beta thalassaemia.  The authority decided in principle to allow HLA 
Tissue Typing, but only where PGD was already necessary to avoid passing on a serious genetic 
disorder.  Licences for tissue typing were to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and would only 
be granted subject to the following conditions:
(a) the condition of the affected child should be severe or life-threatening, of a    
 sufficient seriousness to justify the use of PGD;
(b) the embryos should themselves be at risk of the condition affecting the  child;281
(c) all other possibilities of treatment and sources of tissue for the affected child should  
 have been explored;
(d) the techniques should not be available where the intended recipient is  a  parent;
(e) the intention should be to take only cord blood for the purposes of the treatment;282
(f) appropriate counselling should be given to the parents;
(g) families should be encouraged to take part in follow-up studies;
(h) embryos should not be genetically modified to provide a tissue match.
Josephine Quintavalle283 sought and obtained permission to seek judicial review of the HFEA’s 
decision announced on 13 December 2001 to award a licence to treat the Hashmi family.  She 
challenged the decision on the ground that the HFEA had no power to issue a licence that 
permitted the use of HLA typing to select between healthy embryos. Her challenge succeeded 
in the High Court. 
There were two issues canvassed in the High Court.  The first was whether genetic analysis of a 
cell taken from an embryo involved the ‘use of an embryo’.  If the question were answered in the 
affirmative, then a licence would be required.   If it did not, then no license would be necessary. 
The second issue argued was whether genetic analysis for the purpose of tissue typing was 
‘necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing treatment services’.   The claimant argued 
that the purpose of tissue typing could not be said to assist women to carry children, and could 
not come within the definition of treatment services.
Maurice Kay J applied a literal and restrictive approach.  He found it inconceivable that 
Parliament would have intended to leave an issue such as tissue typing outside the ambit of 
the Act, as it of necessity constituted ‘use’ of an embryo.  Tissue typing therefore could only be 
performed in pursuance with a licence.  In regard to the argument framed in the alternative 
he held that tissue typing of an embryo had no impact on the ability of a woman to carry the 
embryo after implantation, and could not be said to be ‘necessary or desirable for the purpose 
of assisting women to carry children’.  In the context of whether the activities in the course of 
treatment were ‘designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be placed in a 
woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that purpose’, Maurice Kay J was of 
the opinion that ‘suitable’ meant only that the embryo would be viable.  That would constrain 
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the use of PGD for some genetic conditions which do not affect the viability of the foetus. This 
had significant consequences for the scope of permissible PGD as many genetic disorders do 
not impact on the viability of a foetus. As the purpose of tissue typing was to ensure tissue 
compatibility with a sibling it was not for the purpose of assisting women to carry children 
and therefore did not constitute ‘treatment services’.  Hence, tissue typing was not an activity 
for which the authority was entitled to grant a licence under paragraph 1(1).  
Permission was given for the Authority to appeal the decision.  Concerned that the High Court 
judgment had wider implications, in particular that it put in doubt the legitimacy of the use 
of PGD to diagnose genetic disorders in general, the Secretary of State for Health sought and 
obtained permission to intervene to support the Authority’s appeal.
The appeal was upheld in the Court of Appeal.284  The Authority accepted in the higher court 
that embryo biopsy involved the ‘use’ of an embryo, and therefore a licence was required to 
authorise the procedure pursuant to section 3(1)(b).  The Court of Appeal accepted that the 
Authority could only issue a licence for ‘treatment services’ involving the use of an embryo 
where it appeared to the authority to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of ‘assisting 
women to carry children’ and when the activities in the course of the treatment were ‘designed 
to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman or to determine 
whether embryos are suitable for that purpose’.
However, it was held that treatment for the purpose of ‘assisting women to carry children’ was 
not restricted only to that which would assist a woman in the physical process of conceiving 
and producing a child.  Treatment for the purpose of ‘assisting women to carry children’ was 
capable of embracing IVF treatment designed to ensure that a child would not suffer from 
genetic defects or would possess stem cells matching that of a sick or dying sibling where 
concerns about the characteristics of any child conceived would otherwise inhibit or prevent a 
woman from bearing a child.  In those circumstances PGD with tissue typing in the course of 
the treatment services could be said to be an activity designed to secure that the embryo was 
‘suitable for the purpose of being placed in a woman’.  
On these grounds, the Court held that the Authority was entitled to conclude that the Act 
authorised it to licence IVF treatment with PGD for the purpose of tissue typing, subject to 
such conditions it considered appropriate.  
It was noted by Lord Phillips MR that enabling such a choice to be made in regard to 
characteristics of embryos through PGD raised difficult ethical questions as to whether and for 
what purpose such choice should be permitted.  He stated that these decisions had been placed 
in the hands of the Authority.285  Lord Justice Schiemann went further, stating that the decision 
of the Authority did not mean that parents had a right to IVF for social selection purposes.286 
However, it is still implicit in his judgment that the Authority had the power to mandate social 
selection procedures, should it choose to do so.
The decision of Mance, LJ provides a greater depth of reasoning, making a distinction 
between performing embryo biopsy for trivial preferences, and performing it in the face of 
compelling medical situations. He determined that the circumstances of the Hashmi’s (the 
family concerned) lay conceptually between the two poles of ‘good medical reasons’ for tests, 
and testing for ‘purely social reasons’.  In his opinion they: 
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lie closer in spirit in my view to the former pole than to the latter.  There are here good 
medical reasons for screening any embryo, although they do not relate to any future child’s 
health.  The concerns to which the authority’s decision and the licence for Mr and Mrs 
Hashmi are directed are anything but ‘purely social’, relating as they do to the health of a 
sibling and the well-being of the whole family.287
Undeterred, Josephine Quintavalle took an appeal to the House of Lords.288  Again it was held 
that IVF treatment was a medical service provided for the purpose of assisting a woman to 
carry a child within the definition of treatment services in section 2(1) of the Act.  Performing 
HLA typing constituted an activity ‘in the course of ’ providing that IVF treatment within 
section 11(1) provided it was an activity falling within the meaning of a practice to determine 
whether embryos were ‘suitable’ for the purpose of being placed in the woman and appeared 
to the authority ‘necessary or desirable’, within paragraph 1 of schedule 2.  PGD and HLA 
typing could lawfully be authorised by the authority as activities to determine the suitability 
of the embryo for implantation within the meaning of paragraph 1(1)(d) of Schedule 2 to the 
1990 Act. 
It was held that the term ‘suitable’ in paragraph 1(1)(d) fell to be construed in the context of 
the scheme of the 1990 Act and the background against which it had been enacted.  In this way, 
the House of Lords applied a purposive approach.  It was held that Parliament had intended 
to define the licensing power of the Authority in broad terms and to entrust it to decide which 
practices were ethically acceptable, subject to the prohibited matters in section 3(3) of the Act 
and Parliament’s regulatory powers.  The concept of suitability was broad enough to include 
suitability for the purposes of the particular mother. Parliament had not intended to confine 
the Authority’s powers to unsuitability on grounds of genetic defect; the limits of permissible 
embryo selection were ultimately for the authority to decide.
Brown LJ stated:
In the unlikely event that the authority were to propose licensing genetic selection for purely 
social reasons, Parliament would surely act at once to remove that possibility, doubtless 
using for the purpose the regulation making power under section 3(3)(c).  Failing that, in 
an extreme case the court’s supervisory jurisdiction could be invoked.289 
Although the HFEA has the power to license clinics to perform PGD for social reasons, this 
does not mean that it will of necessity do so.  Although sex selection is not illegal in the United 
Kingdom, the HFEA has refused to license the use of PGD for sex selection for non-medical 
reasons. The UK Parliament has acted in the past to curtail what it perceives to be undesirable 
scientific developments, for example with the enactment of the Human Reproductive Cloning 
Act 2001 which bans reproductive cloning in the UK. 
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The purposive approach employed by the Law Lords may have superficial appeal, particularly 
if one thinks that the decision was defensible, but the process employed by the Lords is less 
convincing on close analysis.   Applying a purposive approach involves determining whether: 
…when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, 
the courts have to consider whether they fall within the Parliamentary intention.  They 
may be held to do so, if they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the 
expressed policy has been formulated.290 
It may be argued that both deselecting embryos carrying genetic abnormalities to avoid the 
transmission of serious heritable disease, and deselecting embryos on the basis that they 
will not provide a tissue match for an existing sick child, realise benefits that are not directly 
attributable to the particular embryo that is selected.  PGD to test for genetic disorders is 
generally accepted on the basis that it is in the interests of the ‘future child’.  However, the only 
benefit to the embryo which is found to be free of heritable disease is the fact that it is selected 
for implantation.
Both procedures are carried out for broadly therapeutic reasons; in one case to avoid disease, 
the other in an to attempt to cure disease suffered by a third party. However, the procedures have 
been perceived as being vastly different.291  The initial performance of PGD to test for heritable 
conditions did not provoke a legal challenge by CORE.  It was only when preimplantation 
tissue typing was proposed that judicial review was sought.  There is merit to the view that on 
closer examination, there is not such a great distinction between the two procedures. Neither 
test provides direct benefit to the particular embryo on which the procedure is carried out. It 
is simply a greater stretch to conceptualise this when, in the case of tissue typing, the procedure 
seems only to be undertaken in the interests of a third party.  
The point being made is that the challenge to the Authority’s jurisdiction may have been more 
properly made at the point when it sought to license clinics to perform PGD.  It was by no 
means clear that the Authority had the discretion to license clinics to perform PGD.  The 
ground on which the HFEA based their decision to issue licences for PGD was not firm, albeit 
a pragmatic and reasonable activity.  
In addition, the HFE Act provides the machinery to add, by way of regulations, to the 
purposes for which licences may be given. Yet this process was not utilised. Further, the interim 
guidelines were introduced prior to any consultation being completed. What the Hashmi case 
highlights is that when legislation is drafted in neutral terms and the regulatory purpose is 
very broad, interpretive flexibility may mean that available formal regulatory responses are 
spared. Consequently any decisions made can give rise to challenge. It has been cautioned 
that ‘the legal community, with its tendency towards gentle incrementalism, is not particularly 
well-equipped to handle any kind of [genetic] revolution.’292  Arguably, the Quintavalle293 case 
is evidence of incrementalism occurring in law.  
Ironically, the Chair of the HFEA commented when giving evidence to the Science and 
Technology Committee that the problems that the Authority experienced with PGD arose 
from the fact that PGD was not expressly provided for in the legislation.  She advocated that in 
reviewing the legislation, Parliament set out specifically the acceptable parameters of embryo 
selection, as it had done in relation to embryo research in the 1990 Act.294   
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2.5  tHe HFe act anD tHe coDe oF Practice
The HFE Act 1990 requires that the HFEA give guidance to licensed centres about the ‘proper 
conduct of activities carried out in pursuance of a licence’.295  The guidance is primarily 
contained in the HFEA’s Code of Practice.  Consultation is required on the Code of Practice 
with any persons the Secretary of State requires it to consult with, and any other persons it 
considers appropriate.296  Approval of the Code must be gained from the Secretary of State.  The 
Code of Practice is not legally binding, but it may give grounds to a licence committee to refuse 
a licence if it is not observed.297  Policy decisions may also be conveyed apart from the Code via 
letters from either the Chair or the Chief Executive of the HFEA.   Interim licensing guidance for 
PGD and guidelines for embryo biopsy practitioners were the subject of a letter from the Chief 
Executive in 1999.  Consultation only ensued after the guidelines were sent out.
The composition of the Authority is set out in Schedule 1 of the Act.  Regulations passed 
in 1991 prescribe the composition and procedures of the HFEA licence committees and the 
appeals procedure.298  Members have historically been appointed to the Authority by the 
Secretary of State.  They are now appointed by the NHS Appointments Commission, which 
reduces the political influence over appointments.299  The Chair and deputy chair must be lay 
persons (not medically qualified or engaged in IVF treatment or research) and a majority must 
be lay members.300  
The Code of Conduct which accompanies the Code of Practice sets out seven principles of 
public life.301  It is stated in the introduction to the Code that the object of the HFEA Code of 
Practice is ‘wider than to secure the safety or efficacy of particular clinical or scientific practices. 
It is concerned with areas of practice which raise fundamental ethical and social questions’.  
In framing the Code of Practice, the HFEA has been guided both by the requirements of the 
HFE Act and by:
1 The respect which is due to human life at all stages of its development
2 The right of people seeking assisted reproductive treatment to proper consideration  
 of their request
3 A concern for the welfare of children, which cannot always be adequately protected  
 by concern for the interests of the adults involved 
 and
4 A recognition of the benefits, both to individuals and to society, which can flow   
 from the responsible pursuit of medical and scientific knowledge.302
It is stated in the Code of Practice that the HFEA acknowledges that these considerations may 
sometimes conflict and has sought to reconcile them in a way which is both practicable and in 
accordance with the spirit and intentions of the HFE Act.  The HFEA’s aim is to support the 
best clinical and scientific practice, while guarding against the undoubted risk of exploitation 
of people at a time when they may be particularly vulnerable’. 303
The sixth edition of the Code of Practice included preimplantation testing for the first 
time.  Chapter 14 of the Code deals with preimplantation testing.  The Code distinguishes 
preimplantation screening from preimplantation diagnosis.  
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2.5.1  licensing requireMents
The Code of Practice sets out licensing requirements for ‘Preimplantation Testing’.  A clinic may 
only carry out testing for the genetic conditions, chromosomes or traits (or combinations of 
these) and use those specific tests (or combination of tests) that are listed in the preimplantation 
testing Annex to their licences or approved by a licence committee in any particular case.   Until 
very recently every clinic was required to submit a fresh application to the HFEA every time 
they wished to test for a new condition, and for each new test they wished to use. This is in 
stark contrast to the system set up in New Zealand.  
In January of 2005, the HFEA announced a new policy to streamline the approval of 
applications for preimplantation genetic diagnosis.304 Under the new guidelines, if a clinic with 
proven expertise in performing embryo biopsies, applies for a licence to carry out screening 
for a particular condition, which is already being carried out successfully in another clinic 
– such as screening for sickle cell anaemia, cystic fibrosis and Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy, 
the HFEA will approve the application without having to go through the full HFEA licence 
committee process, providing the same technique and methods are used.  Suzi Leather, Chair 
of the HFEA said:
PGD is now an established technique for screening embryos which has been carried out 
under HFEA scrutiny for several years and we have assessed all the relevant evidence 
gathered over this time. 
We have decided that whilst PGD is a specialised procedure, which can only be carried 
out by a qualified embryo biopsy practitioner, it should be straightforward for those clinics 
with a proven track record in the appropriate techniques to be able to carry out screening 
for any of the conditions currently approved.
This will streamline the system, cutting down on bureaucracy and speeding up the 
approval process which will benefit both the patients who benefit from this treatment and 
the clinicians treating them.
Less common specialised applications of PGD still require consideration by an HFEA licence 
committee on a case-by-case basis.305 It is significant that the HFEA is now providing patients 
with the opportunity to give evidence to the HFEA face to face should they choose to do so.  
Where clinicians wish to test a single embryo for more than one genetic condition or trait an 
application must be made to the HFEA for each specific combination of tests that is proposed, 
regardless of whether the centre is already licensed to use each of the tests individually.  It is 
hard to see the justification for this requirement when running more than one test does not 
necessitate biopsying more than the usual one or two blastomeres, and there is no increased 
physical risk to the blastocyst or embryo.
The Code contains a provision that seems common-sense that it is not apparent why it was 
necessary to include it.  It is to the effect that embryos which have been biopsied, or resulting 
from gametes which have been biopsied, may not be transferred with any other non-biopsied 
embryos in the same treatment cycle.   To do so would risk the birth of a child suffering from a 
disorder that PGD had been performed to prevent.  The Code prohibits the use of PGD, or the 
use of information derived from tests on an embryo, for sex selection of embryos.  
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The HFE Act requires that records must be kept as a condition of all licences, and enables the 
HFEA to specify the manner in which and for how long records are kept.306   The HFEA is 
required by the Act to maintain a confidential register of information about donors, patients 
and treatments provided by licensed centres.  It was set up in 1991.  
2.5.2  accreDitation
Sections 17(1)(b) and (d) of the HFE Act 1990 state that it is the duty of the person responsible 
to secure that proper equipment and suitable practices are used in the course of the activities 
carried out pursuant to licences.307  The Code of Practice requires that all genetics laboratories 
used for Preimplantation Testing are expected to be Clinical Pathology Accreditation (CPA) 
accredited (or equivalent) or at least be working towards CPA, with accreditation to be 
completed within five years.308  It is curious that in the Report of the Science and Technology 
Committee, it was reported that the CPA scheme does not accredit embryology laboratories as 
the field is considered too controversial.309 
As part of its inspection process, the HFEA has taken on the inspection of all technical aspects 
of assisted conception, including clinical and laboratory processes. Inspections cover record-
keeping, conditions for the storage and disposal of licensed material, suitability of staff, 
equipment and working practices.310 
2.5.3  staFF qualiFications
Section 17(1)(a) of the Act confers on the authorised person responsible under the licence the 
duty to secure that the ‘other persons to whom the licence applies are of such  character, and are 
so qualified by training and experience, as to be suitable persons to participate in the activities 
authorised by the licence’.   The Code does not go much further than this, except to provide 
that it ‘is expected that a multidisciplinary team will be involved in the provision of the PGD 
service, including reproductive specialists, cytogeneticists and molecular geneticists.  This team 
is expected to maintain close contact with the primary care physician or the referring clinician, 
and treatment is expected to encompass continued support of patients following PGD’.311
At the beginning of the Code of Practice, guidance is provided as to what certain phrases 
signify.  The words ‘expected to’ or ‘expected that’ indicate what is to be regarded as the proper 
conduct of licensable activities or as suitable practice within licensed centres.  Any departure 
from the Code of Practice may be taken into account by the HFEA and could result in the 
revocation of a centre’s licence.312
2.5.4  counselling
Section 13(6) of the Act provides that ‘a woman shall not be provided with any treatment 
services […] unless the woman being treated and, where she is being treated together with 
a man, the man has been given a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling about 
the implications of taking the proposed steps, and has been provided with such relevant 
information as is proper.’ It is significant that the Code does not impose mandatory counselling 
requirements on providers.   This is in contrast to the New Zealand position, where under 
Guidelines, providers ‘must ensure’ that people seeking PGD for familial disorders receive 
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genetic and psychosocial counselling from qualified counsellors trained in genetic counselling. 
Psychosocial counselling is mandatory when PGD is sought for non-familial disorders.313
The Code sets out that people seeking treatment are expected to have access to both clinical 
geneticists and genetic counsellors, and that ideally, people seeking treatment are expected to 
be referred to the treating centre by a Regional Genetics Centre.  However, all of those seeking 
treatment are expected to be known to an accredited clinical geneticist.314  
2.5.5  Patient inForMation
The requirement of information provision is expressed in terms of what is expected to be 
provided to patients.  It is explained that when ‘expected’ is used in the Code, it indicates 
what is to be regarded as the proper conduct of licensable activities or as suitable practice 
within licensed centres.315   In contrast, the equivalent New Zealand Guidelines declare that the 
provision of specified  information is a mandatory requirement.
It is expected that reference will be made to the experience of the clinic carrying out the 
procedure.  Information is expected to include:
 (i) Genetic and clinical information about the specific condition
(ii) Its likely impact on those affected and their families
(iii) Information about treatment and social support available and
(iv) Where the family has no direct experience of the condition, the testimony 
 of families and individuals about the full range of their experiences of living with  
 the condition.316
It is also expected that the possible outcomes of genetic testing and their implications will have 
been fully explored with those seeking treatment prior to PGD being undertaken.   
  
2.5.6  clinical Decision-Making – tHe welFare oF tHe cHilD
A peculiar aspect of the HFE Act is the requirement in section 13(5) in regards to the welfare 
of the child.  Section 13(5) provides;
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of 
the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need 
of that child for a father), and of any other child who might be affected by the birth.
The HFEA provides guidance to clinics on how to make a ‘welfare of the child assessment’ on 
individuals or couples seeking licensed treatment in Part 3 of the Code of Practice. Fertility 
clinics are expected to take into account a number of factors which could have an impact 
upon the welfare of the child who might be born as a result of treatment. Clinics are also 
expected to write to the individual’s or couple’s general practitioner (GP) to ask whether, from 
the patients’ medical records, the GP has any reason to believe that any child resulting from 
the treatment might be at risk. The patient has to give permission for the fertility clinic to 
approach the GP. The clinic might also ask patients to fill in ‘child welfare’ forms or have a 
special interview with them.
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The Welfare Provision has proved to be a contentious aspect of the HFE Act. The HFEA 
recently undertook a consultation as to how the application of the welfare of the child could 
be improved.317 The Consultation document asked whether taking account of the welfare of 
the child who may be born as a result of treatment and any other child who may be affected 
should remain an HFE Act obligation on fertility service providers.  It was concluded that: 
The involvement of a medical team in assisted conception means that certain third parties 
have some responsibility towards the child to be born. However, the importance of patient 
autonomy means that clinics should only refuse to provide treatment where there is 
evidence that the child is likely to suffer serious physical or psychological harm.318
The HFEA has now released revised Guidance on how to interpret the welfare of the child 
provision under section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990.319  The Code provides that the decision to 
undertake PGD is expected to be made in consideration of the unique circumstances of those 
seeking treatment, rather than the fact that they carry a particular genetic condition.  It is stated 
that the indications for the use of PGD are expected to be consistent with current practice in 
the use of prenatal diagnosis.  The crux of decision-making differs in a major way under the 
Code of Practice as compared with the Guidelines in New Zealand.  The Code provides: 
It is expected that PGD will be available only where there is a significant risk of a serious 
genetic condition being present in the embryo.  The perception of the level of risk by those 
seeking treatment is an important factor in the decision-making process.  The seriousness 
of the condition is expected to be a matter for discussion between the people seeking 
treatment and the clinical team.320 
Further information that is expected to be considered when deciding the appropriateness of 
PGD is:
(i) The view of the people seeking treatment of the condition to be avoided
(ii) Their previous reproductive experience
(iii)  The likely degree of suffering associated with the condition
(iv)  The availability of effective therapy, now and in the future
(v) The speed of degeneration in progressive disorder
(vi) The extent of any intellectual impairment
(vii) The extent of social support available and
(viii) The family circumstances of the people seeking treatment
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2.5.  aneuPloiDy screening
Aneuploidy screening is dealt with separately from PGD in the Code of Practice.  After 
referring to paragraph (1)(d)321 of Schedule 2, the Code sets out the only categories of patients 
for whom it is expected  aneuploidy screening will be used:
(i) Women over 35 years of age
(ii) Women with a history of recurrent miscarriage not caused by translocations or   
 other chromosomal rearrangements
(iii)  Women with several previous failed IVF attempts where embryos have been   
 transferred, or
(iv)  Women with a family history of aneuploidy not caused by translocations or other  
 chromosomal rearrangements.
Information that is expected to be imparted includes reference to the process, procedures and 
risks involved in undertaking IVF and biopsy procedures.  Reference is expected to be made 
to the experience of the clinic in carrying out the procedure.  Patients are expected to be also 
informed in writing:
(i) That embryos that have been biopsied may not be suitable for cyopreservation  and  
 use in subsequent treatment cycles
(ii) That the more tests that are used to examine the chromosomes, the greater   
 the likelihood of finding chromosome abnormalities (whether they are biologically  
 significant or not), and thus the lower the chance of finding suitable embryos for  
 transfer
(iii) Of the procedure to be followed in the case of a diagnostic failure
(iv) That there is no guarantee against a miscarriage occurring despite preimplantation  
 aneuploidy screening being performed
(v) The patients are recommended to undergo prenatal screening
(vi) Of the financial costs of treatment
(vii) Of the possible emotional burden should a successful pregnancy not result   
 following PGS for aneuploidy
These information requirements are materially different from those required under the 
NECAHR interim Guidelines.  
2.6  access to art
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recently published guidelines on 
Fertility.322 In regards to IVF, it was recommended that, subject to specific criteria, women 
should be offered three cycles of IVF on the public NHS service.  The secretary of State 
has responded that he wished the NHS to work towards full implementation of the NICE 
guidelines.323  Funding of IVF cycles in the UK varies widely from region to region, with some 
regions providing no funding for IVF.324  
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2.  reForM
Although the HFE Act has generally withstood the test of time well given the massive leap in 
technological capacity since its inception, recent legal challenges have highlighted a gap between 
the ambit of the Act and new technology or new applications of established technologies.325 
While none of the legal challenges has been successful, there have been calls for reform of the 
UK system from many corners.326  Economic forces and a wish to reduce what some see as a 
bureaucratic and expensive system are factors driving reform.  Changing societal attitudes are 
also drivers for change.
Lord Winston has been a strong critic in regard to regulation; even more so since his retirement 
from clinical medicine:
I am not opposed to regulation. But in the modern UK healthcare system there are now 
quite enough safeguards without the HFEA.  The authority is not a great British success. 
And it is a costly body: the HFEA charges Hammersmith about 30 000 pounds annually 
for its licence.  These costs inevitably are passed to the patients who already pay large sums 
for their treatment.327
The HFEA is funded in part by grant and in part by licence fees. In 2003-2004 the amount 
obtained by grant was around 4 million, while revenue from fees was 3.5 million. Currently 
research license fees are set at 200, with the intention being to increase them to up to 6000. 
The leap is justified by the expensive nature of administering research licences.  If they are to 
be administered more efficiently, with fewer delays for the researchers, more staff are required, 
creating more expense.328  
The HFEA has been criticised for a lack of transparency and public consultation.329  It has been 
claimed that the methods of licensing and inspection are unduly expensive and duplicative.330 
A recent report released after incidents at an NHS hospital found several areas of concern in 
regard to the licensing activities of the HFEA.331 
Fertility expert Lord Winston has claimed that by employing clinicians or scientists working 
in clinics as part-time inspectors for the HFEA, rather than employing a full-time salaried 
inspectorate, a possible conflict is created.  As the clinics are largely privately funded, the 
inspectors are competing practitioners and scientists.332 However it has been indicated by the 
Chair of the HFEA that they will be moving to an in-house inspectorate.333
Two major reviews of the HFE Act have recently been undertaken. The House of Commons 
Science and Technology Select Committee announced their decision to undertake a review of 
the Act in October 2003.  The Select Committee carried out the review for two main reasons. 
Firstly, that it was necessary to ‘reconnect the Act with modern science’ and secondly, that the 
Department of Health approach of keeping the Act ‘under review’ was inadequate given the rapid 
pace of medical and scientific advance and the legal challenges to the HFEA’s jurisdiction. 334  
Following this, the Department of Health announced its intention to review the Act in January 
2004, for which public consultation closed in November 2005.335  The Science and Technology 
Select Committee report was released in March 2005, with a Government response published 
in August 2005.336   
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2..1  rePort oF tHe House oF coMMons select coMMittee on science   
 anD tecHnology
The Report from the Science and Technology Committee is impressive by virtue not only of 
the depth and breadth of the review, but also because of the wealth of information obtained 
in the oral and written evidence provided to the Committee.337  The Report concludes with a 
‘blueprint for a legislative and regulatory system fit for purpose in the 21st century’.338 
The terms of reference were extremely wide.  They included the following: 
The overall tone of the report by the Science and Technology Committee was one of terse 
criticism.  The philosophy apparent in the report was that if the HFEA wished to curtail some 
aspect of ART, then there should be good evidence to justify the restraint.339  
Legislation should reflect the fact that assisted reproduction is now a standard clinical 
procedure and its focus should be on improving clinical standards and ensuring safety. 
Intending parents should be able to seek appropriate services, subject to the professional 
regulation of safety and quality. This would ensure that reproductive decisions remain 
primarily in the private domain, governed by professional ethics and the law of consent. 
However, legislation will be needed to offer appropriate protection for the human embryo 
and to accommodate status and other legal issues.340
Not surprisingly, the opinions of the Committee members were not unanimous. Five of the 
eleven members disagreed with the main report.341  The minority view was that the majority 
had adopted an ‘extreme libertarian position’.   They believed that the report did not reflect the 
legitimate role for the state and regulation to play.342 
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The Select Committee began its report by considering the status of the embryo.  The gradualist 
approach taken by the Warnock committee was endorsed.343  The Committee believed this 
position recognised the special status of the human embryo, while at the same time respected 
the legitimate interests of intending parents and the wider society.  However the Committee 
noted that in the context of treating infertility by IVF, an activity which is for the most part 
a widely accepted and positively perceived intervention, the principal issue was not the 
status of the embryo but rather the ‘rights’ or interests of individuals to have assistance in 
reproducing.  
By adopting an approach consistent with the gradualist approach, the Committee accepted 
that assisted reproduction and research involving the human embryo both remained legitimate 
interests of the state. Reproductive and research freedoms must be balanced against the 
interests of society, but ‘alleged harms to patients or society need to be demonstrated before 
forward progress is unduly impeded’. 344
Whilst assuming a libertarian stance, the majority advocated increased governmental 
oversight.  The majority felt that the HFEA should not be developing policy, but rather 
overseeing technical standards and quality management.345  It was pointed out that section 8 of 
the HFE Act set out the HFEA’s role as an advisory body.  This involved keeping under review 
information about: embryos and any subsequent development of embryos; the provision of 
treatment services and activities governed by this Act; and advising the Secretary of State, if 
asked, about those matters. These functions are distinct from its regulatory functions and the 
dual role, in the opinion of the Select Committee, is problematic.  While under the regulatory 
role it must discharge its duties according to the Act, the Advisory role challenges it to find 
fault with the legislation on behalf of the Government.346  It was acknowledged, however, that 
the HFEA had little choice but to develop a policy function given its brief, but a strengthened 
role for Parliament was called for.347
Significantly, the Select Committee observed that the ‘reasons for which PGD is licensed, if 
at all, are some of the most challenging facing the review of the HFE Act.’348  The Committee 
referred to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 2002 report on genetics and human behaviour, 
in which a description of the libertarian view of selection was provided:
The main argument in favour of the permissibility of selection is that there is a legitimate 
exercise of individual liberty.  There is, quite generally, a strong presumption in favour 
of the exercise of individual liberty wherever its exercise does not conflict, directly or 
indirectly, with the legitimate interests of others.349
The opposing view is expressed as the intuitive objection to prenatal selection, which is that 
it is ‘interfering with nature’.  The Code of Practice states that indications for the use of PGD 
are expected to be consistent with the current practice in the use of prenatal diagnosis.  The 
Select Committee was of the view that applying a gradualist approach, an embryo at five weeks 
demanded less respect than a foetus at nine weeks gestation.  The argument was also raised 
that the two procedures could not be equated because of the fact that in terms of the foetus, 
regard must be paid to the interests of the woman who was carrying the child.  
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The Code of Practice criteria for licensable PGD require a significant risk of a serious genetic 
condition.  Whilst the application of the criteria is straightforward with serious disorders that 
are fully penetrant, it is more problematic when the expression of the gene is not 100%, or 
when there were available treatments.  The Committee stated that: 
We have concerns about the criteria imposed by the HFEA.  PGD is limited in that it 
can only be used to screen out disorders and thus it cannot be used to create ‘designer 
babies’.  We see no reason why a regulator should seek to determine which disorders can 
be screened out using PGD.  Nevertheless, clinical decisions should operate within clear 
boundaries set by Parliament and informed by ethical judgements.350
In relation to preimplantation HLA tissue typing, the Committee was of the opinion that there 
were no compelling reasons for a statutory authority to make judgements on whether or not 
a family could seek preimplantation tissue typing, provided they fell within parameters set by 
Parliament.351
Towards the end of the report the Committee stated that ‘We remain convinced that a larger 
role for our democratically accountable Parliament would give the public greater confidence 
that the big ethical issues of the day are being given adequate attention.’ 
The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee considered the issue of people 
going abroad for treatment that is unavailable in the UK, and in so doing engaging in 
‘reproductive tourism’.  It was concluded that attempts to curtail reproductive tourism would 
not be justified by the seriousness of the offence and, moreover, would be impossible to enforce. 
The Government has agreed with the House of Commons Committee that attempts to control 
reproductive tourism would be extremely difficult and probably not justified.352  However, 
a recent report by the Human Genetics Commission stated ‘we recommend that the HFEA 
should explore ways in which clinics in the UK can be prevented from preparing or otherwise 
colluding with individuals intent on seeking treatments which are permissible abroad, but 
prohibited within the UK.353
2..2  ProPoseD cHanges
The Government Response to the Report from the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee was published in August 2005.354 It was agreed that it would be preferable for 
revised legislation to set out the parameters for PGD more clearly.   The Government indicated 
it would seek wider public views on the boundaries of acceptable uses of PGD and tissue 
typing, and on the appropriate scope and nature of regulatory intervention.355  
The Government has indicated that the current model of regulation, in which Parliament 
determines prohibitions and parameters within which an independent statutory authority 
licenses activities is sound and should continue.356  However, this was subject to the following:
… the Government also accepts that legislation should be more explicit and provide 
Parliament with greater powers to debate and amend the law.  In particular, the Government 
accepts the need to clarify the extent of any policy-making role of the regulator. 
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The HFEA provided a model for the Human Tissue Authority which was recently established 
under the Human Tissue Act 2004.  Although the HTA Act regulates gametes and embryos,357 
it excludes gametes and embryos outside the human body.  Hence, prenatal genetic diagnosis 
comes within the jurisdiction of the Human Tissue Authority, whilst PGD is regulated under 
the HFEA.  Although the HTA has a separate legislative mandate, the two authorities are to be 
merged to create a single body.
In 2004 the Department of Health conducted the Arm’s Length Bodies Review, with the aim 
of achieving economic savings and streamlining the work of such bodies.358  The Report 
said that the HFEA would be dissolved by April 2008 and merged into a new body called 
the Regulatory Authority for Fertility and Tissue.  This new body would regulate assisted 
reproduction, embryo research and the use of human tissue.  The UK Government has since 
announced its intention to replace the HFEA and the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) with a 
single authority responsible for the regulation of assisted reproduction, embryo research and 
the use of human tissue.  This would require primary legislation and would be known as the 
Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos (RATE).  The new authority will be responsible 
for overseeing the requirements of the EU Tissue Directive.359  
It is the intention of the Government that new legislation which will establish the Regulatory 
Authority for Tissue and Embryos (RATE) and disestablish both the HFEA and HTA will be 
effective by April 2008.360  It is intended that ‘this legislation will set out the policy in relation 
to human tissue and embryos and assisted reproduction clearly and comprehensively.  It will 
also give Parliament a greater role in keeping the law up to date through means of secondary 
legislation.  The policy-making role of the new Authority will therefore be limited’.361   
It is proposed that RATE will be headed by a lay chairperson, and have substantial lay 
representation among its membership.  Although the exact functions of the new body will 
depend in part on the outcome of the public consultation, the Government has provided an 
outline of the functions the new body will carry out.  These are very similar to those currently 
carried out by the HFEA.362  RATE will be an executive non-departmental public body.  Its 
primary function will be to consider applications for licences to undertake those activities 
which Parliament decides should be subject to licensing.  It will be funded principally from 
fees levied on licence-holders.  To support its licensing function, RATE will be responsible for 
regular inspections of premises where licensable activities are carried on, and will issue codes 
of practice giving guidance to persons undertaking those activities within its remit.
Both the HFEA and the HTA currently have statutory functions, including monitoring or 
reviewing developments relating to the activities within their remits, and providing advice to 
the Secretary of State where appropriate or where asked to do so.  It is believed that a similar 
‘advisory’ function would be appropriate for RATE.  It is also proposed that legislation will 
set out requirements for consultation and approval of codes of practice. It was agreed by the 
Government that ‘so far as possible clinical decision-making should be left to patients and 
professionals, that professional regulation is essential and that Parliamentary oversight should 
be strengthened’.363 
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The Government has sought the opinions of the public on the guidance given to fertility 
clinics by the HFEA regarding how to implement the welfare of the child provision.364 The 
Government consultation is also canvassing views on whether legislation should set out the 
general criteria under which embryo screening and selection can be undertaken.  Should there 
be a prohibition on deliberately screening in, or selecting for impairments or disabilities – as 
opposed to screening out, or selecting embryos free from such impairments?  Should the 
authority to decide and license uses remain with the statutory regulator in accordance with 
general criteria set by Parliament, or should it be a matter for patients and clinicians, within 
the legal limits set by Parliament?  The Government is also seeking views on sex selection for 
non-medical reasons.  
The UK Government has included in its consultation the issue of whether legislation should 
define a formal role for the professional bodies in advising RATE on the content of technical 
standards for assisted reproduction and embryo research.  These standards would be required 
to conform to the quality and safety requirements of the EU Tissue Directive.
The new licensing authority will be able to revoke or vary licences if necessary in response to 
regulatory breaches.  Where less serious breaches occur which do not justify the withdrawal 
of a licence, less severe sanctions may be a more proportionate response.  The aim is to ensure 
compliance in an environment which encourages the improvement of standards and systems. 
To this end the Government is seeking views on what sanctions should be available to the 
regulator to ensure conformity with regulations. 
2.  suMMary
The United Kingdom was one of the first jurisdictions in the world to introduce legislative 
initiatives in the field of ART.   The legislative regime introduced certain prohibitions in 
relation to embryos and gametes, and delegated considerable power to the statutory body 
created under the Act, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.   The HFEA 
has been described as operating within one of the most liberal laissez-faire schemes in 
Europe.365  The Authority has complete discretion to determine the permissible limits of 
PGD.
When analysing the regulatory model that has been put in place in the United Kingdom, it 
is impossible to ignore the political drive to harness the benefits of new genetic technologies 
and to remain at the forefront of scientific endeavour.  However, this is balanced by 
significant attempts on the part of the Government to set up means of engaging and 
educating the public in relation to genetics and relevant ethical and social issues.  It 
should also be noted that while the HFEA has an extremely wide discretion conferred 
under the HFE Act, there is an unwritten rule that public consultation must occur prior 
to developing significant new policy.  There is evidence of a strong commitment to 
deliberative democracy.  It is therefore ironic that the HFEA put the cart before the horse 
when they developed their interim policy on HLA tissue typing, and suffered  political 
and public backlash as a result. 
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The HFE Act has been at the heart of intense criticism in the last two years in particular.    
The most extensive critique of the Act has been carried out by the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee.  An essential point made by the Committee was that 
assisted reproduction is now an established standard clinical service.  The focus therefore, 
should be on improving clinical standards and ensuring patient safety.  Alarmingly, the 
House of Commons review highlighted inadequacies in quality assurance and safety 
aspects in regard to licensing inspections.  
Another theme of the review was that reproductive decisions should remain primarily in 
the private domain, governed by professional ethics and the law of consent.  The reviewers 
felt that it was inappropriate for a statutory regulator to determine the permissible 
parameters of PGD.  In their view, clear boundaries should be set by Parliament, and be 
informed by ethical judgments.
It appears, from the Government response to the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee Report, that the status quo will be maintained. However, a new 
Authority, the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos will be established under 
new legislation to carry out the functions that have, up until now, been carried out by 
the HFEA.
3  uniteD states
The following provides an overview of the United States position.366  Detailed analysis of 
countries that have dissimilar regulatory systems is not the aim of this report but the regulatory 
system in the United States provides a valuable reference point when the broadly similar 
approaches of the New Zealand, UK and Victoria approaches are considered.
3.1  current us regulation 
3.1.1  FeDeral regulation 
Currently, there is no federal regulation that directly addresses the use of PGD technology. 
Because regulation of medical practice is usually determined at the state level, there are only a 
handful of established federal agencies that could possibly impact current laws at the federal 
level with respect to PGD.367 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) as well as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) are the only three governmental agencies with this potential.
3.1.1.1  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
According to the 1992 Fertility Clinic Success Rate Reporting Act (FCSRA), IVF clinics 
must report a number of statistics to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
(SART) annually.368 Reported information includes initial diagnoses leading to treatment, 
how many IVF cycles are performed, how many embryos were transferred per cycle, and the 
ultimate success rate of pregnancies and live births.369 Currently, clinics are not required to 
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report any data on the use of PGD. If clinics were required to report these numbers, however, 
it would be much more clear what methods are being used, in which cases, on whom and how 
often. Currently, there is no method of systematic collection of this information in the US. 
3.1.1.2  Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
This federal agency usually exercises regulation over drugs, devices and some uses of human 
tissue, all of which apply to IVF in some respect. In the case of PGD, laboratory instruments 
used in the process of genetic testing can fall under the jurisdiction of the FDA. However, genetic 
tests, which are used by most US clinics, do not fall under FDA oversight.370 The Genetics and 
Public Policy Center reports that “given the existing confusion about FDA’s jurisdiction over 
genetic testing in general, there is uncertainty regarding its authority to regulate PGD tests.”371 
Therefore, the FDA does not currently regulate the use of genetic devices for PGD, or exercise 
explicit authority over the technology. However, they could potentially influence regulation of 
PGD in specific areas. 
3.1.1.3  Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) 
The primary contribution that CMS has made to regulation in the area of  reproductive 
technology is the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, more commonly 
referred to as CLIA. The objective of the CLIA program is to ensure the quality of laboratory 
tests.372 According to CLIA, a clinical laboratory can be defined as a laboratory that analyzes 
material “derived from the human body” for the purpose of providing “information for the 
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the 
health of, human beings.”373 Whether clinics performing IVF and PGD should be considered 
clinical laboratories, as CLIA defines them, is an unresolved question. There is concern that 
including PGD in the scope of CLIA would necessarily commit CMS to consider the embryo as 
a human being. In the future, if PGD is found to fall within the scope of CLIA it could subject 
the process of genetic testing to much stricter regulations and federal inspections.374 This 
would ensure quality with respect to the use of PGD and also provide valuable information as 
to the exact details of PGD use in the United States. 
3.1.2  state regulation 
State regulation, like federal regulation, does not exist for preimplantation genetic diagnosis. 
There are a few areas where there is potential for laws and guidelines, but such opportunities 
have not been adopted by any US states. Some state laws exercise regulation over assisted 
reproductive procedures, but in general, fertility clinics do not operate under strict state 
oversight. There are no laws that address PGD technology explicitly. As discussed earlier, 
some states do exercise power in relation to insurance coverage mandates, but these address 
infertility benefits in the broader sense and do place any requirements on coverage of PGD. 
Future state regulation of PGD technology could take many different forms. The state of 
New York, for example, “is in the process of developing standards for laboratories that will 
include oversight of the genetic tests associated with PGD.”375 In 1999, the CDC published 
the Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992: A Model 
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Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories, which was a Notice of “model certification 
program requirements, including definitions, administrative requirements, and embryo 
laboratory standards.376 Although this model was created to be implemented at the state level, 
more than 6 years after its conception it has not been used by any state. Despite the fact that 
almost no state regulation exists today, there remains potential for the construction of state 
regulation that will lead to meaningful oversight of PGD technology. 
3.2  court action 
As the use of PGD increases, there will almost certainly be an increase in the incidence of 
court action surrounding the application and acceptability of different uses of PGD. Often, 
“standards developed through case law frequently influence legislative action or become a de 
facto policy by themselves.”377  In the United States there has been only one notable court case 
with regard to PGD specifically. The case, Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction, 
which is relevant to wrongful life claims, has been discussed above at 1.3.2.6.
3.3  stanDarDs oF ProFessional organisations 
Currently, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) is the only professional 
body in the US that has taken an explicit position on preimplantation genetic diagnosis. This 
organisation has published on the potential benefits and value of PGD as well as the guidelines 
concerning the use of PGD for non-medical sex selection. In 2004, the ASRM published a paper 
entitled Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, in which the Practice Committee recommended:
PGD appears to be a viable alternative to post-conception diagnosis and pregnancy 
termination.  …  It is imperative that patients be aware of potential diagnostic errors and 
the possibility of currently known long-term consequences on the foetus of the embryo 
biopsy procedure.  …  and PGD should be regarded as an established technique with 
specific and expanding applications for standard clinical practice.378 
The Ethics Committee of the ASRM published another document entitled “Sex Selection and 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis” in 2004 to address the the possibility of expanding the 
use of PGD to non-medical sex selection. The Ethics Committee formally recommends that, 
“preimplantation genetic diagnosis used for sex selection to prevent the transmission of serious 
genetic disease is ethically acceptable” while other uses of PGD “should not be encouraged.”379 
Although the recommendations of professional organisations are not legally binding and 
membership of these organisations is voluntary, these guidelines carry significant weight in the 
medical community. Because of this, these professional organisations could potentially play a 
significant role in influencing the direction of development of PGD technology. Other US 
organisations include The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), the College 
of American Pathologists (CAP), and the American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG). 
These professional societies have not published clinical guidelines addressing the details of 
PGD use although they may well do so in the near future. 
It is difficult to report accurately how many PGD procedures occur in the United States 
annually, or even the exact number of clinics that use this technology.  Because the statistics 
are so few in the United States in this relatively new area of reproductive medicine, analysis 
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is conducted on worldwide scale.  An article published in 2005 in the journal of Gynecologic 
and Obstetric Investigation entitled “Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Earliest Form 
of Prenatal Diagnosis” reports that in ten years there have been only 6,000 PGD cycles even 
attempted, resulting in only about 1,000 PGD pregnancies.380 Currently, the European Society 
of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) states that there are 97 clinics worldwide 
performing PGD in a number of different countries including the US, the UK, Spain, Israel, 
Belgium, and Australia.381  ESHRE reports that the United States alone has 19 clinics; a number 
significantly greater than any other individual country.  These US clinics operate all over the 
country in many different states including, but not limited to, California, New York, Texas, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts.  
3.4  access
Because PGD first requires IVF, the entire process can be extremely expensive for couples.  On 
average, the cost of IVF is between $10,000 and $12,000 with an additional $2,500-$4,000 for 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis.382  The natural question is how couples can pay for this 
medical service since many people do not have sufficient monetary resources to cover the 
procedure on their own. 
3.4.1  insurance coverage
In the United States, many people are insured in some form or another by their employer or 
through the policy of a family member.  The United States Census Bureau broadly classifies 
health insurance coverage as private or government coverage.  In addition:
Private health insurance is coverage by a plan provided through an employer or union 
or purchased by an individual from a private company.  Government health insurance 
includes the federal programs Medicare, Medicaid, and military health care; the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); and individual state health plans.383
These two categories will be distinguished here as public and private insurance coverage. 
Federal law states that coverage provided by private insurance is not subject to insurance 
regulation by states.  This fact complicates federal and state regulation of health benefits 
offered to insured Americans because many insurers are exempt from state mandated policy. 
In the six-month period from January to June 2005, the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS) of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reports 19.2 % of Americans between the 
ages of 18-64 were uninsured at the time of the interview, and that of those insured, 70.6% of 
Americans in the same age group were covered by private insurance policies and only 11.5% 
had public insurance coverage.384  The following chart is taken from this CDC report.
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Figure 2. Percentage with health insurance coverage under 65 years of age, by type of insurance 
and age group: United States, January-June 2005.
Data Source: Family Core component of the 2005 National Health Interview Survey. The estimates 
for 2005 were based on data collected from January through June. Data are based on household 
interviews of a sample of the civilian noninstitutionalized population.
According to this recent data, a significant number of Americans would not have access to 
guaranteed insurance coverage of PGD even if it were state mandated.  More generally, analysis 
of state-mandated insurance coverage of infertility treatment demonstrates that there is no 
systematic regulation of coverage for reproductive technology.  This includes not only PGD, 
but IVF, diagnosis and diagnostic tests, gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), medication, 
etc.  A non-profit organisation called the InterNational Council on Infertility Information 
Dissemination (INCIID) publishes an updated review of state mandates with regard to 
insurance coverage of infertility treatment.  Currently, 13 states have individual state mandates 
for insurance coverage with respect to infertility.  To illustrate the variance in state policy, a 
summary of state mandates from Arkansas, California and Connecticut follows:385
3.4.1.1  arkansas
In Arkansas, state law requires insurance providers to cover the cost of in vitro fertilization if 
the couple meets the necessary conditions.  These conditions include a history of unexplained 
infertility for two or more years, infertility due to a specific condition, including a requirement 
that either the patient or the spouse is a policy holder and that the patient’s eggs will be 
fertilized only with sperm from the spouse.  Under this law, HMO’s are not required to comply 




In the California Health and Safety Code, Section 1374.55, infertility is as “the presence of a 
demonstrated condition recognized by a licensed physician and surgeon as a cause of infertility; 
or the inability to conceive a pregnancy or carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more 
of sexual relations without contraception.”386  Some insurers are required to provide a number 
of diagnostic procedures and treatments under this mandate.  Treatments under this mandate 
include diagnosis and diagnostic tests, surgery, medication and gamete intrafallopian transfer. 
However, IVF is specifically excluded from the list of required treatments.  In California, many 
insurers are not required to offer any coverage of infertility treatment, but they must inform 
employers what coverage is or is not available.  If coverage is available, employers can then 
choose whether or not they provide the coverage to employees.  In California, therefore, many 
IVF procedures are not covered by insurance policies.
3.4.1.3  Connecticut
In 2005, the Act Concerning Health Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment and Procedures 
passed in the state of Connecticut.  Here, Connecticut defines infertility as a “condition of a 
presumably healthy individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception or sustain 
a successful pregnancy during a one-year period.”387  Although couples are subject to some 
limitations and requirements, the act requires the coverage of “medically necessary expenses 
of the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including, but not limited to, ovulation induction, 
intrauterine insemination, in vitro fertilization”388 as well as a number of different procedures. 
Some procedures such as IVF are limited to cases where all other less expensive methods have 
been exhausted.
In addition to these three states, 10 other states, including Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia have enacted 
state mandates regarding infertility and assisted reproductive technology.  Each state’s laws 
can widely differ with respect to specific requirements, limitations and given definitions of 
infertility, diagnosis and treatment. 
Insurance coverage cannot be depended upon to provide an adequate or sufficient method 
for helping couples in need pay for infertility treatment.  Coverage of PGD is even more 
difficult because it is not formally included in any state mandates.  In medically necessary 
cases, a fertility clinic can appeal on behalf of a patient to the insurance company by writing 
a convincing letter.  Couples can also write appeals to insurance companies with a heartfelt 
explanation of why they need PGD to ensure the absence of a serious genetic condition for 
their child.  Anecdotal evidence from fertility clinics and online message boards suggest that if 
coverage is granted, it is most often the result of written appeal.  
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As is often the case with relatively new technology in the medical field, access to PGDis limited 
to the very few who can pay large sums of money for the services.  The Genetics and Public 
Policy report concludes that: 
for insurers, the question of whether to cover any medical procedure or test primarily 
comes down to an analysis of the potential costs and benefits of coverage.  A cost-benefit 
analysis of PGD would have to take into account the cost of the underlying IVF, the embryo 
biopsy and genetic testing.  It is not clear whether any health insurer in this country has 
undertaken a formal cost-benefit analysis of PGD for inherited genetic disorders.389
Until this economic analysis occurs, insurance companies are not likely to include policy 
regarding PGD in infertility plans, and access to the technology will remain restricted.
3.4.2  alternatives to insurance coverage
Although the following alternatives are certainly not ideal, they do provide an option for 
couples who are denied insurance coverage for the use of PGD or for those who are not insured 
at all.  The first option is seeking financial aid from the fertility clinic itself.  This could take the 
form of discounts for couples that fit a certain low economic profile, or long- term payment 
plans.  However, even a significant discount on a $16,000 procedure could far exceed what 
many people are able to pay.  Payment plans, on the other hand, seem like a more viable option. 
A somewhat controversial practice is offering discounts if patients are willing to donate their 
eggs for other couples’ use.  The controversy here exists because some argue that this option is 
coercive and takes advantage of the desperation of financially disadvantaged couples.
When examining the insurance coverage of infertility treatments as well as the limited 
alternatives to insurance, it becomes quite clear that access to PGD technology faces severe 
financial restrictions.  Until insurers are willing to pay for IVF and PGD, in whole or in part, 
the access to this potentially beneficial technology will remain limited to a small number of 
people in the United States.  
3.5  suMMary
In the US, there is a lack of direct regulation concerning PGD. While current regulatory 
mechanisms can be stretched to encompass PGD technology and providers, such an 
approach seems to be inadequate and there is an inherent lack of control and monitoring. 
The current general system of oversight raises concerns over the acceptable uses of PGD, 
its safety, accuracy, effectiveness and accessibility. It has been observed that “[t]here are…
neither governmental nor nongovernmental guidelines regarding the boundary between 
using PGD in efforts to produce a disease-free child and using it in efforts to select genetic 
traits that go ‘beyond therapy’ –  that is, traits that are useful to older siblings or simply 
desirable to the would-be parent.”390 In such an open market, “there is a clear tendency to 
expand the application of PGD beyond the scope of clearly and narrowly defined medical 
purposes of detecting embryos that will suffer from a disease or severe handicaps”.391 
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 The current ambit of unregulated PGD technology in the U.S. is extensive – 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis includes:
 ~ testing for severe heritable genetic diseases/disorders 
 ~ testing for sex-linked diseases (therapeutic sex selection)
 ~ testing for late onset diseases
 ~ testing for complex diseases (multi-factoral, predisposition, susceptibility diseases)  
 where the risk of disease development is largely unknown
 ~ aneuploid screening (testing of embryos for aneuploidies to help improve the   
 success rate (implantation rate) of IVF, particularly in women of advanced   
 maternal age)
 ~ testing for carrier status 
 ~ HLA tissue matching (to create a stem cell donor for an existing child) and
 ~ “social sexing” (non-therapeutic sex selection).
 The above applications of PGD are permissible and not against the law. This 
represents a truly ‘open market’, with no legal impediments to PGD use and subject 
only to scientific boundaries and limits. In 2004, the President’s Council on Bioethics 
concluded that PGD is “essentially unmonitored, unstudied, and unregulated.”392
 Access to this technology is a very important social consideration given that the 
process of IVF and PGD is expensive.  In the US, having health insurance does not 
necessarily mean coverage of infertility treatment or genetic testing.  In fact, many 
policies do not even cover IVF.  It is also important to note that many Americans do 
not even have health insurance.  The consequence of the high out-of-pocket expense 
is that only those people who can pay for the procedure have access to the technology. 
In addition to the issue of economic inequality, it is also important to consider 
the societal cost of putting resources toward this very complicated and expensive 
procedure.  Redirecting funds and staff away from the basic health needs of millions of 
Americans could be controversial in the future as PGD becomes more common.    
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Part B:   a coMParative analysis oF Facilitative regiMes
1  introDuction
This section of the report provides an analysis of PGD and compares the regulatory responses 
of NZ, Victoria and the UK.
It has been said that, at its simplest, PGD regulation can be distilled as involving choices along 
two axes: who regulates and under what normative framework.393  The normative framework 
may be permissive or restrictive. An intermediate model distinguishes between medical and 
non-medical uses of PGD, balancing the individual social benefits of PGD against its perceived 
individual and social harms.394 There may also be a mix, for example, permission subject to a 
particular qualification such as adherence to specific licensing requirements.  Sanctions may 
also reflect certain values and may be criminal or administrative in nature. 
The response to the regulation of PGD throughout the world has been predictably varied. 
However, most jurisdictions have implemented some form of regulatory control.  The 
spectrum of control runs from a virtually free market system that is regulated only by 
professional self-regulation and the particular criminal or civil system of that jurisdiction, 
such as in the United States.395  In these jurisdictions, reproductive autonomy and scientific 
freedom take precedence.  Further along the spectrum are facilitative regimes which create 
broad legislative frameworks that delegate a range of decision-making powers to a statutory 
body, such as those in New Zealand, the Australian State of Victoria and the United Kingdom. 
Narrower frameworks create restrictive legislation, where, although some forms of PGD are 
permitted, the acceptable use of PGD is specified as precisely as possible.  Examples of such 
legislation is that enacted in France and the Netherlands.396  At the end of the spectrum are 
those jurisdictions which completely prohibit PGD, such as Italy and Germany.397 Travelling 
to another country to obtain treatment, often referred to as ‘reproductive tourism,’ is the only 
option for persons seeking PGD in these latter countries. 
Regardless of the framework adopted, a necessary precursor to creating a regulatory framework 
is clarity as to why regulatory ‘interference’ is required, what consequences are to be avoided, and 
how best to achieve the regulatory objective.  It is also essential to determine the requirements 
for legitimate and fair law making in the face of extensive diversity of opinion.398
In a liberal democracy, good legal policy should be guided by an ideal of democratic theory. 
This means that legal policy on ethically controversial issues should be based on norms which 
represent an intersection amongst competing ethical positions.  Hence the challenge for policy 
makers is to identify, prioritise and balance a competing and complex range of ethical beliefs.399 
Decision makers must seek to achieve ‘regulatory legitimacy’ in the absence of a consensus 
view.  To do this requires promoting a sense of connection between the stakeholders and the 
regulation itself. There is a need and precedent for community participation in debate.  In 
addition, the law must be responsive to evolving technologies.400
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Legislators must balance competing views on the moral status of the embryo, and determine 
what compromise is required to enable medical benefits to accrue to society whilst avoiding 
what may be, to many people, socially unacceptable practices. How they do this will be reflected 
in the policy created and the degree to which it is permissive or restrictive.401  When regulators 
are pressed to defend the legitimacy of their position, it might not be so much a matter of 
justifying its general orientation (for prohibition or permission) as its fine-tuning.
The first reported clinical application of PGD occurred in 1990, when it was used to sex select 
an embryo to prevent the transmission of an X-linked heritable condition.402  In the same 
year, the United Kingdom established a regulatory framework for human assisted reproductive 
technology and associated reprogenetic technologies with the enactment of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.  The United Kingdom was one of the first jurisdictions 
to enact legislation after the State of Victoria introduced the first legislation in 1984.403  This 
section of the report will analyse these legislative and policy frameworks in relation to PGD, 
and to consider the distinguishing aspects of New Zealand’s policy choices. 
This analysis will concentrate on the Victorian and UK systems because they sit in a similar 
position on the regulatory range as New Zealand.  The process of determining the respective 
policy positions, and the strengths or weaknesses of the different systems will be reviewed with 
the aim of evaluating the regime established in New Zealand. It is not proposed to go into 
detail in respect of countries that have strongly prohibitive legislation, or countries that have 
no regulatory controls, unless they add to the analysis of the jurisdictions to be examined.  A 
table setting out the range of possible responses to the regulation of PGD and the implications 
of those choices adopted by various countries is provided in the appendix of this part of 
report.  
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 does not exist in a legal  vacuum, but 
sits within a broader context of health law in New Zealand.  It is therefore proposed to consider 
other aspects of health law that will impact on this area in New Zealand.
2  wHy regulate?
The UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee stated, in a recent review 
of ART, that ‘the philosophical view that individuals should have the right to make private 
choices – such as reproductive decisions – free from the scrutiny of the state” can be traced to 
John Stuart Mill who said:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  The only part of the 
conduct of any one, of which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In 
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.404
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It follows that the starting point in any discussion of law which seeks to curtail aspects of 
individual choice is to determine the basis for intervention. Rationales which are often used to 
justify regulating new reprogenetic technologies such as PGD include:
~  the need to determine parameters in regard to creating, manipulating and        
 destroying embryos, 
~ the prevention of treatment or research excess in a vulnerable patient population;
~  minimising risk to prospective children and future generations; and 
~   preventing harm to women.  
PGD necessarily involves the creation and wastage of embryos which are not suitable for 
implantation. Policy choices, which may or may not involve specific legislative frameworks, 
inevitably require placing a value on the status of the embryo which is at the centre of all debates 
involving reproductive technology.  Yet the moral status of preimplantation human embryos is 
highly contested.   At one end of the debate are those who believe that an embryo has the moral 
status of full personhood, and should accordingly be protected.405  An intermediate position 
would assert that the embryo gradually acquires greater moral status as it develops.  Applying 
this gradualist approach, a developing foetus would be accorded greater moral status than an 
early embryo.  The gradualist approach gives some explanation for the various restrictions 
relating to the use of embryos, which arise, for example, the appearance of the primitive streak 
at fourteen days is often taken to prescribe acceptable limits for embryo research.   Equally, the 
point at which a foetus becomes potentially viable influences the lawfulness of termination.  At 
the other end of the debate, the position taken is that the embryo is no more than a collection 
of cells, albeit with the potential to develop into a human being. 406   
One factor which must be taken into account when regulating PGD is achieving, at the least, 
consistency with the law in relation to abortion, which has already placed a value on the 
moral status of the embryo.  Reproductive autonomy is emphasised in abortion law where a 
pregnancy may be terminated on the basis of prenatal testing. This reflects reproductive choice 
as a high-end value.  If the abortion framework in a jurisdiction is essentially permissive, this 
will have implications for the lawful parameters of PGD.
Concerns for the health and safety of the children born as a result of PGD, and the women 
undergoing the procedures, have been part of the drive to impose regulatory restraints on PGD. 
Until very recently, PGD has been described as an ‘experimental procedure’.407  It is not difficult 
to find instances of treatment or research excess in New Zealand, or in other countries.408 
Most jurisdictions have experienced instances in their history where medical treatment or 
research excess has caused extreme harm to specific populations.409  In reprogenetics, the stakes 
are high.  Third parties are involved in the form of the putative child to be born and some 
reprogenetic interventions may have intergenerational effects.
In the United States it was recently reported that experimental reprogenetic techniques have 
been rapidly introduced onto the market ‘without sufficient prior animal experimentation, 
randomized clinical trials, or the rigorous data collection that would occur in federally 
funded studies.’410 One study reported an experimental technique that had assisted twenty 
women to achieve a pregnancy.  The women had previously been unable to conceive as the 
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result of defects in their eggs’ cytoplasm, or ‘ooplasm’.   Transplantation was performed and 
healthy ooplasm from donor eggs was injected into the defective eggs.  The transplant entails 
the transfer of genetic material from one egg to the other, as the ooplasm contains minute 
organelles called mitochondria, and each mitochondrion contains a small loop of DNA.  In this 
way, the resulting child receives a genetic contribution from three different persons. Because 
mitochondrial DNA is maternally inherited, if the resulting child is female she will pass on 
to her child the genetic contribution of both her mother and the female ooplasm donor. The 
researchers announced that they had achieved the first successful ‘germ-line modification’ and 
that it had resulted in apparently healthy babies.411  Alarmingly, ooplasm transplantation was 
advertised on the Internet before the United States Food and Drug Administration intervened 
to collect information and conduct hearings on the safety and efficacy of the technique.412  Like 
many reproductive procedures, the long-term effects of the intervention are not known.413  
Because of the lessons learned by past research and treatment excesses, and the novel problems 
raised by reprogenetics, limits are perceived to be required to balance the benefits available to 
society against the putative risks from the excesses of science.  However, the risks associated 
with PGD are not known to be substantially higher than those associated with IVF.  A recent 
review carried out in New Zealand, “Systematic Review of the Quantifiable Harms and 
Benefits of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis”, reported that PGD does not increase obstetric 
or neonatal complications above those which occur with IVF alone.414  While the incidence 
of major birth abnormalities is about 3.8%, similar to that reported with IVF,415 there are 
suggestions of an increased incidence of rare epigenetic disorders in babies born as a result 
of reproductive techniques such as IVF and ICSI.416  This could also apply to infants born 
following PGD. 
Although the risks involved in PGD are not higher than those linked to IVF, there are established 
risks associated with IVF.  The New Zealand Advisory Group on Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (AGART) found that singleton children born as a result of IVF are more likely to 
be born early, be of low birth weight and have poorer neonatal health outcomes than naturally 
conceived children.417  The risk of preterm delivery for singletons conceived as a result of IVF 
is around twice that of natural conception.  Neonatal, perinatal and infant mortality rates are 
twice as high for babies conceived by IVF as for natural conceptions.418  Whilst these risks were 
found to be acceptable in the case of infertility, the ratio of risk to benefit may alter when there 
is no infertility or medical indications for the performance of PGD.  
The argument for regulating PGD is often phrased in terms of setting ‘appropriate limits’, yet 
there is much debate as to where the permissible limits should be drawn.  Most people would 
understand, even if they would not agree with, a decision conscientiously taken to undergo 
PGD to test for the presence of a chromosomal disorder such as Down Syndrome or the Fragile 
X gene.  But where then is the line to be drawn: ‘At gender selection? To exclude homosexuals? 
To favour the tall, the blonde, or the beautiful? To exclude a propensity to obesity or a potential 
for ugliness?’ 419   Hence, the issue for decision makers is not only whether the law should be 
involved, but if it should, where the limits of permissible PGD should be drawn.
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3  exPectations oF regulation – realisM or iDealisM?
Epithets such as ‘designer babies’ and ‘eugenics’ are often used in relation to preimplantation 
genetic technology.  To a large extent, such labels are neither accurate, nor are they helpful.420 
The impetus for the initial use and subsequent development of the technology has been to 
provide better options for avoiding the transmission of serious heritable disorders and to 
increase the chances of successful implantation for subfertile patients.421
However, possible extensions of the technology have evoked concern.  Should testing for 
susceptibility disorders, where there is no certainty that a genetic condition will develop and 
where an individual may live many years before the onset of symptoms, be available?  Should it 
be permissible to test for late onset disorders?  Should PGD be used to determine if an embryo 
possesses the same tissue type as a sick sibling and could therefore be a potential tissue donor 
of umbilical cord stem cells?  The prospect that the technique may be used to select embryos 
for non-medical indications, such as physical characteristics, has provoked the strongest 
controversy.422  In this latter category sex selection is the only realistic current prospect.423
Particular challenges are presented when regulating in this area where views may be polarised 
and morally or politically charged, and where the science is complex and rapidly evolving.  In 
determining the parameters of legislation, legislators cannot solely rely on public consensus, 
as there may in fact never be one.424  The rate of scientific advance means that the law must 
be sufficiently flexible to cope with changes.  Similarly, views held by the public may also 
change with time, as interventions come to be perceived as more mainstream, and technology 
improves.425
In order to deal with these challenges, creating legislation which delegates decision-making 
authority to a regulatory body has been the approach of many jurisdictions to regulating ART 
and PGD.  This includes New Zealand.  In these circumstances, certain values may appear to 
be in conflict.  These bodies are generally set up as statutory authorities that are independent 
or one step removed from government.  Depending on the particular regulatory framework 
involved, such bodies may effectively be creating quasi-law.  This role may clash with the view 
that it should be Parliament that determines the lawful parameters of ART.  
The need for legislation to be flexible so that it does not quickly become obsolete when 
technological advances occur may also attract the criticism that regulatory powers conferred 
on a statutory body are too broad and are not sufficiently certain.  Finally, answers to difficult 
questions are expected quickly, often under significant time pressures.426 The expectations 
placed on such bodies are high.
Regardless of the specific characteristics of the approach taken to regulating ART, there 
are accepted principles which must underpin any regulatory initiative for the regulatory 
scheme to be perceived as legitimate by stakeholders and the general public.  The regulatory 
framework must be proportionate to the perceived harms or risks posed to justify the 
imposition of regulatory limits. When it is determined that regulation is necessary, regulatory 
measures should be kept to the minimum required in order to achieve the regulatory objective. 
Regulators should have clear lines of accountability.  In particular, this requires that they 
justify their decisions, and are subject to public scrutiny.  There should be accessible, fair and 
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effective complaints and appeals processes.  There should be consistency in administering 
the regulation and in the regulation itself, and transparency in terms of what the regulatory 
objective is, and the legal obligations of those being regulated.  Finally, regulation must be 
sufficiently targeted to achieve its objective.427  By observing these principles, it is hoped that 
regulation is perceived to be legitimate in a pluralist society where views of the public may be 
very divergent.   While such regulatory measures will not be universally endorsed by people 
who may either be opposed to certain practices, or those who oppose regulatory interference, 
the regulatory process will at least meet the minimum standards of legitimacy.
In addition to these principles, it may be added that the regulatory framework in New Zealand 
should provide for the incorporation of Mäori values.428  A pragmatic requirement is that the 
regulatory structure that is put in place is cost effective, both for the bodies that oversee the 
regulation and the providers delivering the service.  
4  regulatory aPProacHes – tHe sPectruM
Although this analysis is focused on the regulatory approaches adopted by New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom and the State of Victoria, these regulatory schemes are by no means 
representative of other jurisdictions.  Not every jurisdiction has adopted legislative frameworks, 
and not all that have resemble those adopted by the jurisdictions under study in this analysis. 
Whilst, most jurisdictions have implemented some form of regulatory control, the means of 
regulating vary widely. 
At one end of the spectrum are jurisdictions such as the United States, which operate in a 
virtually free market system that is regulated only by professional self-regulation and the 
criminal or civil law system of that particular jurisdiction.   In such jurisdictions, reproductive 
autonomy and scientific freedom appear to take precedence.429  Other jurisdictions – such as 
the UK, Victoria and NZ – have opted for facilitative regimes which create broad legislative 
frameworks that delegate a range of decision-making powers to statutory bodies.  More 
restrictive frameworks create legislation with narrower scope, where although some forms 
of PGD are permitted, acceptable uses of PGD are specified as precisely as possible.  This 
may be seen in the legislative instruments of France and the Netherlands.430  At the end of 
the spectrum are those jurisdictions which completely prohibit PGD, such as Italy and 
Germany.431 Reproductive tourism is the only option for persons seeking PGD in this last-
mentioned category.  
New Zealand has only recently passed legislation dealing with ART after a legislative process 
that took eight years.432  The analysis that follows will focus on countries that sit in a position 
similar to NZ on the regulatory spectrum. This section will not go into detail about countries 
that have strongly prohibitive legislation or those which have an absence of direct regulatory 
controls.  A table setting out the range of possible responses to the regulation of PGD and the 
implications of choices adopted by various countries is provided in Appendix 1.
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5  coMParative analysis:  nZ, victoria anD tHe uk
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Australian State of Victoria have all adopted broadly 
similar regimes to regulating ART, which includes PGD.  Each of the three jurisdictions has 
enacted an overarching statute which regulates ART, and creates a statutory body to facilitate 
the administration of the Act.  Although the structures are similar, there are key differences. 
The following analysis seeks to analyse:
~ the underlying purpose or philosophy of each Act, 
~ who is responsible for decision-making in relation to PGD under the respective   
 regulatory regimes and how decisions are made,
~ the permissible limits of PGD in each jurisdiction,   
~ mechanisms to ensure the safe provision of fertility services,  
~ provisions for administrative fairness and appeals, and
~ regulatory legitimacy and the HART Act 2004.
By making comparisons with the United Kingdom and Victorian, it is hoped to identify the 
distinctive aspects of the New Zealand system. 
5.1  BackgrounD – regulatory FraMeworks
In contrast to the other jurisdictions studied in this report, Australia does not have one central 
statute regulating ART.433  Specific statutes regulating ART have been passed in Victoria, South 
Australia and Western Australia.434   For the purpose of this report, an in-depth analysis of the 
Victorian system will be made.
The state of Victoria, Australia was the first jurisdiction in the world to pass legislation in 
the area of ART when it enacted the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984.  The Act was 
essentially based on a ‘criminal model’.435   It was repealed in 1995 with the passing of the 
Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic), which adopted a licensing approach in contrast to the 
earlier criminal approach.  The current Victorian Act, sets out definitive principles of the Act, 
provides certain prohibitions, and delegates power to a statutory body, the Infertility Treatment 
Authority, to administer the Act. The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) provides for the 
regulation of infertility services through the licensing and approval of places and practitioners 
by the Infertility Treatment Authority.436  
The legislative approach to ART adopted by the United Kingdom in 1992 differs markedly 
from that first enacted in Victoria in 1984.  Instead of a criminal system, the UK opted for a 
licensing system, an essentially  ‘civil’ model of regulation.437  The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (UK) sets out specific prohibitions in relation to embryos and confers 
power on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to authorise embryo research, 
treatment services and the storage of embryos through a licensing system.  
New Zealand has adopted a slightly different system.  The New Zealand Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (HART Act) has introduced a framework that declares 
certain assisted reproductive procedures to be prohibited, and creates two distinct decision-
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making bodies.438  These two bodies have clear remits - an Advisory Committee on Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ACART) is responsible for creating policy in accordance with 
the principles and requirements set out in the Act - and an Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ECART) is responsible for facilitating the implementation of that 
policy.   Whilst the HART Act incorporates a health and safety framework for performing 
assisted reproductive procedures, it does not set up a licensing system, in contrast to the UK 
and Victorian legislation.
5.2  unDerlying PHilosoPHy/PurPoses/oBJectives oF tHe acts
In the area of rapidly advancing biomedicine, it is essential to have a clear understanding of 
the underlying philosophy of the Act which establishes the particular regulatory framework. 
When science points in one direction, but compelling arguments point in another, decision-
makers are thereby able to justify their decisions on the basis of the underlying philosophy of 
the Act and the regulatory objective.  
The philosophy underpinning the New Zealand HART Act is apparent in the provision that 
sets out the first purpose of the Act. The overarching purpose is to: 
secure the benefits of assisted reproductive procedures, established procedures and human 
reproductive research for individuals and for society in general by taking appropriate 
measures for the protection and promotion of the health, safety, dignity, and rights of all 
individuals, but particularly those of women and children, in the use of these procedures 
and research.439 
Hence, the intention of the Act is to obtain the benefits of assisted reproductive procedures not 
only for individuals, but also for society in general. It seeks to do this by creating a framework to 
protect and safeguard the health, safety, dignity and rights of all individuals, especially women 
and children, in the use of assisted reproductive technology and research.  This protective 
purpose is ambiguous.  While, at first, it seems to encompass the wider effects of assisted 
reproductive technology on society in relation to benefits, it then seems to limit the protective 
purpose to the individuals accessing the technology.  Another interpretation of the purpose 
section of the Act is that the benefit to society is conferred by ensuring that individuals can 
access assisted reproductive technology safely. 
Although the primary purpose of the Act appears to be about securing the ‘benefits of assisted 
reproductive procedures’, the underlying philosophy of the HART Act does not appear to be a 
libertarian one which places foremost priority on reproductive autonomy.440  The Act contains 
rigid prohibitions on sex selection, and also places prohibitions on the commercial supply 
of human embryos or gametes, and commercial surrogacy arrangements.441   It seems that 
the underlying purpose intended by the legislature is to balance the securing of benefits for 
individuals within the perceived wider interests of society.442   
Providing a robust and flexible framework for regulating and guiding the performance of 
assisted reproductive procedures and research is expressly declared as another central purpose 
of the Act.443  This is achieved by conferring decision- making authority on ACART subject 
to certain restraints.  The Act sets out principles which guide all persons exercising powers 
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or performing functions under the Act.  These include the principles that the health and 
well-being of children born as a result of an assisted reproductive procedure is an ‘important 
consideration’ in all decisions about that procedure;444 that ‘human health, safety, and dignity 
of present and future generations should be preserved and promoted;’445 and that ‘while all 
persons are affected by assisted reproductive procedures and established procedures, women, 
more than men, are directly and significantly affected by their application, and the health and 
well-being of women must be protected in the use of these procedures’.446  These principles 
clearly indicate that there are competing interests to be assessed and balanced in relation to 
assisted reproductive procedures or research.  However, no particular interest is accorded 
primacy. 
Additional principles require that the different ethical, spiritual, and cultural perspectives in 
society should be considered and treated with respect.447 In particular section 3(f) provides 
that the needs, values, and beliefs of Mäori should be considered and treated with respect.  
In summary, the general philosophy underlying the purposes and principles of the New Zealand 
Act is closely akin to the ethical principle known as an ‘ethic of care’.448  Traditionally associated 
with feminist thought, the ethic of care seeks to balance the principles of individual autonomy, 
equality, respect for human life and dignity, protection of the vulnerable, appropriate use of 
resources, accountability, and individual and collective interests.   An ethic of care is also the 
underlying principle in the Canadian legislation.449
The Victorian Infertility Treatment Act 1995 sets out that two of its seven purposes are ‘to 
regulate the use of IVF … and to establish the Infertility Treatment Authority’.450  Clearly, 
the overriding purpose of the Victorian statute is to prescribe limits, and to set up a body 
to enforce those limits. Section 5 outlines guiding principles which must be given effect in 
administering, or carrying out functions or activities under the Victorian Infertility Treatment 
Act 1995.  These principles are set out in descending order of importance, with the interests 
of the person born or to be born as a result of treatment of paramount concern.  This is a 
high order criterion.  Neither the New Zealand nor United Kingdom adopt the paramountcy 
principle in their regulatory frameworks.  This principle is followed by the principle that human 
life should be preserved and protected, and the interests of the family should be considered. 
The interests of the infertile couple in fulfilling their desire to have children is included, but is 
accorded least priority.451  
There are several characteristics of the IT Act that distinguish the Victorian legislation in the 
context of this discussion.  The first is the fact that the IT Act has clearly ascribed paramountcy 
to the welfare of the prospective child.  However, this principle may raise tensions with aspects 
of reproductive technology where the interests of the future child require balancing against 
uncertainty as to risk, and with the interests of other individuals.  It is also unusual that the 
interests of the family should precede those of fulfilling an infertile couple’s desire to have children. 
Without a couple, there is no family to consider.  In addition to these distinguishing aspects of 
the legislation, the Victorian legislature attempted to prescribe very narrowly those who could 
access ART.  Section 8 of the Act specifies who is eligible for treatment.  It essentially provides 
two pathways to treatment, either infertility, or the risk of transmission of a heritable condition. 
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Section 8 provides:  
8. Persons who may undergo treatment procedures
 (1) A woman who undergoes a treatment procedure must - 
  (a) be married and living with her husband on a genuine domestic basis; or 
  (b) be living with a man in a de facto relationship
 (3) Before a woman undergoes a treatment procedure-
  (a) a doctor must be satisfied, on reasonable grounds, from  an examination   
   or from treatment he or she has carried out that the woman is unlikely to  
  become pregnant from an oocyte produced by her and sperm produced by   
  her husband other than by a treatment procedure; or
  (b) a doctor, who has specialist qualifications in human genetics, must be   
   satisfied, from an examination he or she has carried out, that if the woman  
   became pregnant from an oocyte produced by her and sperm produced   
   by  her husband, a genetic abnormality or a disease might be transmitted to  
   a person born as a result of the pregnancy.
Although section 8(1) of the Act refers to a woman who is married or in a de facto relationship, 
marital status is no longer a ground for preventing access to ART, as long as other statutory 
requirements are met.  It was held in the Federal Court that requiring a woman be married or 
in a heterosexual de facto relationship in order to access infertility treatment was inconsistent 
with the Federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984.  This rendered the state law invalid.452 However, 
the access requirements which limit treatment to persons requiring assisted reproductive 
procedures services for ‘infertility’ are still problematic for single or lesbian women.  There is 
no definition of ‘infertility’ under the Act, so it is unclear whether it would encompass social 
infertility, where for example a lesbian woman ‘is unlikely to become pregnant’ because her 
partner is female, or clinical infertility whereby physical characteristics such as endometriosis 
exist causing infertility.  The ITA has directed their clinics that unmarried women must be 
assessed as clinically infertile to be able to access infertility treatment.453  This prevents lesbian 
or single women who are not suffering from clinical infertility accessing ART in the State of 
Victoria.
Limiting access to persons requiring treatment for infertility, or to those who are at risk of 
transmitting a genetic disorder to their child produces incongruous results. For example, a 
single or lesbian woman could access ART on the basis of a genetic disorder, or under the 
infertility provision because she is sufficiently old to be categorised as infertile, but if she is not 
assessed as clinically infertile, or at risk of transmitting a heritable condition, then treatment 
under the Act is precluded.454  The irony is that in the case of single women or lesbian women 
who are not experiencing infertility, the fact that they are capable of transmitting a genetic 
disorder provides them with a pathway to fertility services they would not otherwise have.  
The access requirements of the Act have been criticised as producing unfair and irrational 
results, and lacking a clear policy basis.455  It has been observed that the Act ‘clearly’ enshrines a 
regulatory framework which expresses a community view about who should receive treatment, 
how children born of the procedures should be treated and the status of the human embryo.456 
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It has been said, although disputed, that the interests of the Catholic Church are reflected in 
the legislative framework.457  One commentator has noted that there are limitations to the 
ability of the Victorian system to monitor and review community attitudes and responses to 
the development of the technology, and propose modifications to the regulatory framework 
because of the difficulty of amending the Act.458  Yet all these criticisms of the Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995, described as a prescriptive regime which delegates minimal discretionary 
power to the statutory body, belie the fact that the Authority permits a greater range of PGD 
than that currently permitted in the United Kingdom or New Zealand.
The provisions of the Act do not specify what is considered to be a ‘genetic abnormality or a 
disease’.  It is this absence of a rigid definition that makes the Victorian legislation facilitative, as 
opposed to restrictive.459  The only direct reference to PGD in the Act relates to sex selection.  
Unlike the New Zealand and Victorian legislation, there is a noticeable absence of any express 
guiding principles in the United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.460 
However, the Act should be read with the Warnock report.461  The legislation sets out certain 
limits of assisted reproductive technology and research,462 and establishes a licensing authority 
which may issue licenses for treatment, and research.463   However, the Act prohibits the 
provision of treatment pursuant to a licence unless ‘account has been taken of the welfare of 
any child born as a result of treatment (including the need of that child for a father), and of any 
other child who may be affected by the birth’.464  There are several broad objectives underlying 
the HFE Act 1990: flexibility, safety and the welfare of the next generation.465
In summary, the New Zealand HART Act seeks to provide a means for the provision of ART 
within a flexible protective framework, which arguably includes consideration of the wider 
interests of society, and which does not prioritise the interests of any particular stakeholder.  In 
contrast, the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic), is more prescriptive, prioritising the interests 
of the person to be born as the paramount concern.  It also limits who may access ART.
The United Kingdom’s HFE Act creates the most permissive and potentially liberal framework, 
delegating considerable discretionary authority to the HFEA. It has been said that the HFE 
Act is evidence of the intention of the British Parliament to facilitate research and progress by 
legitimating such research with regulation.466 
5.3 new ZealanD
5.3.1  wHo regulates?
Having analysed the underlying philosophy of the respective Acts responsible for the regulatory 
frameworks of the jurisdictions under study, it is proposed to determine who in fact makes 
decisions in relation to PGD, and what are the current permissible parameters in the respective 
jurisdictions. 
The HART Act 2004 provides a skeleton framework whereby certain ‘assisted reproductive 
procedures’ and research are expressly prohibited,467 others are regulated by a statutory body, 
and those which are declared to be ‘established procedures’ are excluded from the regulatory 
regime.468  A commitment to imposing the minimum regulation necessary is achieved by the 
mechanism available to declare certain procedures to be established.469  
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The only provision in the HART Act which expressly refers to PGD provides that no person 
may select an embryo on the basis of sex unless it is to prevent or treat a genetic disorder or 
trait.  A policy-making role is designated  to ACART, – subject to specified requirements, for 
procedures which include PGD.  ACART is responsible for the development of guidelines and 
the provision of advice to ECART, and the review of such guidelines and advice.470  ACART must 
also provide advice to the Minister on relevant issues.471  This includes advice as to  whether an 
assisted reproductive procedure should be declared to be an established procedure.  
Effectively, ACART is responsible for determining the boundaries of permissible PGD in 
New Zealand, although it is subject to certain restraints.  ACART may only issue guidelines 
if interested parties and members of the public have been given a reasonable opportunity 
to make submissions on a discussion paper or on an outline of the proposed guidelines.472 
ACART is statutorily obliged to take those submissions into account.473  After receiving a 
copy of the guidelines, the Minister must table them in the House of Representatives, but the 
guidelines do not need the approval of the House.474  However, the Health Committee can, 
under Parliamentary rules, choose to undertake an inquiry into the guidelines.
Similarly for specified instances of assisted reproductive research and assisted reproductive 
technology, which include selection of embryos using PGD, ACART must call for and take into 
consideration submissions before giving significant advice to the Minister.475 This requirement 
effectively ensures that the committee assesses the barometer of public opinion prior to issuing 
guidelines or providing significant advice to the Minister, but does not mean that views 
expressed will necessarily be accommodated.476    
Before ACART gives advice to the Minister or issues guidelines to the ECART it must consult 
on the proposed advice or guidelines with any members of the public or any other person or 
group ‘that the committee considers appropriate’, or with appropriate government departments 
and agencies.477  
The HART Act provides that assisted reproductive procedures may only proceed with the prior 
written approval of ECART.478  An assisted reproductive procedure is defined in section 5 of 
the Act.  An assisted reproductive procedure:
(a) means a procedure performed for the purpose of assisting human reproduction that  
 involves-
 (i)  the creation of an in vitro human embryo; or 
 (ii)  the storage, manipulation, or use of an in vitro human gamete or and in vitro  
  human embryo; or 
 (iii)  the use of cells derived from an in vitro human embryo; or 
 (iv)  the implantation into a human being of  human gametes or human embryos; but 
(b)  does not include an established procedure.
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Effectively, if an application of PGD has not been declared to be an established procedure, 
it constitutes a regulated activity under the Act.  ECART may not give approval unless it is 
satisfied that the activity proposed to be undertaken under the approval is consistent with 
relevant guidelines or relevant advice issued or given by ACART.479  If there are no relevant 
guidelines or advice, the ECART may not approve an application until such time as the ACART 
formulates them.  ECART is therefore tightly constrained by the parameters set by ACART.480 
The Act provides a mechanism by which certain procedures may be declared to be ‘established 
procedures’, or cease to be an established procedure, on the basis of ACART’s recommendation. 
Once an assisted reproductive procedure is declared to be an ‘established procedure’ by 
Order in Council, the procedure ceases to be regulated under the Act.481  PGD in restricted 
circumstances has recently been declared to be an established procedure.482
Whilst Parliament has provided a prohibition on sex selection, it is essentially the Advisory 
Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology which determines the permissible limits of 
PGD in New Zealand.  However, ACART is constrained to act in accordance with the principles 
declared in the Act, and is statutorily required to engage with the public and interested parties 
prior to formulating policy.
5.3.2  PerMissiBle liMits
The current regulatory framework in New Zealand has established three categories of PGD: 
PGD which is statutorily prohibited; PGD which is regulated under Guidelines promulgated 
by the Advisory Committee and which requires Ethics Committee approval; and PGD which 
has been declared to be an established procedure by Order in Council. 
In regard to PGD which is prohibited, section 11 of the HART Act provides:
Restrictions on sex selection of human embryos
(1)  No person may, for reproductive purposes, -
 (a) select an in vitro human embryo for implantation into a human being on the  
  basis of the sex of the embryo; or  
 (b) perform any procedure, or provide, prescribe, or administer any thing in order  
  to ensure, or in order to increase the probability, that a human embryo will be of 
  a particular sex.
Breach of this section attracts a hefty penalty, with a person liable to either imprisonment for 
up to one year, or a fine of up to $100 000 or both.483  However, a lawful excuse will be available 
if sex selection was undertaken to prevent or treat a genetic disorder or disease.484  
Whilst section 11(1)(a) relates directly to PGD it is assumed that section 11(1)(b) is intended 
to cover techniques such as sperm sorting,485 or to new techniques which may develop in the 
future, that allow parents to select the sex of their child prior to conception.  
Section 11(1)(b) is drafted extremely broadly.  The provision is drafted so widely that a person 
who consults, for example, a homeopath for homeopathic remedies to increase the chances 
of conceiving a child of a particular sex, could hypothetically, result in the provider breaching 
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section 11(1)(b).  Throughout history people have practised sex selection.  Reportedly 
the Greeks thought that tying off the left testicle would produce a male because the male 
determining sperm were derived from the right testicle.486  Section 11(1)(b) is possibly one 
of the better examples of regulatory overkill in current New Zealand legislation. It begs the 
question whether the extremely broad prohibition on sex selection is commensurate with the 
putative risks or harms arising from sex selection.  
The prohibition on non-medical sex selection sends a strong signal that the intended normative 
axis for regulating PGD in New Zealand is strictly therapeutic. It is noteworthy that the only 
high order criterion relevant to PGD in the Act relates to sex selection. PGD for selection 
of non-medical traits, which is arguably one of the most contentious aspects of PGD, is not 
expressly prohibited under the Act.487  
The prohibition on sex selection was not in the HART Bill as amended by Supplementary 
Order Paper No 80 initially.  It was added by the Select Committee in response to concerns 
that New Zealand was being more permissive than other jurisdictions.488  The current policy 
in relation to sex selection appears to be based broadly on perceived ‘social acceptability’ – an 
intellectually and ethically dubious concept, and one which has not been used to determine the 
acceptability of other medical practices.489 Perceived societal disapproval of certain practices 
does not necessarily mean that those practices should be prohibited. 490 
 
5.3.3  estaBlisHeD ProceDures
A recently passed Order in Council491 declared certain categories of PGD to be established on 
the basis of advice received by the Minister of Health from an Advisory Group on Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies and a systematic review undertaken by the New Zealand Guidelines 
Group.492  In her subsequent report to the Minister of Health on established procedures, the 
Director-General of Health stated; ‘current evidence indicates that the risks associated with PGD 
are not markedly higher than those associated with IVF or ICSI,’ and the ‘risks associated with 
PGD fall within an acceptable level for New Zealand, because the risks are not raised above those 
risks which exist for IVF alone’.   In this context, PGD offers potential benefits for those who are 
genetically predisposed to having a child with a serious disorder.493  
The Order permits the use of PGD as an established procedure for non-familial chromosomal 
disorders (aneuploidy screening) without regulatory restraint where the woman is of 
advanced reproductive age, or has suffered from recurrent implantation failure or recurrent 
miscarriage.494  
PGD may be performed as an established procedure for familial single gene disorders which 
have been identified in the family or whanau and  where there is a 25% or greater risk of an 
affected pregnancy.  The same criteria are applied to performing PGD for sex determination 
where familial sex-linked disorders have been identified in the family or whanau, but no 
specific test for the particular mutation that causes the disorder is available. The restriction 
prevents the performance of sex-selection where a familial sex-linked disorder exists, but it is 
possible to diagnose the particular mutation.495  In the case of familial chromosomal disorders, 
the disorder must also have been identified in the family/whanau.   
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The final threshold  criterion for PGD involving familial single gene disorders, familial sex-
linked disorders and familial chromosomal requires that there be ‘evidence that the future 
individual may be seriously impaired as a result of the disorder’.  
In contrast, the proposed threshold set out in a consultation document prior to the established 
procedures order sought to authorise PGD when there was ‘a high risk of serious abnormality’.496 
There is no longer any reference to a ‘high risk’, but mere evidence of potentially serious 
impairment will suffice. This would indicate that the threshold for permissible PGD without 
approval has been lowered from that originally proposed. 
The Order in Council does not provide a definition of serious impairment.  However, the 
Interim Guidelines on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, since incorporated as ACART 
Guidelines, provide that ‘it is the responsibility of PGD providers, in collaboration with a clinical 
geneticist, to determine whether a disorder is likely to be serious in the offspring’.497  On the face 
of it, clinicians have a broad mandate to determine what constitutes a disorder that could cause 
serious impairment in a future individual, and the likelihood of that happening.498 
The fact that clinicians determine the likelihood of a disorder manifesting in prospective 
offspring is generally unproblematic, but determining what constitutes a serious disorder is less 
straightforward.499  It could be claimed that by leaving such decisions in the hands of the treating 
clinicians, rather than in those seeking the procedure, PGD cannot be represented as providing 
greater autonomy and reproductive freedom.500  However it is likely, and desirable, that in clinical 
practice these decisions will be made in collaboration with the prospective parents.  
The group of genetic disorders that may be brought within the category of ‘single gene’ 
disorders which may cause ‘serious impairment’ in an individual is extremely wide.  It could 
be, and is likely to be, interpreted by providers as including late onset and reduced penetrance 
disorders.  An example of a late onset, lower penetrance disorder is the BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 
mutation.  Carriers of the mutation have a 60-90% risk of developing cancer of the breast or 
ovary compared with a 10% risk in the general population.  There is no certainty of developing 
cancer, only a significant risk.  A carrier of the mutation may never in fact develop cancer, or 
even if they do, may live several decades before the first symptoms of disease appear.  However, 
the only fool-proof prophylaxis for carriers of the mutation is double mastectomy, a radical and 
mutilating surgical procedure.  It is thought to be doubtful that new therapeutic developments 
will be available for the next generation of BRCA mutation carriers that could significantly 
improve prevention and morbidity and mortality by BRCA-related forms of cancer.501  
The provision of PGD for late onset, lower penetrance conditions such as BRCA 1 and 2, or 
familial adenomatous polyposis coli,502 may potentially be carried out as a matter of course 
in New Zealand under the established procedure category.  The decision to provide PGD is 
essentially left up to the clinician involved.  In this respect, the provision of PGD in New 
Zealand for single gene disorders where there is evidence that the mutation may cause serious 
impairment in the ‘future individual’ (not ‘child’) could be readily accessible, being made at 
the point of patient-doctor contact.  It is comparatively broad in relation to the current policy 
of the HFEA.  PGD for BRCA mutation has not yet been licensed in the UK, but is permitted 
in the State of Victoria.
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The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has only recently undertaken 
a review to determine if testing for susceptibility conditions should be permitted in the 
United Kingdom.503  In contrast, there has not been any public consultation undertaken in 
New Zealand as to whether PGD should be extended to select against embryos with genetic 
mutations which cause late onset disorders or which increase the risk of developing a disease 
later in life. 
The potentially broad approach in relation to single gene disorders in the established procedure 
category is in contrast with the prohibitive policy in the HART Act in relation to sex selection, 
and the restrictive approach to HLA testing under the Interim ACART Guidelines.  It should 
be noted that the current Guidelines were created prior to the newly established ACART being 
appointed.504    
The only application of PGD which is currently within the remit of ECART as a regulated 
activity is PGD carried out in conjunction with human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing. 
HLA tissue typing involves testing embryos to determine compatibility as stem cell donors 
for siblings suffering from life-threatening diseases.  This may arise when a child is suffering 
from disorders such as neoplastic505 or congenital diseases which affect the formation of blood 
cells and/or the immune system.  In these cases, transplantation of haematopoietic stem cells 
such as cord blood or bone marrow is currently the best course of treatment for the affected 
child.506   Where there is no HLA identical donor available in the family, PGD can be used to 
select an embryo that is HLA identical.507  The procedure has evoked controversy, particularly 
where the affected child is not suffering from a genetic disorder, and there is no genetic risk to 
the embryo to medically justify an embryo biopsy.508  
Interim Advisory Committee Guidelines on PGD require that proposed PGD for HLA tissue 
typing must be submitted for ethics approval on a case-by-case basis.  The Guidelines provide 
criteria for decision-making by the ethics committee.509  
Provisions which specifically relate to the affected child provide that tissue typing may only be 
carried out when the disorder suffered by the live child is a familial single gene disorder or a 
familial sex-linked disorder.  This eliminates any application in the case of an affected child who 
is suffering from a sporadic disease, or a non-genetically transmitted disease.510 In addition, 
the planned treatment for the affected child must only involve utilising the cord blood of the 
future sibling.  This last provision is problematic. Medical procedures carried out on a live 
child, such as the aspiration of bone marrow for the purpose of transplantation, are covered 
by established principles of health care law.  It is not within the remit of a policy-making body 
on assisted reproduction to attempt to predetermine those issues.   The final criterion provides 
that no other possibilities for treatment or sources of tissue should be available.  
In respect of the embryo, the Guidelines state that it must be a sibling of the affected child, and 
be at risk of being affected by a ‘familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked disorder 
for which a PGD test is available’.   This provision has been broadened from that originally 
proposed in a previous consultation document, which required that the embryo be ‘at risk of 
being affected by the condition affecting the existing child’. 511  This has extended the scope of 
permissible HLA tissue typing to a small extent, while maintaining the normative framework 
which permits PGD with HLA tissue-typing only when there are therapeutic indications for 
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the embryo to justify a biopsy.  In this way, the New Zealand guidelines prohibit PGD with 
HLA testing for third party benefit in the absence of a risk to the embryo of a genetic disorder 
for which there is a test available.
There is a distinct structural anomaly in regard to the HLA guidelines, which may produce 
bizarre results. This anomaly may be best explained by a clinical example.  Consider  the 
scenario where there is a genetic indication to test an embryo for a heritable condition, such as 
cystic fibrosis, and the parents also wish to carry out tissue typing because a sibling is suffering 
from a non heritable medical condition that could be cured by a stem cell transplant, such 
as a life-threatening blood condition. The ethics committee would be unable to approve the 
application to perform HLA testing in conjunction with PGD because the sick sibling is not 
suffering from a familial single gene disorder or familial sex linked disorder, as required by the 
guidelines.  This is so even though the PGD may be carried out as a matter of course as cystic 
fibrosis comes within the established procedures category.  However, it seems that NECAHR, 
which was responsible for formulating the guidelines, had intended to permit HLA testing to 
be carried out as an ‘add on’ when the potential embryo was at risk from a genetic condition 
for which a test was available.512  Clearly, the framers wished to permit HLA tissue typing 
as long as there was a medical indication to justify performing an embryo biopsy, and this 
anomaly is unintended.  It could be easily rectified by simply requiring that the affected child 
be suffering from a condition which is severe or life-threatening.
As already clearly established, the New Zealand Guidelines restrict HLA tissue typing unless 
there is a genetic risk to the embryo.  However, a compelling ethical argument has been 
made for performing HLA tissue typing as a stand alone procedure when there is no risk 
of a heritable genetic disorder being transmitted to the embryo.  This argument compares 
the ethical basis for performing PGD to detect genetic anomalies, against HLA tissue typing 
to determine donor compatibility.513 This argument is necessarily based on the premise that 
embryo biopsy in the course of PGD does not expose the embryo to significant harm.  
The restrictive approach which limits HLA tissue typing in New Zealand to circumstances 
where the live sibling is suffering from a genetic condition departs from the current approach 
of the United Kingdom.514  Such a restrictive approach is surprising, considering the approach 
taken in regard to PGD as an established procedure.  
The rationale since given for declaring PGD to be an established procedure in specified 
circumstances is that the risks associated with PGD were not markedly higher than those 
associated with IVF or ICSI, and could be justified in the case of serious heritable genetic 
disorders.   Given the underlying philosophy of the Act and the level of risk associated with 
PGD, it is very difficult to reconcile the more restrictive aspects of the regulatory framework.
The final criterion for ECART when deciding whether to permit PGD with HLA tissue typing 
stipulates that the health and well being of the family/whanau must have been fully considered. 
It is unclear why the same risks which attach to PGD in the case of single gene or chromosomal 
disorders may not be justified when balanced against the benefits to seriously ill children, their 
families and society in general in the case of preimplantation HLA tissue typing.  
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The implication of the current policy is that it is better for a child not to be born at all, than 
to be born partly as a result of a parental wish to provide a tissue donor for an existing child. 
However, the ‘protection and promotion of the health, safety and dignity and rights’ of 
New Zealanders may be better achieved by permitting parents to demonstrate to an ethics 
committee why they should be able to access PGD to perform HLA tissue typing when they 
have a seriously ill child.  
In summary, the rigid statutory prohibition on non-medical sex selection and the very 
restrictive policy in relation to HLA tissue typing indicates that the normative axis for PGD 
in New Zealand currently is very narrowly restricted to therapeutic indications for serious 
heritable genetic diseases.  The restrictions on HLA typing seem difficult to justify on the 
basis of the underlying philosophy of the Act, and the risks associated with embryo biopsy.  In 
contrast, the established procedures category is much more expansive. 
5.4  victoria
5.4.1  wHo regulates? 
The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 prescribes who may access fertility services, sets out 
definitive principles underpinning the Act, provides certain prohibitions, and delegates power 
to a statutory body, the Infertility Treatment Authority, to administer the Act.  The Victorian 
legislation is prescriptive and is said to delegate much less discretionary power to the ITA than 
occurs under the UK legislation.515  It has been said that the Victorian legislation is the starkest 
example of capture by a particular group, where the predominant interests of the Catholic 
Church are reflected in the legislative framework.516  Yet ironically, in the context of PGD, some 
provisions appear to be broader than the current New Zealand policy.
PGD is permitted in accordance with guidelines produced by the ITA, which are bound to 
limit PGD to circumstances where it is used to avoid the transmission of a genetic disorder. 
Hence, there is no room for the ITA to extend PGD to applications for social selection. 
The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) provides for the regulation of infertility services 
through the licensing and approval of places and practitioners by the Infertility Treatment 
Authority.517  A licence authorises the performance of the activities specified in the licence at 
the premises identified in the licence.518  The Authority has published two PGD policies; one 
governs the use of PGD for genetic testing and the other covers genetic testing combined with 
tissue typing.519 
5.4.2  PerMissiBle liMits 
As in New Zealand, sex selection is prohibited under the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) 
unless it is necessary for the avoidance of a genetic abnormality.520 Unlike the New Zealand 
Guidelines, there is no restriction in the ITA guidelines that sex selection may only occur in 
the absence of a specific genetic test for the particular sex-linked disorder for which an embryo 
is at risk of inheriting.  
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The IT Act does not specify what is to be considered a ‘genetic abnormality or disease’.  The ITA 
guidelines provide that PGD will only be utilised for those disorders which ‘will significantly 
adversely affect the health of a person who may be born’.521   Responsibility for determining 
what is a genetic abnormality or disease lies with a doctor with specialist qualifications in 
human genetics.  The Act therefore imposes the responsibility for gate-keeping on the specialist 
doctor.522  This is the same approach taken by the New Zealand Guidelines.
The ITA policy sets out a list of ethical questions that arise in the context of genetic testing, 
which take into consideration the principles as set out in section 5 of the Act.  These are:
 ~ whether the interests of the person born are universally met through the application  
 of PGD and genetic testing; 
 ~ whether it is ethically appropriate to discard embryos with a carrier status, and   
 whether this is consistent with the guiding principles of the Act; 
 ~  the extent to which these considerations are viewed in the context of the interests of  
 the family, as outlined in the guiding principles of the Act; 
 ~ the use of PGD for conditions of different severity or impact on quality of life is   
 not morally similar. The level of risk of transmission, the degree of abnormality and  
 the family’s experience and perception of abnormality are important considerations; 
 ~ there is a broader public policy issue about the way in which genetic testing of   
 embryos may impact on people who are already living with a condition which is   
 being selected against; 
 ~  for people seeking to utilise PGD, there may be a different moral status afforded to  
 an embryo as opposed to a foetus. Therefore the decision to select against an embryo  
 is different for them, from the decision to terminate a pregnancy. Further, the   
 likelihood of success of this option will vary, particularly for the older mother who  
 is likely to produce fewer embryos, and where genetic testing may further reduce the  
 number of available embryos. 
It is significant that the ITA expressly states that whilst applications of PGD for the purposes 
of genetic testing must be guided by the current practice in relation to Prenatal Diagnosis, and 
guided by the Policies of the Human Genetics Society of Australia, it is recognised that there 
may be a greater range of indications where PGD may be considered.  This includes selection 
against carrier embryos. Such cases must be reviewed on their individual merits in terms of the 
clinical and ethical considerations, by the clinicians involved and the couple seeking treatment. 
This statement is significant in providing that there may be more clinical indications for 
performing PGD than prenatal screening, and that decisions must be made in conjunction 
with the couple involved.  It is evidence that the ITA is clearly applying a gradualist approach 
to the embryo, whereby it accrues greater status and rights as it develops, and an embryo 
is accorded less moral status than a developing foetus.  It goes further than the parameters 
provided by both the New Zealand and United Kingdom frameworks.  This is so even though 
the guiding principles of the Act are more restrictive than those of the New Zealand Act and 
United Kingdom Acts.  The broader approach to permissible PGD is reflected in the following 
policy adopted by the ITA.
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A list of conditions for which PGD may be carried out which do not require application on 
a case-by-case basis is provided by the Authority.523  The first category permits testing for 
chromosomal imbalances where there has been recurrent implantation failure, recurrent 
miscarriage, the woman is of advanced maternal age, there is a previous history of foetal 
aneuploidy, or if the parents are known carriers of chromosomal rearrangements.  The 
second category includes known carriers of chromosomal rearrangements, specified X-
linked conditions and carriers of those X-linked disorders, and specified single gene 
disorders.  Significantly, BRCA1 is included in the category of single gene disorders, so 
PGD for BRCA1 may be carried out without notification to the ITA.  As already discussed, 
testing for BRCA1 is not universally permitted. It is a late onset disorder which is not fully 
penetrant.  There are other disorders in the list, which indicate that the ITA has adopted 
a broad approach to permissible disorders for which PGD may be carried out.524  Any 
other applications of PGD must be approved by the Authority on a case-by-case basis. 
 These include: 
 (a)  testing for autosomal recessive conditions where it is proposed to identify and  select  
 against carrier embryos, in addition to testing for the condition; 
 (b) exclusion testing where a person is at risk of an autosomal dominant condition but  
 does not wish to undertake direct testing; 
 (c) conditions where there is a higher incidence in one sex, but there is inconclusive   
 genetic evidence about the transmission of that condition, eg autism, Asperger’s   
 syndrome. In this context, clinical evidence, family history and peer-reviewed   
 evidence to support the application must be presented to the Authority.  
 (d) HLA tissue typing with PGD of a causative gene is also considered on a case-by-case  
 basis.  
These categories go significantly further than those established in New Zealand.  Testing for 
carrier status has not been addressed in the current NZ guidelines, nor have categories (b) and 
(c). Performing PGD in categories (a) and (c) is unlikely to be permitted under the current 
established procedures category in New Zealand.  Being a carrier of an autosomal recessive 
condition is unlikely to constitute potentially serious impairment in the future individual.  Yet 
many parents may reasonably wish to select against carrier embryos so that future offspring do 
not have to face the same difficulties in their child-bearing years.  This is an area that needs to be 
addressed by the New Zealand ACART.  The United Kingdom has not provided any guidance as 
to whether parents may select out carrier embryos in the Code of Practice.  However, a recent 
report published by the UK Human Genetics Commission has recommended that parents 
should be able to choose which embryos they wish to have implanted when there are both 
carrier and unaffected embryos suitable for implantation available.525 
The Established Procedures category declared under the HART Act only covers Mendelian 
and X-linked conditions by virtue of the requirement that there must be a 25% or greater 
chance of transmitting the genetic disorder.  It is unclear that category (c) would fall within 
the 25% threshold.  The New Zealand Ethics Committee would be unable to adjudicate on any 
applications made to perform PGD in these categories in the absence of Guidelines released by 
the ACART.  This is a possible area for guideline development in the future.
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The ITA assesses applications for compliance with the Act, including whether the appropriate 
counselling information and consent procedures have been undertaken.526 A comprehensive 
medical report is required.  After approval by the Authority, ethics committee approval 
may still be required in certain categories.  This includes the use of PGD to select against 
carrier embryos where there is an autosomal recessive genetic condition, or in circumstances 
where the clinician or clinic is of the opinion that although a procedure is lawful, it requires 
consideration of the ethical implications of the specific case history.  Ethics committee approval 
is also required in the case of HLA tissue typing.  
As already indicated, the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) permits access to ART where 
there is a risk of a genetic abnormality or disease being transmitted to a prospective child.  The 
use of PGD for non-medical sex selection is expressly prohibited under the Act, even though 
sex selection for non-medical indications could not come within the access criteria as set they 
are out in the Act.   The Infertility Treatment Authority has, under the discretion conferred on 
it, articulated the threshold for permissible PGD.  
Analysis of the Infertility Treatment Authority policy in relation to PGD has highlighted areas 
that are not yet addressed by the current New Zealand guidelines.  This includes whether 
carrier testing and selection against embryos that are carriers of a specific mutation is 
permissible, and whether sex selection may be carried out when there is a familial history 
of a particular disorder, but for which there is inconclusive evidence that the condition is 
genetically inherited. It is expressly stated that the indications for PGD may go beyond those 
for PNT.   There is some irony in the fact that the Victorian policy, which is promulgated 
under an Act known for its restrictive policy and ‘catholic capture’, has extended the 
permissible limits of PGD beyond that of prenatal testing in contrast to the UK and 
New Zealand.527    
The ITA policy governing HLA tissue typing diagnosis528 is necessarily limited to circumstances 
where there is a genetic risk to the embryo.  This is because the access provisions under the 
Act require that, except in the case of infertility, treatment may only be used if a genetic 
abnormality or a disease might be transmitted to a person born as a result of pregnancy.529 
Hence, the ITA is prevented from extending tissue typing to circumstances where there is no 
genetic risk to the embryo unless there is an amendment to the statute.530
The ITA policy on HLA tissue typing provides that PGD and HLA tissue typing are not 
explicitly prohibited by the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 provided that the applied techniques 
do not infringe any prohibition imposed by the Act.531  It is acknowledged that the intention 
of the Act is generally that the interests of the person born or to be born are paramount.  It 
is stated that the use of PGD and HLA typing can be seen to be consistent with the guiding 
principles of the Act, as every effort is made to both save an existing life and create a new 
life.  However, it is stated that it is clear that the application of the technology in this way is 
novel, and raises many ethical and social considerations beyond the immediate interests of the 
couple seeking the procedure, or the terminally ill child.  For this reason, the Authority has 
imposed a number of conditions on its use.  An overriding condition of the ITA is that each 
application will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.532 In relation to the affected child, the 
genetic disorder suffered must be severe or life-threatening.
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Each application to the Authority must provide an outline and evidence of the genetic 
condition that the embryo is to be tested for; the clinical circumstances in relation to the use of 
the procedure; the current prognosis of the living child;  the nature of the procedure proposed 
in relation to the child who is to be born (ie cord blood or bone marrow);  the likely effect of 
cord blood or bone marrow transplantation with HLA matched blood or bone marrow on the 
future prognosis of the affected child; and whether alternative treatments to PGD and HLA 
have been investigated and/or utilised.  There must be confirmation from a specialist geneticist 
that all reasonable efforts have been made to identify alternative forms of treatment for the 
sick child. 
In addition, evidence must be provided to the Authority that the patient has been 
comprehensively advised of: the risks associated with IVF treatment for the woman and the 
PGD procedure for the embryo; the chances of producing an embryo that is unaffected by the 
genetic conditions and tissue typed; the likely success rates of achieving a pregnancy; and any 
alternatives to treatment.  
The ITA policy provides that the Authority will only consider applications to harvest cord 
blood or bone marrow and further provides that ‘the harvesting of non-regenerative organs 
is not acceptable’.  This last statement is a timid representation of the position at law.  It is 
most unlikely that there could be any justification at common law that would enable a parent 
to provide a proxy consent for the removal of a non-regenerative organ from their child for 
donation to another child.533  To be lawful, such a procedure must be in the ‘best interests’ of 
the donor.  If a child donates a non-regenerative organ, such as a kidney, they are exposed to 
significantly increased health risks in the future, and thus it would be very unlikely to be legally 
justifiable. It is most unlikely that any surgeon would agree to carry out such a procedure. 
The procedure is only available if the primary recipient is a sibling, although if a relative suffers 
from a similar genetic condition, it is the prerogative of the parents to decide if cord blood or 
bone marrow may be donated.  The Authority reviews all applications on a case-by-case basis, 
but the final decision rests with the ethics committee at the institution where the procedure is 
being undertaken.
Key considerations, which must be brought into an ethical consideration of an application by 
an ethics committee, and which are covered in counselling include:
(i) the motivation and level of understanding of the parent in seeking to have an   
 additional child. If this motivation is solely for the purposes of furthering the   
 interest of an existing sibling, then this may raise concerns. However, if the child is  
 wanted for his/her own worth, then this may be justifiable. The Authority’s ethical  
 advice highlights the difficulty of identifying the motivation for parents, faced with a 
 terminally ill child, and a desire to complete their family; 
(ii)  the issues which may arise where the birth of a child does not resolve the genetic   
 condition for the existing sibling;
(iii)  the status of the child within the family and the relationships, which grow, with the  
 growth of all children within the family.
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It is significant that the ITA countenances the future use of bone marrow, which goes further 
than the current New Zealand Guidelines where it is a requirement that ‘the planned treatment 
for the affected child will utilise only the cord blood of the future sibling’.  However as already 
discussed, the New Zealand restriction exceeds the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, as the 
donation of bone marrow from a living child is governed by general principles of medical law.
5.5  tHe uk
5.5.1  wHo regulates?
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 contains few express prohibitions, and 
delegates considerable decision-making power to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA).  The Act empowers the HFEA to act as licensing authority for the purposes 
specified in the Act.534 The Authority is responsible for maintaining a code of practice for the 
proper conduct of activities carried on in pursuance of a licence under the Act.535  
There is no express reference to PGD in the HFE Act.  However, the Act prohibits the creation, 
keeping or use of an embryo except in pursuance of a licence.536   The HFEA may grant licences 
approving activities in the course of providing ‘treatment services’.537 ‘Treatment services’ for the 
purposes of the Act are defined as ‘medical, surgical or obstetric services provided to the public 
or a section of the public for the purpose of assisting women to carry children’.538  Activities for 
which treatment licences may be given are set out in paragraph 1, Schedule 2 of the Act.  
Paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 provides:
1-(1)   A licence under this paragraph may authorise any of the following In the course of  
  providing treatment services-
  a. bringing about the creation of embryos in vitro,
  b. keeping embryos,
  c. using gametes,
  d. practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to be   
   placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that   
   purpose,
  (e)  placing any embryo in a woman…
The foregoing is limited by the restraint on the HFEA’s power contained in clause 3:
   (3)   A licence under this paragraph cannot authorise any activity unless it appears   
  to the Authority to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing   
  treatment services.
Licences for treatment made under paragraph 1 of schedule 2 may be granted subject 
to conditions specified in the licence.539  The Act sets out conditions of every licence for 
treatment.540  One such condition provides that ‘a woman shall not be provided with treatment 
services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result 
of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father), and of any other child who may 
be affected by the birth’.541  
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Although the Act does not provide expressly for the licensing of PGD, the HFEA took the 
approach that the Act implicitly authorises them to license clinics to provide PGD services. 
542  This was despite the fact that the HFE Act provides a mechanism via regulation for adding 
to the practices which may be authorised by the Authority in a treatment licence.543 However, 
regulations were not utilised to mandate the licensing of clinics for PGD when applicants 
first approached the HFEA. The HFEA has been approving licences for PGD since 1999, and 
licences for HLA tissue typing since 2001. 
When the HFEA approved a licence in 2001 permitting HLA tissue typing to be performed 
in conjunction with PGD, the scope of the Authority’s discretion became the subject of legal 
challenge.544  It was claimed that the HFEA had no power to issue a licence that permitted the 
use of HLA tissue typing to select between healthy embryos.  The case was initially successful 
in the High Court.  However, it was confirmed in the Court of Appeal and subsequently in 
the House of Lords that the Authority has the power to issue licences for PGD and HLA tissue 
typing under the Act.545  
Consequently, PGD may be licensed by the HFEA as a practice designed to secure that ‘embryos 
are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are 
suitable for that purpose’.  The Court of Appeal has held that treatment for the purpose of 
‘assisting women to carry children’ is not restricted only to that which would assist a woman 
in the physical process of conceiving and producing a child.  It is capable of embracing IVF 
treatment designed to ensure that a child will not suffer from genetic defects or will possess 
stem cells matching that of a sick or dying sibling where concerns about the characteristics 
of any child conceived would otherwise inhibit or prevent a woman from bearing a child. 
The House of Lords has affirmed that PGD and HLA tissue typing may be authorised by the 
HFEA as activities to determine the suitability of the embryo for implantation.546 On their 
analysis, the concept of suitability in paragraph 1(1)(d) fell to be construed in the context of 
the scheme of the 1990 Act and the background against which it had been enacted. It was held 
that Parliament had intended to define the licensing power of the HFEA in broad terms and to 
entrust it to decide which practices were ethically acceptable, subject to the prohibited matters 
in section 3(3) of the Act and Parliament’s regulatory powers.  The term ‘suitable’ was broad 
enough to include suitability for the purposes of the particular mother. Parliament had not 
intended to confine the HFEA’s powers to unsuitability on grounds of genetic defect; the limits 
of permissible embryo selection were ultimately for the HFEA to decide.
Despite the wide discretion conferred on the Authority, the HFEA is not free to act arbitrarily, 
at least not without attracting criticism.  The HFEA was soundly rebuked by the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee after releasing its interim policy on HLA 
testing.547  The policy permitted HLA testing to be performed in conjunction with PGD when 
there was risk of transmission of a genetic disorder. The House of Commons Select Committee 
stated that the decision to allow tissue typing in conjunction with PGD occurred in the absence 
of public consultation on the issue, and went significantly further than PGD which was carried 
out in the interests of the future child itself.  The decision went beyond the scope of the HFEA’s 
public consultation on PGD and it was ‘vital that the public are taken along with such matters 
of ethical importance’.548 
326
Similarly, in 2004 the HFEA evoked sharp criticism again when it agreed to grant a licence to 
a clinic to test embryos for familial adenomatous polyposis coli (FAP), a genetically inherited 
form of colon cancer which usually manifests in early adolescence or early adulthood.549  Prior 
to this, licences had been approved only for genetic disorders that invariably led to untreatable 
conditions, or those affecting children. It was alleged that the HFEA were making decisions 
behind ‘closed doors’.550   
This type of criticism is significant, as there is no requirement in the HFE Act that the HFEA 
carry out consultation prior to determining whether licences should be granted.551   Yet, there 
seems to be a presumption on the part of the Government, the public and interest groups that 
policy decisions in the United Kingdom, which appear to extend the use of PGD, must occur 
following public input.  Such consultative work has been essential to the perceived legitimacy 
and acceptance of the decisions of the HFEA by both the public and by Parliament.  
The United Kingdom’s approach to regulating the use of PGD has rightly been described as ‘one 
of the most liberal regulatory mechanisms in the world’.552  Although the HFEA has the power 
to license clinics to perform PGD for social reasons, it does not mean that it will necessarily 
do so.  Sex selection is not illegal in the United Kingdom under the HFE Act, although the 
HFEA has refused to license the use of PGD for sex selection for non-medical reasons.  But 
should they wish to, it is clearly within their mandate.  It is undoubtedly the HFEA who set the 
permissible limits of PGD in the United Kingdom. 
Changes to the UK system are imminent.  The British Government has announced its 
intention to replace the HFEA and the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) with a single authority 
responsible for the regulation of assisted reproduction, embryo research and the use of human 
tissue.553  This will require primary legislation and will be known as the Regulatory Authority 
for Tissue and Embryos (RATE).  The new authority will be responsible for overseeing the 
requirements of the EU Tissue Directive.554  
5.5.2  PerMissiBle liMits
The HFEA Code of Practice sets out licensing requirements for what is referred to as 
‘preimplantation testing’.555  The Code states that ‘it is expected that PGD will be available 
only where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic condition being present in the 
embryo’.  The perception of the level of risk by those seeking treatment is an important factor 
in the decision-making process.  The seriousness of the condition is expected to be a matter 
for discussion between the people seeking treatment and the clinical team.556  Aneuploidy 
screening guidance is similar to that of both NZ and Victoria.557 
The HFEA Code of Practice states that indications for the use of PGD are expected to be 
consistent with current practice in the use of (post-implantation) prenatal diagnosis.558 
Concern has been expressed about whether this is the appropriate benchmark;559    
..the basis for the comparison is that both PGD and PND have at the least theoretical risks 
attached to them but to apply the same clinical indications to both is only justified if these 
risks are equivalent.  The HFEA surveyed the scientific literature on the risks associated 
with embryo biopsy in relation to its policy review on preimplantation tissue typing.  It 
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cited two studies and reported that ‘These studies showed consistently that the sample of 
children studied did not show a significant increase in incidence of serious abnormalities at 
birth, or, where information was available, at 1 and 2 years of age.   Nevertheless, there are 
as yet no long-term follow-up studies of PGD offspring available’.560
The House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology concluded that 
applying a gradualist approach to the status of the embryo would suggest that a 5-day old 
embryo should be accorded fewer rights or less respect than a developing foetus.  Paradoxically, 
there is a divergence between the protection afforded to an embryo created in vitro before it is 
implanted and one at a later stage of development under the current HFEA Code of Practice. 
The irony of the PGD – PNT dichotomy was made obvious in evidence given to the House of 
Commons Select Committee.   A couple, whose application to the HFEA to undertake PGD 
with HLA tissue typing was declined on the basis that their sick child was not suffering from 
a genetic condition, reported that they were initially advised to undergo amniocentesis and 
termination if the foetus was not a tissue match.561  The HFEA has subsequently reviewed HLA 
tissue typing guidelines, and tissue typing may be performed regardless of whether there is a 
risk of transmission of a genetic disorder. 
As observed by the Royal Society of Edinburgh,562 restricting PGD to serious genetic conditions 
might mean that the (arguably) ethically less troubling option of non-implantation would 
be subject to more rigorous controls than the (arguably) more troubling ethical option of 
pregnancy termination following prenatal diagnosis.563  In New Zealand, the Guidelines simply 
state that PGD is an alternative to prenatal diagnosis, and is distinguished from it by the stage 
at which decisions have to be made: at the embryonic rather than the foetal stage.564 
Apart from FAP, the HFEA has not yet permitted licences to test for late onset susceptibility 
conditions, such as inherited breast cancer or inherited ovarian cancer.565  The HFEA has 
announced that it had been carrying out a scientific review on disorders where the genetic 
conditions were not fully penetrant.  This includes conditions such as BRCA 1 and 2, and 
hereditary non polyposis colon cancer.  The views of the public are currently being sought on 
the appropriateness of offering PGD to screen out such disorders.566  Researchers are soliciting 
the opinions of women carrying the mutation in regard to the effect their carrier status has on 
reproductive choices, and whether they would consider PGD if it was available.567 It is likely 
that the HFEA will approve licences for BRCA testing in 2006.568  Although the UK system is 
comparatively permissive, such consultation has been important in the HFEA maintaining the 
confidence of the public.  
UK clinicians face more bureaucracy than their Antipodean counterparts in providing PGD 
services. Until very recently, every clinic was required to submit a fresh application to the 
HFEA each time they wished to test for a new condition, and for each new test they wished to 
use. Each application requires the payment of a fee to the HFEA.569  A licensed clinic may only 
carry out testing for the genetic conditions, chromosomes or traits (or combinations of these) 
and using those specific tests (or combination of tests), that are listed in the preimplantation 
testing annex of their licences, or that have been approved by a licence committee in any 
particular case.   This is in stark contrast to the system in New Zealand.                           
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In January 2005 the HFEA announced a new policy to streamline the approval of applications 
for PGD.570  If a clinic, with proven expertise in performing embryo biopsies, applies for a 
licence to carry out screening for a particular condition, which is already being carried out 
successfully in another clinic, such as screening for sickle cell anaemia or cystic fibrosis, the 
HFEA will approve the application without having to go through the full HFEA licence 
committee process, provided that the same technique and methods are used.  Less common 
specialised applications of PGD still require consideration by an HFEA licence committee on 
a case-by-case basis.571   
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act has been described as a pragmatic response to 
the public anxieties evoked by the ability to create in vitro human embryos and the related 
potential for embryonic use, manipulation and research.572  In defence of the lack of clearly 
articulated principle, it has been observed that ‘issues involving perplexing cocktails of ethics, 
law and public morality have been resolved in a manner which has served private access to 
assisted conception services whilst maintaining broad public support for this provision. 
Indeed, the lack of any dogmatic stance has allowed the development of liberal policy without 
causing widespread offence or opposition’.573  However as science advances and ethical debates 
intensify, the need for a central philosophy or principle becomes more and more apparent.
5.6  tHe saFe Provision oF Fertility services
Ensuring that the health and safety of both the persons accessing fertility services and the embryos 
produced as a result of assisted reproductive procedures are protected to the highest standard 
possible is a major factor in gaining public confidence in any regulatory framework.574  
The licensing approach followed by Victoria and the UK was rejected in New Zealand.  Instead, 
the HART Act 2004 provides that fertility services are deemed to come within the definition 
of specified health or disability services under the HDS(S) Act 2001.575  Under section 9 of that 
Act, a person providing fertility services must be certified by the Director-General of Health 
to provide fertility services, meet all relevant service standards, comply with any conditions 
to which the person was subject by the Director-General, and operate in compliance with the 
HDS(S) Act. 
There are no specific standards at present for fertility services in New Zealand.576 Until such 
time as the Minister approves specific standards for providing fertility services,577 providers 
are deemed to comply with the HDS(S) Act578 if the provider complies with specified criteria. 
The provider must be certified by the Director-General of Health, have been the subject of an 
audit report completed for the purposes of accreditation by an organisation approved by the 
Director General of Health, and must comply with any standards approved by the Director 
General under the HART Act.579
The Director-General has approved the Reproductive Technologies Accreditation Committee 
(RTAC) of the Fertility Society of Australia to audit the provision or likely future provision of 
fertility services in New Zealand in the interim period580 until the fertility service standards are 
notified.  The RTAC Code of Practice has been approved as the standard for fertility services 
in the interim period.581  
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The provisions of the HART Act have essentially provided a legal requirement for clinics to be 
accredited and to adhere to standards, putting what was occurring on a voluntary professional 
self-regulatory basis on a statutory footing and providing civil sanctions for non-compliance. 
In essence, the New Zealand regulatory framework has built on existing institutions for health 
and safety, as well as requiring standards to be formulated which are specific to the New 
Zealand context.    It is a positive aspect of the New Zealand approach that it incorporates both 
professional self-regulation and government regulation within the statutory framework.   
In New Zealand, ACART is charged with monitoring the application, and health outcomes, 
of assisted reproductive procedures and established procedures; and developments in human 
reproductive research in New Zealand.582  This requirement places an emphasis on safety 
and accountability, which covers all assisted reproductive procedures and research, including 
established procedures.  However, the Act does not specify in what way the oversight is to occur. 
Nor does it provide specifically that medium and long-term outcomes must be monitored.583 
The interim Guidelines require that fertility clinics provide an annual report detailing the 
number of PGD procedures carried out for familial and non-familial disorders, and the 
genetic or clinical indications for the use of PGD.  A follow-up report is required detailing 
the outcomes of those procedures.  Currently, all embryo biopsy carried out on behalf of New 
Zealand consumers is carried out at Monash IVF, in the State of Victoria.584  
The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) provides for the regulation of infertility services 
through the licensing and approval of places and practitioners by the Infertility Treatment 
Authority.  Section 93 of the Act stipulates that certain activities may not be performed unless 
they are performed at a place which is licensed.585  A licence authorises the performance of the 
activities specified in the licence at the premises specified in the licence.586  Section 106 of the 
Act confers power on the Authority to impose conditions on licences. 
The ITA has produced a policy document which sets out the conditions required to be met in 
order to obtain a licence.587 Failure to comply with these conditions can result in revocation of 
the licence or an order for compliance. 588 
The licensed centre must be accredited with the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards. In 
addition, the licensed centre must be accredited by, or be in the process of seeking accreditation 
from, the Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee. All diagnostic laboratories used 
by the licensed centre must be accredited with National Association of Testing Authorities 
(NATA).  Failure to comply with the terms of the licence carries a penalty of 240-penalty 
points or 2 years’ imprisonment.589 In all cases of PGD, licensed places are required to report 
annually the number of applications used for genetic testing, and the types of indications for 
which it is used.  Licensed places are required to notify the Authority of any applications of 
PGD which have not previously arisen.  The Authority is responsible for carrying out a yearly 
audit to ensure that the policy meets the requirements of the Guiding Principles of the Act. 
In the United Kingdom, the HFE Act 1990 provides that it is the duty of the person responsible 
to ensure that proper equipment is used, and that suitable practices are used in the course 
of the activities carried out pursuant to licenses.590    The HFEA Code of Practice requires 
that all genetics laboratories used for preimplantation testing are expected to be Clinical 
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Pathology Accreditation (CPA) accredited (or equivalent) or at least be working towards CPA, 
with accreditation to be completed within five years.591  It is curious that in the Report of the 
Science and Technology Committee, it was reported that the CPA scheme does not accredit 
embryology laboratories as the field is considered too controversial.592 
The HFEA has taken on the inspection of all technical aspects of assisted conception, 
including clinical and laboratory processes. Inspections cover record keeping, conditions 
for the storage and disposal of licensed material, suitability of staff, equipment and working 
practices.593  Significantly, the inspection processes have come under attack by the very people 
being inspected. The HFEA inspection process was described by the Association of Clinical 
Embryologists as being inadequate to amount to accreditation for two reasons.  Firstly, the time 
spent was insufficient, and secondly the inspector training was inadequate or inappropriate. 
The Association stated that there was no observation of practice, and no time to obtain 
evidence that people were actually doing what they said they were doing.  Compared with other 
laboratory accreditation systems, the time spent with a practice was so small as to be valueless. 
The group advocated that accreditation be a prerequisite to licensing.594  On the instigation of 
the HFEA, a group of professionals began working together to develop Standards for Assisted 
Conception Units in 2004, which would provide the basis for accreditation, reflecting a move 
away from a system of licensing to accreditation.595  
This would seem to be a good example of a case where those being regulated are alienated 
by the requirements of the regulatory body, in this case on the grounds that the inspection 
process does not meet the standards of professional self-regulation.  
The health and disability infrastructure in New Zealand, which provides a framework for 
safety and accountability, and which can be extended to cover fertility services, is a compelling 
argument against adopting the licensing approach taken by other jurisdictions.  
5.  aDMinistrative Fairness anD aPPeals
In liberal democracies such as the countries being reviewed in this analysis, it is important that 
a regulatory process is perceived as being fair and transparent by those affected by the regulatory 
framework, as well as imposing a degree of accountability on the part of decision makers. 
Provisions for natural justice and an appeals process go some way to meet these criteria. 
However, there is an absence of any explicit provision for natural justice or an appeal process in 
the New Zealand system. The terms of reference for ECART are silent as to whether applicants 
appear before an ethics committee.  The framework does not provide in any way for an appeal 
from a decision of ECART.   By allowing applicants to state their case to them, the legitimacy 
of the ethics committee structure is strengthened.  This is affirmed by the experience of the 
HFEA, which now permit applicants to appear before licence committees.   
When an application on behalf of the Whitaker family was made to a licence committee to 
carry out HLA tissue typing on embryos to determine donor suitability for a child who was 
suffering from Diamond Black Fan Anaemia, the HFEA rejected the application. The condition 
had not been inherited from either of the child’s parents, as neither was a carrier of the disease; 
rather the condition was a sporadic mutation.  The application was rejected on the basis that 
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the tissue typing procedure would be carried out solely to find a tissue match, and not to 
diagnose a genetic condition. The Whitaker family was not permitted to appear before the 
HFEA to argue their case.596 However, it is significant that the HFEA now intends to provide 
applicants with the opportunity to give evidence to the HFEA licence committee face to face 
should they choose to do so.597  
As yet, there have been no indications from the New Zealand ECART as to whether applicants 
will have the opportunity to attend meetings.  The argument in favour of allowing applicants 
to make a case to the ECART is strengthened by the fact that the ECART is not responsible 
for the policy which is formulated by ACART, they simply administer it.  Hence, permitting 
applicants to appear will not impact on policy formation, but may influence the way that 
policy is interpreted.  
It is important, as a matter of administrative law, that an appeals process is put in place for 
applicants who have been denied approval by the ECART.  Applicants who have been denied 
approval to perform PGD-HLA, or any new application, should have an avenue to have their 
claim reconsidered.  This could be performed by a subcommittee of ACART.  
Although decisions of ACART and ECART may be subject to judicial review on grounds of 
either substantive or procedural invalidity, this process is time consuming and costly.  It is 
possible that a complaint to the ombudsman may be utilised as a vehicle for review.598 
In contrast, section 149 of the Victorian Infertility Treatment Act 1995 provides an appeal 
mechanism to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the Act where an application is 
declined by the Authority.599  Appeals may only be made by a person aggrieved by the decision 
of the Authority.600  
In the UK, the HFEA is required to establish Licence Committees to discharge the Authority’s 
functions relating to the granting of licences under the Act.601  The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Licence Committee and Appeals) Regulation 1991602 sets out the composition 
and procedure of Licence Committees.  A licence committee must have five members.603  If a 
licence is approved, the centre will be informed and the procedure may be carried out. If a licence 
committee refuses a licence application, the applicant may appeal under section 20 of the Act.  
An Appeal Committee consists of at least five members of the Authority.604  An appeal is by 
way of rehearing by the Authority. Any member who took part in the initial licence committee 
work is disqualified from sitting on the appeal.605  The appellant is entitled to appear or be 
represented, as are the members of the licence committee.606  The HFEA is precluded from 
taking into account anything adduced by a member of the public, other than the grounds for 
his or her original complaint.607 
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5.  regulatory legitiMacy anD tHe Hart act
Sue Kedgley, Deputy Chair of the Health Select Committee responsible for the HART Bill 
stated in Parliament at the time of the third reading of the HART Bill:
Regrettably, the Government has taken what was a really impressive bill – Dianne Yates’ 
member’s bill – that would have set up a good regulatory regime similar to one that exists 
in England, Canada, Australia, and other jurisdictions, and gutted it to such an extent that 
this legislation sets up one of the weakest, most permissive regulatory regimes for assisted 
human reproductive technologies in the world – a regime that relies on guidelines, rather 
than regulation, and a regime that bypasses Parliament completely and delegates policy-
making in that highly contentious, ethical minefield area to a committee of unelected and 
unaccountable experts meeting behind closed doors.608  
It is doubtful whether such stinging criticism is warranted.  As already discussed, the HART 
Act designates the outer limits of ART and research by providing express prohibitions for 
some assisted reproductive procedures and research.609  Section 11 of the Act has entrenched 
the prohibition against PGD to determine sex for non-medical reasons as well as precluding 
a person from performing any assisted reproductive procedure or providing, prescribing 
or administering any thing in order to increase the likelihood that an embryo will be of a 
particular sex.  The particular section is somewhat over zealous, potentially prohibiting a 
wider range of activities than it needs to.  
The underlying philosophy of the HART Act 2004 cannot be described as liberal, in contrast to 
the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.  The UK Act has virtually authorised 
unfettered decision-making by the HFEA in regard to PGD and HLA tissue typing.  Because of 
the broad discretion conferred on the HFEA, mechanisms present in the Act which would have 
provided Parliamentary oversight when extending the procedures for which licences could be 
given, such as PGD in conjunction with HLA tissue typing, were not invoked.  
However, the New Zealand Act has successfully achieved a flexible regulatory framework in 
relation to PGD, with the exception of sex selection.  The regime is significantly less liberal 
than the United Kingdom. However, a particular strength of the New Zealand framework is 
the ability for assisted reproductive procedures to be declared to be ‘established’ on the basis 
of scientific and ethical analysis provided by ACART.  Such a mechanism enables regulators to 
impose the least necessary regulatory intervention when there is no evidence that regulatory 
oversight is required.  There is also a safeguard provided under the Act in that ACART may 
provide the Minister with advice as to whether any established procedure should be modified 
or should cease to be an established procedure.610    
The structure set up by the UK HFE Act 1990 has often been referred to as a system worthy 
of emulating,611 and much may be learned from the rich history of the Act and the HFEA 
since its inception.  However, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act has been the 
subject of several legal challenges over its fifteen years of existence.612 It has been at the heart 
of intense scrutiny and debate in the last two years in particular. It has been claimed that the 
HFEA method of licensing and inspection of clinics is unduly expensive and duplicative.613 
Alarmingly, the House of Commons review highlighted inadequacies in quality assurance and 
333
safety aspects in regard to licensing inspections carried out by the HFEA.  In contrast, the New 
Zealand system is not overly bureaucratic, in terms of health and safety, and does not impose 
additional costs on providers above those that they have been incurring on a voluntary basis 
prior to the legislation being enacted.614  In addition, New Zealand is the only jurisdiction of 
those reviewed which has made state funding available for use of PGD.
Decisions of the HFEA have allegedly lacked transparency and initial public consultation before 
permitting HLA tissue typing and in extending PGD to test for susceptibility to childhood 
cancers such as familial adenomatous polyposis.615  It is clear that although the HFE Act 1990 
confers enormous discretion on the HFEA, decisions which appear to be have been made 
arbitrarily and that are disconnected from public input impact negatively on whether policy is 
perceived as legitimate by the public, by professionals and the Government.
The New Zealand HART Act requires that the public be given an opportunity to make 
submissions on proposed guidelines in relation to PGD.  This attempts to ensure ‘deliberative 
democracy’ as a part of the regulatory process.   Such consultation attempts to ensure that it 
is not medical or scientific utility alone that is taken into account in decision-making, but the 
perceived impact of the activity by the public.   
In addition, ACART must consult with interested parties and members of the public that 
they consider are appropriate.  Yet for policy to be seen as democratic and legitimate, genuine 
engagement with stakeholders and the public in general must go further than this.  The need 
for the existing policy, effectively ‘inherited’ by the newly appointed ACART, to be reviewed 
goes hand in hand with a need to ensure that both the ACART and ECART discharge their 
statutory duties in such a way that enables them to create and apply policy legitimately, openly 
and fairly. 
In order to achieve regulatory legitimacy, policy must be perceived by the public as being 
legitimately made, regardless of their views at to the appropriateness of the policy.616  It is 
essential that ACART obtains robust, non-partisan scientific evidence, and it is well informed 
of competing moral views, and the merits of those moral views.  In a pluralistic society, it 
is important that policy makers, who are essentially creating quasi-law, are perceived to be 
listening to all (reasonable) voices in the debate.  As McCarthy says:
An ongoing, and perhaps permanent, feature of free societies is that reasonable people 
disagree on basic values.  In such conditions, there are really only two choices.  One is to 
have a society in which whichever interest group happens to achieve the balance of power 
gets to force its values on others who can reasonably disagree with those values.  The other 
is to have a society in which value disputes are resolved in a way in which no one can 
reasonably reject.617(emphasis added)
This is particularly so when some groups may feel excluded from the composition of ACART. 
A diverse composition is generally viewed as enhancing deliberative democracy.  Yet there is no 
one on the ACART who subscribes to the view that embryos deserve full moral status.  Interest 
groups who hold such views may subsequently feel disenfranchised.  It should be documented, 
when policy is released, how such different views were considered, but most importantly, they 
must be acknowledged.  
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In the absence of reaching a consensus view on policy issues, ACART is to determine questions 
by simple majority vote.618  This has raised alarm in some quarters.  However, the real issue is 
not whether consensus is reached in decision-making; rather it is the robustness of the debate 
and the range of views considered. This should be reflected in the reasons given for policy 
decisions.  Providing information as to whether a decision was made unanimously, or whether 
it was a split decision may also demonstrate transparent and open decision-making, which 
may enhance how ACART processes are perceived. Objective transparency is a key means of 
engendering public trust.619
conclusion
The New Zealand HART Act seeks to provide a means for the provision of ART within a 
flexible protective framework. The Act does not prioritise the interests of any particular 
stakeholder, but arguably requires consideration of the wider interests of society in regards to 
assisted reproductive procedures. 
The New Zealand HART Act may, like the United Kingdom’s HFE Act, be similarly described 
as a pragmatic response to the public and political concerns evoked by the use of reprogenetic 
technologies such as PGD.   Social sex selection has been statutorily prohibited as a result 
of a last minute amendment to the HART SOP, inserted to avoid allegations of comparative 
permissiveness.  In all other respects, the Act confers on ACART the role of balancing individual 
rights and public policy in the area of preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  This is subject to 
constraints which require ACART to act in accordance with the principles declared in the Act, 
and to engage with the public and interested parties prior to formulating policy.
With the exception of sex selection, the regulatory framework for PGD as it stands now was 
essentially determined prior to ACART being appointed.  There is much for the ACART to address. 
The established procedures policy does not define a familial single gene disorder, which may create 
some uncertainty as to the ambit of permissible PGD in New Zealand. On a plain reading of the 
Order in Council, late onset and low penetrance conditions are included as established procedures. 
By encompassing late onset and low penetrance conditions, the established procedures category 
extends PGD beyond the scope of public consultation carried out.  
This wide scope of permissible PGD which does not require external oversight by ECART is 
also in tension with the rigid prohibition in relation to sex selection, and the restrictive policy 
in regard to HLA tissue typing. The HLA policy restricts tissue typing to situations where 
embryo biopsy for a genetic condition is clinically indicated, and HLA tissue typing is an 
add-on to the primary procedure.  This mandates revision of the Guidelines, which restrict 
tissue typing to cases where the sick child is suffering from a genetic disorder.  If embryo 
biopsy is indicated, then it becomes irrelevant whether or not the sick child is suffering from 
a genetically heritable disorder.  For this reason, the Guidelines should be amended to require 
simply that the affected child be suffering from a condition which is severe or life-threatening. 
There is also a need to determine whether the current restrictive HLA policy is justifiable.  The 
‘protection and promotion of the health, safety and dignity and rights’ of New Zealanders may 
be better achieved by permitting parents to make a case to the ethics committee for HLA tissue 
typing as a stand alone procedure.
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The comparison with Victoria has also highlighted gaps in the current regulatory framework. 
Victorian Guidelines permit the use of PGD to select against carrier embryos in certain 
circumstances.  The Infertility Treatment Authority will also consider applications to perform 
PGD where there is a higher incidence of a condition in one sex in a particular family, but 
there is inconclusive genetic evidence about the transmission of that condition.  The policy 
developed by the ITA has resulted in a comparatively liberal approach to the conditions which 
PGD may be used to detect.  This is notable for two reasons.  Firstly, the Infertility Treatment 
Act 1995 (Vic) is widely perceived as a non-liberal piece of legislation.  Secondly, the liberal 
policy has been created without undertaking public consultation and has seemingly not 
attracted criticism from either the public, or the Victorian Government, in contrast to the 
experience of the United Kingdom
The success of the ACART will depend in large part on how it undertakes its policy-making 
role in the future. The Committee will be judged on whether its policies can be justified on 
the basis of the underlying principles of the Act, whether they are proportionate to perceived 
risks, are consistent, and transparently made.  It is important that ACART obtains robust, non-
partisan scientific evidence.  In addition, ACART must be well informed on competing moral 
views.  The competing moral views that have been taken into account by ACART should be 
documented alongside policy that is released. 
It is a concern that the New Zealand regulatory framework does not make any provision for 
natural justice or an appeal process. The success of ECART’s deliberations rests on whether 
they are perceived to be conducted fairly and transparently.  Both the Victorian and United 
Kingdom regimes provide appeals processes, and the HFEA now permit applicants to appear 
before them.  It is important that these matters are addressed by ACART and ECART as a 
matter of administrative fairness.
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Models of regulation for PgD  (lexi neame, Poster Presentation, ita, Melbourne, victoria, australia. 2004)
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aPPenDix 2
guiDelines on PreiMPlantation genetic Diagnosis620
section one  
uses of PgD not requiring necaHr approval - now established Procedures
Familial Single Gene Disorders 
1.   PGD for familial single gene disorders may be carried out where: 
 1.1  the disorder has been identified in the family/whänau and 
 1.2 there is a 25% or greater risk of an affected pregnancy and  
 1.3  there is evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired as a result of  
  the disorder. 
Familial Sex-linked Disorders 
2.  Sex determination for familial sex-linked disorders may be carried out where: 
 2.1  the disorder has been identified in the family/whänau and 
 2.2  there is a 25% or greater risk of an affected pregnancy and  
 2.3  no specific test for the particular mutation that causes the disorder is available and 
 2.4  there is evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired as a result of  
  the disorder. 
Familial Chromosomal Disorders 
3.  PGD for familial chromosomal disorders may be carried out where: 
 3.1  the disorder has been identified in the family/whänau and 
 3.2  there is evidence that the future individual may be seriously impaired as a result of  
  the disorder. 
Non-familial Chromosomal Disorders Associated with Advanced Reproductive Age 
4.  PGD for non-familial chromosomal disorders (aneuploidy testing) may be carried out  
 where: 
 4.1  the woman is of an advanced reproductive age. 
Non-familial Chromosomal Disorders Associated with Infertility 
5.  PGD for non-familial chromosomal disorders (aneuploidy testing) may be carried out  
 where: 
 5.1  the woman has had recurrent implantation failure or recurrent miscarriage. 
Determination of a Serious Disorder 
6.  It is the responsibility of PGD providers, in collaboration with a clinical geneticist, to   
 determine whether a disorder is likely to be serious in the offspring. 
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section two 
uses of PgD requiring necaHr approval – now regulated by the advisory committee 
and ethics committee
PGD with Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) Tissue Typing 
7.  HLA tissue typing in conjunction with PGD must be submitted to NECAHR for ethics  
 approval on a case-by-case basis and may only be carried out where: 
 Affected Child 
 7.1  the affected child suffers from a familial single gene disorder or a familial sex-linked  
  disorder and 
 7.2  no other possibilities for treatment or sources of tissue are available and 
 7.3  the planned treatment for the affected child will utilise only the cord blood of the  
   future sibling and 
 Embryo 
 7.4  the embryo will be a sibling of the affected child and 
 7.5  the embryo is at risk of being affected by a familial single gene disorder or a familial  
  sex-linked disorder for which a PGD test is available and 
 Family/Whänau 
 7.6  the health and wellbeing of the family/whänau has been fully considered. 
section tHree - ProHiBiteD uses oF PgD
 8. PGD may not be carried out for the following: 
 8.1 social reasons, including sex selection 
 8.2  to alter the genetic constitution of an embryo 
 8.3  to select embryos with a genetic impairment seen in a parent 
 8.4 any reason other than those specified in sections one and two. 
section Four - inForMation anD counselling 
inForMation 
9.  Providers must ensure that those seeking PGD are given all of the information relevant  
 for informed decision-making, and this must include reference to the following: 
 9.1  the processes and procedures associated with IVF and PGD 
 9.2  the risks associated with the procedures 
 9.3  the background and experience of the clinic and clinicians 
 9.4  the success rate of the procedure, both in general, and at that particular clinic 
 9.5  the alternatives to PGD. 
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10.  Providers must ensure that those seeking PGD are given all of the following    
 information prior to giving consent: 
 10.1  genetic and clinical information about the specific disorder/infertility 
 10.2  the likely impact of the disorder/infertility on those affected and their families/  
  whänau 
 10.3  information about treatment, counselling, and the extent of community and social  
  support available 
 10.4 the availability of prenatal testing following successful implantation 
 10.5  NECAHR’s requirement for providers to supply information for the Committee’s  
  annual report as specified in guideline 17. 
Counselling for People with Familial Disorders 
11.  Providers must ensure that those seeking PGD for familial disorders receive genetic   
 and psychosocial counselling from qualified counsellors who are trained in genetic   
 counselling. 
12. Counselling must be culturally appropriate and include consideration of the following: 
 12.1  the nature of the disorder, its likely impact on the offspring and family/whänau and  
  the availability of treatment 
 12.2  the family/whänau experience of the genetic disorder 
 12.3  the range of alternatives to PGD and subsequent decision-making processes 
 12.4  the possible implications of undertaking PGD. 
Counselling for People with Non-familial Disorders 
13.  Providers must ensure that those seeking PGD for non-familial disorders receive   
 psychosocial counselling from a qualified counsellor. 
14.  Counselling must be culturally appropriate and include consideration of the following  
 issues: 
 14.1  the range of alternatives to PGD and subsequent decision-making processes 
 14.2  the possible implications of undertaking PGD.
section Five - ProceDural requireMents 
Accreditation 
15.  All clinics wishing to provide PGD must be accredited by, and meet any requirements   
 regarding the provision of PGD of, the Reproductive Technology Accreditation   
 Committee of the Fertility Society of Australia. 
NECAHR Approval 
16.  All clinics wishing to provide PGD must apply to NECAHR for approval using the   
 innovative treatment application form. 
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Annual Reporting 
17.  Each clinic that is given approval to perform PGD must submit an annual report to   
 NECAHR, which will include: 
 17.1  the number of PGD procedures carried out for familial disorders, and the genetic  
  condition for each procedure 
 17.2  the number of PGD procedures carried out for non-familial disorders, and the   
  medical indications leading to the use of PGD 
 17.3  the outcomes of each procedure (to be reported in the following year), including  
  results from any subsequent genetic testing 
 17.4  any ethical issues that have arisen during the course of treatment 
 17.5  any issues that have emerged during counselling that could have long-term impact  
  on the offspring and their family/whänau. 
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aPPenDix 3
Main Features oF tHe Hart Bill, assisteD HuMan 
reProDuction Bill, Hart soP, Hart act 2004
HART Bill: (Yates) (Licensing, prevent commercialisation, require record keeping)
• Establishment of a Human Reproductive Technology Authority, that would grant licences 
for treatment fertility services, the storage of embryos, and research
• Prohibited a range of AHR procedures including; cloning, implanting a non human 
embryo in a woman and a human embryo in an animal, germ line genetic modification, 
sex selection, and the use of eggs from human foetuses
• Prohibited payment in connection with human embryos and gametes, surrogacy 
arrangements, and child, body part or foetuses
• Provided a record-keeping scheme relating to AHR treatments, and an information-
keeping scheme for donor offspring
Assisted Human Reproduction Bill
• Expands role of NECAHR, review ART proposals, develop protocols and guidelines for 
providers on ART procedures and techniques, advise the Minister on issues
• Prohibited cloning of humans, fusing of animal and human gametes, implantation 
of animal or human embryos into the opposite species, use of human cells to develop 
procedures or techniques for undertaking any of these activities
HART SOP:
Retains certain features of the HART Bill
• Regulatory framework for assisted reproductive procedures and human reproductive 
research – removed licensing regime for fertility providers
• Principles to guide those operating under the legislation,  with the interests of a child born 
as a result of assisted reproductive procedures being paramount in decisions about the use 
of such procedures
• Allowed for certain procedures to be declared ‘established procedures’
• Established a ministerial advisory group to give advice, develop guidelines for ethics 
committee(s) established under act
• Provides for regulations to be made by on recommendation of Minister 
• Removed prohibition on germ line genetic modification, sex selection, mandatory genetic 
screening, the use of eggs from foetuses, and non-reproductive cloning. Requires MAC to 
give advice to Minister before applications relating to these activities could be considered 
for ethical approval
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• Protection against the commercialisation of surrogacy, embryos and gametes
• Prohibitions relating to particular activities including reproductive cloning, and the 
implantation of an human embryo in an animal or vice versa
• Creates a duty to stop an embryo developing beyond 14 days outside a human body
• A record keeping regime, and provisions for access to information about donors and 
donor offspring
• Regulation of fertility service providers under the HDS(S) Act.
HART Act  (modifications by health committee)
• Additional purpose: bill intended to protect and promote the health, safety, dignity and 
rights of all individuals, particularly women and children, in the use of assisted reproductive 
procedures  and reproductive research
• Additional purpose statement about the intention of the legislation to secure the benefits 
of assisted reproductive procedures and human reproductive research
• Additional principles: ‘human health, safety, and dignity of present and future generations 
should be preserved and promoted’, ‘women, more than men, are directly and significantly 
affected by the application of assisted reproductive procedures and established procedures, 
and the health and well-being of women must be protected in the use of these procedures
• Amended the principle that a child’s health and well-being born as a result of assisted 
human reproduction should be ‘paramount’ to ‘an important consideration’
• Amended functions of advisory committee to include giving advice on whether a 
moratorium should be imposed on any assisted reproductive procedure or human 
reproductive research and whether regulations should be made
• Strengthened requirements to be met before an assisted reproductive procedure can be 
declared an established procedure by requiring that the advisory committee must, before 
providing advice to the minister, furnish information about the procedure or treatment, an 
assessment of known risks and benefits, an assessment of whether that risk is acceptable, 
and an ethical analysis
• Strengthened advisory committee guideline process by requiring the committee to consider 
public submissions before issuing guidelines
• Guidelines to be presented to the House of Representatives (does not require approval of 
the House)
• Strengthened advisory committee duty to consult before providing significant advice to 
minister
• Additional prohibition against the genetic modification of gametes and embryos for 
reproductive purposes
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• Permitted sex selection if the purpose was to prevent or treat a genetic disorder.  Restricted 
any action that would ensure, or increase the probability that an embryo would be of a 
particular sex unless to prevent or treat a genetic disorder
• Removed  proposal in the SOP that additions to the list of prohibited actions be allowed 
to be made by order in council, on recommendation of Minister, commencing only with 
approval of house,  now requires amending legislation (but what about removing from list, 
isn’t that the greatest concern?)
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